The political economy of public debt, reforms, and public investments by Esslinger, Christoph
The Political Economy of Public Debt,
Reforms, and Public Investments
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universität Mannheim
vorgelegt von
Christoph Esslinger
August 2016
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Carsten Trenkler
Referent: Prof. Dr. Eckhard Janeba
Korreferent: Prof. Pierre Boyer, Ph.D.
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 7. Oktober 2016
Meinen Eltern

Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my supervisors Eckhard
Janeba and Pierre Boyer. Both knew the right path even when times turned tricky
and they always put me on track towards great research. I thank them for all their
invaluable comments and discussions that made the present thesis possible. It was a
privilege to learn from such great academic researchers and teachers over the years. I
also truly enjoyed having Pierre Boyer as the coauthor of the second chapter of this
dissertation and see his great motivation in action.
I would like to also greatly thank Cornelius Müller, the coauthor of the fourth
chapter of this dissertation. We both kept each other fascinated in pursuing this
research and Cornelius also became a very good friend outside the academic life.
A big thanks goes also to Hans Peter Grüner. He supported me with very helpful
advice on my work and he often opened up interesting new views on aspects that I
came to appreciate in a whole different way.
I would like to thank our whole public economics group, Andreas Peichl, Anna
Raute, Sebastian Siegloch, and Galina Zudenkova, our chair’s secretary Angelika Abuja,
all further members and research assistants at the chair of Eckhard Janeba, my former
chair colleagues Andreas Bernecker and Hannes Kammerer, and especially my office
mate Océane Briand.
Similarly, I would like to thank all members of team C5 of the special research
area SFB 884, Melissa Berger, Sebastian Blesse, Friedrich Heinemann and Christoph
Schröder. I also thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support.
I thank all my friends and colleagues who accompanied me during my time at the
University of Mannheim. I would really like to list all, but this runs the risk of forgetting
some. Representatively for all my friends, let me thank my oldest companions that even
did their diploma in Mannheim with me: Andreas Dzemski, Timo Hoffmann, Fabienne
Rasel, Henning Roth, Stefan Weiergräber, and of course my flat mate in Mannheim,
Benjamin Lutz, and my best friend from my Toronto time, Ahmed Huzayyin.
My very special thanks go to my parents Ute and Werner. Their great support
made the present thesis possible. They kept me going all the time and always made
me believe in myself. I could count on their support whichever path I might choose,
and this allowed me to follow the path that culminated in this thesis. I would therefore
like to dedicate this thesis to them.
Of course, I would like to say my great thanks to my brother Patrick. Nobody
could ever replace him in giving the support that only a brother can give. He was
also my great example in finding the best balance between work and life. I hope I will
always be able to celebrate achievements with him and his girlfriend Kim looking at
the panorama of the great Alps.
My dearest thanks go to my lovely Hana. Meeting her on a public economics
conference in London was the luckiest moment of my life. She has been my constant
inspiration and motivation. Her love and her belief in me and my research made
this thesis a wonderful experience. I hope I will always be able to give her the same
wonderful support that she has given me and keeps giving me each day of my life.
Contents
1 General Introduction 1
1.1 Public Debt and Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Reforms and Distortionary Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 State Capacity and Public Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Second-period political equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 First-period political equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.1 Private good reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.2 Reform with private and public good benefits . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Constitutional limit on debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6.1 Debt limit and the nature of reform benefits . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6.2 Very restrictive debt limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 The Political Economy of Reforms with Distortionary Public Debt 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Second-period political equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 Low debt-related distortions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Constitutional limit on debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.6 High debt-related distortions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 State Capacity and Public Debt: A Political Economy Analysis 77
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4 The Incentivizing Effect of Public Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.4.1 The Social Planner’s Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4.2 Three Types of States Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.5 Sovereign Default and Increasing Costs of Debt Financing . . . . . . . 100
4.5.1 Adjustments to Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5.2 The Effects of Increasing Costs of Debt Financing . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.3 Cross-Country Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Appendix 121
A Appendix to Chapter 2 121
A.1 Debt limit: equilibrium characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
A.2.1 Proof of Part (I.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1 . . . 124
A.2.2 Proof of Part (II.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1: Ex-
istence of equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
A.2.3 Proof of uniqueness of equilibrium for Part (II.) of Proposition
2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1 and Corollary 2.5.2 . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3 and Corollary 2.5.4 . . . . . . . . . . 145
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6.2 and Corollary A.1.2 . . . . . . . . . . 145
B Appendix to Chapter 3 147
B.1 Equilibrium characterization for special cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
B.2 Equilibrium characterization in general form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
CONTENTS ix
B.3 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B.3.1 Proof of Corollary B.1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
B.3.2 Proof of Corollary B.1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B.3.3 Proof of Corollary B.1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
B.3.4 Proof of Corollary B.1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.3.5 Proof of Proposition B.2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
B.3.6 Proof of Proposition B.2.2: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
B.4 Comparative statics: alternative parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
C Appendix to Chapter 4 197
C.1 Comparative Statics for Default Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
C.2 Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C.3 Cross-country Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
C.3.1 Scatter plots including highly cohesive countries . . . . . . . . . 207
C.3.2 Variable descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Bibliography 211
Eidesstattliche Erklärung 219
Lebenslauf 221

Chapter 1
General Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that one important driving force behind an economy’s
performance are decisions taken by governments today that have costs in the short-
run but carry positive implications in the future. For instance, Besley and Persson
(2011) show that in order to explain why some states have well-functioning systems of
tax administration or legal protection, which are conducive to a better performance of
the economy, we need to understand the incentives behind investing into these forms
of state capacity, where the initial investments are costly. More generally, we can
think of many reforms implemented by governments that have costs today but will
yield benefits in the future. One example could be a reform improving the efficiency
of a country’s educational system. Often the positive long-run effects outweigh the
short-run costs, making the implementation of such reforms the optimal decision from
an efficiency viewpoint.
Such reforms or investments are usually implemented by elected politicians that fol-
low their own agendas. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the reform and investment
decisions in a setup of political economy. This setup takes the motives of politicians
explicitly into account when explaining why certain investments or reforms will or will
not be implemented.
Besides reforms and public investments, another important dynamic decision of
governments is the decision to raise public debt. With the recent European debt crisis,
the decision on public debt has regained the interest not only of media but also of the
academic debate. We have seen a revival of the political economic literature on public
1
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debt, which tries to explain the apparent tendency of the political process to raise high
public debt.
However, what has been neglected in the political economy literature until now is
the interaction between the reform/investment decision and the decision to raise public
debt. Since the political process usually decides on both issues simultaneously, there
might be important trade-offs arising between them. To investigate the interactions
between reforms/public investments and public debt in a political economic setup is
the general topic of the present dissertation.
The dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters, each one constituting a
theoretical analysis of specific aspects of this general topic. Chapter 2, which is joint
work with Pierre Boyer, investigates the interaction between public debt and growth-
enhancing reforms when politicians compete for votes in an electoral campaign. The
political candidates decide both on reform implementation and public debt while at
the same time trying to target electoral favors to a majority of voters. We find that
the growth-enhancing reform will always be implemented in the political process when
enough public debt can be raised. In contrast, restrictions on the use of public debt
inhibit the success of such efficient reforms in electoral campaigns. Importantly, in this
chapter, high public debt does not create any costs on the economy itself but is mainly
a way of shifting resources across time.
In Chapter 3, I introduce debt-related distortions into the setup of electoral com-
petition and find that the incentivizing effect of public debt on the implementation of
growth-enhancing reforms has to be weighed against the costs implied by high public
debt. Such costs can for instance arise from the consequences of sovereign debt default,
which occurs more likely at higher debt levels.
While such default is not modeled explicitly in chapter 3, chapter 4 contains an
explicit modeling of sovereign default. This final chapter, which is joint work with
Cornelius Müller, investigates the interaction between public debt and investments in
capacities of a state to raise taxes and to enforce the law. It does not model electoral
competition, but rather considers the incentives of rival political groups alternating in
power and their incentives to invest into state capacities during their term in office.
Also in this setup, we find an incentivizing effect of public debt on these investments,
which is however weakened the higher are default-related costs of using public debt.
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Appendices to all chapters are collected in a joint appendix and the bibliography
at the end jointly lists all chapters’ references.
1.1 Public Debt and the Political Economy of Re-
forms
As already pointed out, many reform decisions by governments have costs in the short
run but imply higher long-run gains, making the implementation of these reforms the
efficient choice. However, whether such reforms are really implemented, depends on the
incentives of the politicians that have to propose them. In the second chapter of this
dissertation, we look at the incentives of political candidates competing for election by
targeting electoral favors to subsets of voters at the expense of others. Reforms that
affect the allocation of resources across time will have an impact on the capacity to
target favors to voters. Therefore, the decision to propose these reforms is influenced
by the electoral incentives of political candidates. Similarly, the decision to raise public
debt also has an impact on the inter-temporal allocation of resources and the capacity
to target them to voters. We should hence expect interactions between the decisions
for reform and public debt in such a setup of electoral competition.
We develop a two-period model of voter targeting building on Lizzeri (1999). The
same two politicians compete for election in each period. They do so by redistributing
available resources across voters in order to convince the beneficiaries of this process to
vote for them. This tactical voter targeting does not have any efficiency implications.
In contrast, the decision to implement a reform, which exists in the first period, costs
resources today but will yield higher benefits in the next period. The decision to reform
therefore has the positive efficiency implication described above. The second dynamic
decision, which also exists in the first period, is the decision how much public debt to
raise. In contrast to the third chapter, this choice on public debt does not have any
efficiency implications in this chapter.
We show that the ability to raise public debt to target current voters can help
sustain the efficient reform in political competition. Without public debt, politicians
compete only on how to target first-period resources to voters. This implies a disadvan-
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tage for a reforming candidate, who loses targetable resources through the first-period
reform costs. In contrast, the use of public debt allows politicians to also compete
on targeting the pie of future resources. This gives a competitive edge to a reformer,
since her advantage lies in the future. We show that putting a less restrictive limit
on public debt will increase the probability of reform. The impact is especially high
for growth-enhancing reforms that create more targetable resources in the future. In
that case, if no exogenous limit restricts public debt, the efficient reform will always be
implemented. If the reform mainly creates non-targetable public good benefits, public
debt cannot ensure the implementation of the reform anymore. However, a higher
ability to raise public debt still decreases the relative importance of the reform costs
and still increases the probability of reform.
Our results highlight a new view on the trade-off between targeted pork-barrel
spending and efficient spending. As long as the efficient policy creates benefits only
in the next electoral cycle, allowing enough debt-related targeted spending might be
necessary in electoral competition to incentivize spending on the efficient policy.
1.2 The Political Economy of Reforms with Distor-
tionary Public Debt
The third chapter takes this result from chapter 2 as a starting point. As just described,
we find that efficient policies, like growth-enhancing reforms, with costs today and ben-
efits in the next electoral cycle might necessitate the simultaneous use of public debt in
order to get them through electoral campaigns. In the analysis of chapter 2, public debt
does not have any direct efficiency implications itself. That is, the use of high public
debt does not impose any costs on the economy. As the recent European debt crisis
made clear, excessive public debt can, however, have significant negative consequences.
These negative consequences include, for instance, costs related to sovereign default,
which gets more likely with high public debt. A related detrimental consequence of
high public debt is less possibilities to smooth out tax-related distortions across time
when the further increase of public debt gets very costly at high debt levels.
In terms of thinking about efficient policies, if a high level of public debt implies
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a high degree of such debt-related distortions, then investing into low public debt can
be seen itself as an efficient dynamic policy with costs in the current electoral cycle
and benefits in future electoral cycles. It is the only such policy which by its nature
cannot be incentivized by the use of more public debt. In the third chapter, I therefore
investigate the trade-off between the decision to implement a growth-enhancing reform
and the decision to raise public debt when high public debt does impose costs on
the economy. I investigate this trade-off in the two-period setup of voter targeting
employed in the second chapter. However, in the third chapter, the focus is solely on
growth-enhancing reforms that create potentially redistributable benefits.
The main insights from my analysis are the following. If the distortionary cost of
raising high public debt is very high, then the political process eliminates high public
debt on its own. In particular, if high-debt policies create a high efficiency loss, then
even the majority of voters that is advantaged in the process of targeted redistribution
is better off with a low-debt policy. In this case, the incentivizing effect of public debt
on the pie-increasing reform, which is highlighted in the second chapter, is not present
and hence the reform will not be implemented with certainty.
On the other hand, if the distortionary cost of raising high public debt is low enough
compared to the net benefit of the reform, then the political process creates a bias for
high public debt. Specifically, a politician that uses high public debt for targeting
current voters can gain an advantage over her opponent as long as that politician can
still compensate a majority of voters for the implied efficiency loss of public debt. In
this case, we confirm the result from the second chapter that the growth-enhancing
reform will always be implemented in electoral competition if no exogenous restrictions
are placed on public debt. In particular, with some probability high public debt is
raised and we do have an efficiency loss due to debt-related distortions, but this ensures
efficiency on the side of implementing the pie-increasing reform. This trade-off persists
once we introduce an exogenous debt limit into the analysis. Such a debt limit reduces
the distortionary costs of public debt. However, at the same time, not implementing
the reform gets more attractive since public debt cannot unfold its incentivizing effect
on reforms as well. Hence, when setting a debt limit, more efficiency on the side of
public debt has to be weighed against lower efficiency in terms of implementing the
pie-increasing reform.
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1.3 State Capacity and Public Debt: A Political
Economy Analysis
The last chapter, which is joint work with Cornelius Müller, turns away from general
growth-enhancing reforms and towards investments of governments into specific capac-
ities of a state: the capacity to raise taxes and the capacity to provide a functioning
legal environment. The combination of high public debt and low capacities of the state
to raise taxes and to enforce the law can upset even developed economies. In light of
this, it is important to understand the mechanisms underlying the combined evolution
of state capacity and public debt.
In contrast to chapters 2 and 3, we turn to a different political economic setup in or-
der to study the interaction of state capacity investments and public debt. Specifically,
we build on the recent literature on state capacity, which was pioneered by Besley and
Persson (2009). We integrate a baseline model of state capacity investment building
on Besley and Persson (2010, 2011) with the strategic use of public debt, fluctuat-
ing incomes, and the possibility of default. In a two-period framework, an incumbent
government cannot be sure to remain in power in the future. It wants to benefit its
own clientele, and decides about investments in the future capacities of the state to
raise taxes and to enforce the law. Besides investing, the incumbent government can
spend on a common-interest public good or channel money towards its own clientele.
The “cohesiveness” of institutions determines to what degree these clientele politics
are possible. Specifically, low cohesiveness means it is very easy to do clientele politics.
We also introduce the possibility of default on public debt, which gives us a tractable
way to study the effects of increasing costs of debt financing.
We derive two main sets of results. First, in a model without default, we show
that the possibility to raise debt can create an additional incentive to invest in state
capacity. In particular, we find that politicians’ incentives to execute investments
while in power interact with public debt in a similar way to incentives of electoral
candidates to propose reforms, as analyzed in chapters 2 and 3. Specifically, public
debt allows to draw future tax resources to the present. In the setup of this chapter,
this circumvents the problem of a use of future public funds that is not in line with
the current incumbent’s objective. In particular, high political instability and low
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cohesiveness make the first-period incumbent afraid of giving additional state capacity
to the future government. By high political instability, this government is likely to
be from the opposed political group, and by low cohesiveness, it can use the higher
taxing power to heavily extract money from the period-1 incumbent group. Without
debt, the only possibility to protect against such an adverse use of future public funds
is to decrease investments in state capacity. However, if debt can be used to bring
future public funds at the disposal of the first-period incumbent, then this incumbent
can decide about their use. With the simultaneous use of public debt, the incumbent
therefore has higher incentives to invest in state capacity.
Our second set of results shows how the debt mechanism can be weakened, thereby
allowing the original low-investment mechanism to partly resurface. Specifically, with
fluctuating incomes, the cost of raising additional debt depends on the possibility of
default. When debt is raised to the point where default becomes possible, it becomes
increasingly expensive to use the debt channel to draw future public funds to the
present. To the extent that it is very costly to draw newly created future public funds
to the present, the low-investment mechanism resurfaces. Specifically, it resurfaces the
stronger, the higher are the income fluctuations. Besley and Persson (2011) identified
so-called development clusters with weak states combining all the negative outcomes
in terms of low investments in state capacity, low income and higher internal violence.
We show that, under high income fluctuations, this notion of of a negative cluster can
be extended to include high public debt and a high risk of default, because public debt
then might not be able to overcome the low investment incentives that define these
weak states.

Chapter 2
Public Debt and the Political
Economy of Reforms1
2.1 Introduction
What determines whether efficient reforms are implemented in the political process?
This question has dominated the academic and policy spheres over the last decades.2
A key to explaining the political decision to reform is to understand under which cir-
cumstances electoral incentives can stand in the way of reforms. Electoral competition
occurs to a considerable degree through targeting electoral favors to subsets of voters
in order to gain their support. Since many reforms imply a shift of resources across
time, the decision to reform should be influenced by this incentive to target resources
to voters. The second important decision that determines the allocation of resources
1This chapter has been co-authored with Pierre Boyer. We thank Enriqueta Aragonès, Raicho Bo-
jilov, Jean-Marc Bourgeon, Micael Castanheira, Davide Cantoni, Antonio Ciccone, Gregory Corcos,
Eduardo Davila, Philipp Denter, Philippe De Donder, Matthias Doepke, Allan Drazen, Clemens Fuest,
Vincenzo Galasso, Catarina Goulão, Renato Gomez, Olivier Gossner, Hans Peter Grüner, Matthias
Hertweck, Roland Hodler, Guillaume Hollard, Eckhard Janeba, Paul Klein, Yukio Koriyama, Michel
Le Breton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Ralf Meisenzahl, Jean-Baptiste Michau, Massimo Morelli, Salvatore
Nunnari, Andreas Peichl, Eugenio Peluso, Eduardo Perez, Facundo Piguillem, Mattias Polborn, Jean-
Pierre Ponssard, Niklas Potrafke, Anna Raute, Alessandro Riboni, Maik Schneider, Klaus Schmidt,
Guido Tabellini, Michèle Tertilt, Karine Van Der Straeten, Ngo Van Long, and Galina Zudenkova for
very helpful comments, as well as seminar and conference participants at Bocconi University, Munich
University, University Carlos III Madrid, Toulouse School of Economics, Mannheim University, École
Polytechnique, the 2015 Workshop “Political Economy: Theory meets Empirics” in Konstanz, LAGV
2015 in Aix-en-Provence, PET 2015 in Luxembourg, CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Eco-
nomics 2016, and the Verein für Socialpolitik in Münster. The first author gratefully acknowledges the
Investissements d’Avenir (ANR-11-IDEX-0003/Labex Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047) for financial sup-
port. The second author gratefully acknowledges the Collaborative Research Center 884 for financial
support. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See for instance Williamson (1994), Tommasi and Velasco (1996), Rodrik (1996), Persson and
Tabellini (2000), and Drazen (2000).
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across time is the decision to raise public debt. Therefore, in order to understand
incentives for reform, it is important to investigate how the decisions to reform and to
raise public debt interact with political competition.
We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics that builds on Lizzeri
(1999). Two politicians compete for election in each period. They do so by targeting
available resources to subsets of voters at the expense of others. This tactical redistri-
bution does not imply any efficiency gain. In the first period, politicians also choose
the level of public debt and whether to implement a reform. The reform is efficient
in the sense that it costs resources in the first period but yields higher benefits in the
second period. The introduction of the reform decision besides the decision to raise
debt is our main contribution.
A main insight from our analysis is that the electoral incentives to implement the
efficient reform depend on the interaction between the reform decision and the decision
to raise public debt. We show that the ability to raise public debt to target current
voters can help sustain the efficient reform in political competition. The argument is
the following: resources left in the future cannot be targeted to specific voters due to
endogenously arising electoral uncertainty between the two periods. Without public
debt, politicians compete only on how to target first-period resources to voters. This
implies a disadvantage for a reforming candidate, who loses a potentially big proportion
of these targetable resources through the first-period reform cost. In contrast, the use
of public debt allows politicians to also compete on targeting future resources. This
gives a competitive edge to a reforming candidate, since her advantage lies in the
future, where the reform benefits occur. Indeed, our results show that the reform will
always be implemented in political equilibrium when the use of public debt allows a
reformer to make up for her loss in targeting capacity in the first period. On the
other hand, the efficient reform will not be implemented for sure if the reform mainly
creates non-targetable public good benefits or if the use of public debt is too heavily
restricted. Both aspects hinder a reformer to compensate for her first-period targeting
disadvantage. However, even if the reform corresponds to investing in a pure public
good, we show that putting a more restrictive limit on public debt will still decrease the
probability of reform. The driving force behind this result is the following: restricting
public debt means reducing the amount of targetable resources on which electoral
2.1. INTRODUCTION 11
competition occurs. A given amount of reform costs therefore creates a relatively
bigger disadvantage in terms of targeting capacity.
These results highlight a new view on the tradeoff between targeted pork-barrel
spending, which does not increase aggregate welfare, and efficient policies like spend-
ing on a reform. As long as the efficient policy creates benefits only in the next electoral
cycle, allowing enough debt-related targeted spending might be necessary to incentivize
spending on the efficient policy.
In the following, we describe in more detail the setup we use to derive our results.
To focus on the effects of electoral competition in its purest form, we consider an
environment without any pre-imposed heterogeneity. There are two periods and the
same two politicians run for election in each period. These politicians are purely
office-motivated and voters are ex-ante homogenous with each voter having a resource
endowment of one in each period. Politicians compete for voters by redistributing
the available resources across voters. They are not restricted in the tools available
for redistribution of resources within a given period. In the first period, politicians
additionally decide on the level of public debt and on the implementation of a reform
that costs some resources today and will yield benefits in the next period. All voters
and politicians know the reform benefits and costs. The reform is efficient in the sense
that the benefits surmount the costs. On the other hand, targeting resources to voters
is a purely tactical instrument and does not create a net gain like the reform.
In our analysis the reform benefits can take the form of an increase in the endow-
ment of the economy and/or they can have a public good nature. By way of illustration,
starting from a situation with deficient enforcement of property and civil rights, con-
sider a reform of the legal system that ensures efficient and universal enforcement of
these rights. This is what is usually termed establishing the rule of law.3 By decreas-
ing uncertainty for investors, such a reform will lead to an increase in the economy’s
GDP,4 which in our case corresponds to an increase in the endowment of the economy.
Besides that there will be a general increase in well-being beyond the increase in the
endowment. For instance, everybody will feel more safe in such a functioning legal
3See, for instance, La Porta et al. (2008), Besley and Persson (2011), and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012).
4Rodrik et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2007) provide empirical support for this claim.
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environment. This second kind of benefit has the properties of a public good in the
sense that it is non-rival and non-excludable.5 When the benefits result in an increase
in the endowment, which can be taxed, the benefits can potentially be redistributed to
specific voters. In the case where the benefits have a public good nature, a reforming
politician cannot shuﬄe the benefits that voters derive from the reform. In line with
the political economy literature, we therefore assume that benefits that have a private
good nature can be targeted to individual voters whereas targeting is precluded for the
public good part of the reform.
We prove two main sets of results. In the first part, we focus on how the nature of
the reform impacts on the interaction between the reform and debt decisions. There-
fore, we impose no restrictions on debt except for the natural debt limit. Implementing
the reform increases the natural debt limit by the induced increase in the second-period
endowment.
We show that, if the proportion of reform benefits that increases the endowment is
high enough, then both politicians will choose to implement the reform with probabil-
ity one. The intuition behind this result is the following: due to endogenously arising
electoral uncertainty, resources in the second period cannot be targeted to specific vot-
ers. This gives both candidates the incentive to transfer as many resources as possible
to the first period by debt in order to target them to specific voters. Since debt repay-
ment capacity increases by the reform-induced increase in the endowment, a reformer
can raise higher debt than a non-reformer. This allows a reformer to compensate for
the disadvantage of losing targetable resources through the reform costs.
In contrast, when the reform benefits are mainly of a public good nature and don’t
increase the endowment much, the result is overturned. In that case, a reformer cannot
raise much more debt than a non-reformer. If the major part of the reform benefits
has the character of a public good, then this part is non-targetable by nature and also
cannot be made targetable through the use of public debt. Therefore, by saving on
the costs of the reform, a non-reforming candidate has more targetable resources and
she can use this advantage to compensate at least a majority of voters for missing out
on the net gain that the reform creates. Due to this efficiency gain, the reform will
5Excluding some people from access to the legal system would mean a failure to establish the rule
of law.
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still be implemented with positive probability, but it will no longer be implemented
with certainty. For reforms that create mainly public good benefits, we therefore get
a failure of the political process to implement the efficient policy.
Our second set of results focuses on the availability of the debt channel. Constitu-
tional limits on deficit and debt are a popular response to the recent debt crisis and
are present in many jurisdictions: most U.S. states have a balanced-budget rule, the
Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union limits gross government debt to
sixty percent of the country’s GDP. We first look at a reform that mainly creates ben-
efits corresponding to an increase in the endowment. Such benefits can potentially be
targeted to first-period voters through the use of public debt. We show that an exoge-
nous restriction on public debt that prevents a reformer from raising more debt than
the non-reforming candidate gives these potentially targetable benefits the character
of non-targetable public good benefits. From the point of view of first-period voters,
future reform benefits that cannot be transferred to the present have the character of
providing a public good that promises higher utility for everyone, but whose benefits
cannot be targeted to specific voters. Above, this public good character was given
through the nature of the reform. Now, it is artificially created through the debt limit.
We show that if the debt limit becomes too stringent, the efficient reform is no longer
implemented with probability one.
However, even if the reform only creates non-targetable public good benefits, we
show that putting a more restrictive exogenous limit on public debt will still decrease
the probability of reform. The probability is lowest if public debt is not allowed at
all. If there is no public debt, this means restricting electoral competition of targeting
favors to the subset of only the present resources. A given disadvantage of having to
finance the first-period reform costs is then relatively bigger. In other words, allowing
public debt gives politicians the opportunity to also compete on targeting the pie of
future resources. Such targeting does not create any efficiency gain itself. However, by
putting a reformer in a relatively better position, it incentivizes spending on efficient
policies whose benefits only occur in the next electoral cycle. This gives us a new
view on the effects of targeted spending, which until now has mainly been shown to
disincentive efficient spending on public goods in the same electoral cycle.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 2.3 describes the formal framework. Section 2.4 solves for the
political equilibrium in the last period of the game. Our main results are presented in
Section 2.5, where we solve for the equilibrium in the first period, and in Section 2.6,
where we study the implications of debt limits. The last section contains concluding
remarks. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
2.2 Related literature
Our work builds on the game-theoretic literature on the “divide-the-dollar”-game. Fol-
lowing Myerson (1993), this literature features models of political competition in which
a policy proposal specifies how a cake of a given size should be distributed among vot-
ers.6 Our model differs from these models in that policy proposals affect the size of
the cake that is available for redistribution.7
Lizzeri and Persico (2001) extend the framework of Myerson (1993) by characteriz-
ing political equilibria under the assumption that politicians face a choice between an
efficient public good and pork-barrel redistribution.8 In their static framework, they
show that targeted pork-barrel spending stands against the efficient policy of providing
a public good that creates a net gain in utility.9 In contrast, we consider an efficient
policy that is of a dynamic nature in the sense that its benefits only occur in the next
electoral cycle. For such policies, we show that allowing more debt-related targeted
spending can actually increase the probability of implementing the efficient policy.
The first extension of Myerson (1993)’s setup to a dynamic model was done by
Lizzeri (1999). Lizzeri (1999) shows that in a two-period model of “divide-the-dollar”
electoral competition, candidates will always raise the maximal debt, because it allows
them to better target the pool of resources to voters. Our analysis builds on Lizzeri
6Contributions to this literature include Laslier and Picard (2002), Roberson (2006), Sahuguet
and Persico (2006), Carbonell-Nicolau and Ok (2007), Kovenock and Roberson (2008), Kovenock and
Roberson (2009), Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009). See Kovenock and Roberson (2012) for a review.
7Some related papers that endogenize the size of the redistributive pie are Ueda (1998), Bierbrauer
and Boyer (2016), and Boyer and Konrad (2014), however these papers are static and do not study
the interaction between debt and reforms.
8See also Lizzeri and Persico (2004) and Lizzeri and Persico (2005).
9Roberson (2008) adds the possibility to provide different public goods to different districts.
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(1999) by studying the interaction between debt and reform in such a redistributive
politics setup. This setup allows to distill the pure effect of electoral competition on
policy outcomes, because it does not impose any exogenous heterogeneity on politicians
or voters. Furthermore, it derives political turnover endogenously as the outcome of
the electoral game. In contrast, the literature on strategic debt has derived the ten-
dency of the political process to accumulate debt from partisan preferences combined
with the exogenously imposed threat that a currently ruling government is replaced
in the future. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) show that a currently ruling party that
has different spending objectives than a potential future incumbent uses debt to tie its
successor’s hands.10 Recently there has been a revival of the literature on the political
economy of public debt.11 Battaglini and Coate (2008) introduce Barro (1979)’s tax
smoothing setup of public debt into an infinite horizon model of legislative bargaining.
Similar to Alesina and Tabellini (1990) they show that, when an electoral district is
not sure to remain in the governing coalition, the incentive of politicians to spend pork
on their own district leads to the use of public debt even when this means accepting
higher tax distortions in the future.12 In that sense, investing into low public debt is
an efficient dynamic policy whose benefits only occur in the future. By its very nature,
it is the only such policy that cannot be incentivized by a higher use of public debt.
We add an important aspect to this literature by establishing this incentivizing effect
of public debt for all other efficient dynamic policies that have costs today and benefits
in the future.
We also complement the existing literature on political economy of reforms. In
this paper, we shut down the channels that the previous literature has identified as
impediments to reform.13 Our objective is to show how efficient reforms and public
10Other early papers in this line of research are Persson and Svensson (1989), Aghion and Bolton
(1990) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990). See Martimort (2001) for an extension of these models to
an optimal income taxation setup à la Mirrlees (1971).
11See Alesina and Passalacqua (forthcoming) and Battaglini (2011) for recent reviews of this liter-
ature.
12See Battaglini and Barseghyan (forhcoming) for a recent application of the legislative bargaining
model investigating public debt in a growth setup. Further papers with different setups are Yared
(2010), Drazen and Ilzetzki (2011), Song et al. (2012), Maskin and Tirole (2014), and Azzimonti et
al. (2014).
13In contrast to Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), our analysis
does not link the benefits and costs of reform to specific voters. Consequently, we also do not con-
sider problems of asymmetric information in compensating losers of the reform as in Grüner (2002).
Furthermore, we have no uncertainty regarding appropriate timing of the reform as in Laban and
Sturzenegger (1994b,a) and Mondino et al. (1996). Reforms do not fail because of insufficient tech-
nical knowledge by decision makers as in Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2015).
We also exclude powerful vested interest that could block reform as in Olson (1982), Benhabib and
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debt interact in a setup of electoral competition, absent all the previously identified
channels. The only previous papers that have looked at public debt in combination
with reforms do not model electoral competition. Specifically, Beetsma and Debrun
(2004, 2007) rely on the assumption of an exogenous probability of change in political
power. In contrast to us, they do not consider a feedback of the decisions on debt and
reform on the electoral outcome. As we show in our model, these forces of political
competition are crucial to understanding the interaction between debt and reforms.14
2.3 The model
Our setup builds on Lizzeri (1999), who introduces debt in a model of redistributive
politics but does not consider the decision to perform an efficient reform.
The electorate. There are two periods and a continuum of voters of measure one.15
All voters are ex-ante homogenous. They are risk-neutral, live for the two periods,
and have a discount factor equal to 1. There are two goods, money and a public good.
Voters have linear utility over goods with the marginal utility of money normalized to
one.16 All voters in each period have one unit of money which is perfectly divisible.
Political process. In each period, there is an election where voters choose between
two candidates. The set of candidates is the same for both dates. One candidate is
denoted by A, the other by B. Each candidate i ∈ {A,B} is purely office-motivated
and maximizes vote-shares.
Rustichini (1996) and Gehlbach and Malesky (2010). There is no conflict between different groups
about who will bear the costs of reform as in Alesina and Drazen (1991), Drazen and Grilli (1993) and
Hsieh (2000). Finally, the success of the reform does not depend on the competence of politicians as
in Prato and Wolton (2014). Inefficiencies of the political process to pursue efficient investment have
been investigated in several setups, see, e.g., Besley and Coate (1998), Battaglini and Coate (2007),
Azzimonti et al. (2009), Battaglini et al. (2012), and Azzimonti (2015).
14Ribeiro and Beetsma (2008) take a first step towards endogenizing political turnover. However,
they still need to add a final period with exogenous probability of change in power. Furthermore, one
politician is forced to run a reform platform and she cannot decide not to reform, while her opponent
is exogenously set to run a no-reform platform. Again, this precludes to see the workings of the forces
of political competition that we establish in this paper.
15This is a convenient assumption that is meant to be an approximation for a game with a large
(but finite) number of voters.
16Our results extend if we introduce some curvature in the utility function on public good con-
sumption.
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Policies. In the first period, a strategy pi1 has three elements: the decision to enact
a reform, a level of public debt, and promises of taxes and transfers to each individual
voter.
1. Reform. The possibility to enact a reform is present only in the first period.
The cost of this reform is incurred in the first period and the benefit occurs in the
second period. Denote by c the per capita cost and by e the per capita benefit from
the reform. We assume that
e− c > 0, (2.1)
c < 1. (2.2)
Assumption (2.1) states that the reform is beneficial and therefore should always be
implemented from an efficiency perspective. Assumption (2.2) ensures that there is
enough first-period endowment to finance the reform.
We allow the reform to generate benefits that have pure public good and/or private
good characters. Formally, a fraction λ ∈ [0, 1] of the reform benefits has a private
good character. The remaining part of the benefits has a pure public good character,
i.e. it is non-rival and non-excludable. The public good nature of a policy makes it
impossible for politicians to affect the distribution of the utility gains derived by the
voters. This is often referred to as the non-targetable part of the policy in the political
economy literature. In contrast, the targetable aspect of the reform associated with
its private goods aspect can be redistributed between voters in the political process.
Hence, for λ = 0, we have the case of a pure public good and e denotes the utility that
each and every voter derives from the reform. For λ = 1 on the other hand, we have
the case of a pie-increasing reform in the sense that e corresponds to the increase in
the per-capita endowment of the economy for the second period. Since the proportion
of benefits with private good character can be potentially targeted to voters, we refer
to λ also as the targetability of reform benefits.
We also introduce the possibility that the reform is not offered by politicians for
sure and denote by βi the probability with which candidate i proposes the reform.
2. Debt. Government debt is financed by borrowing from abroad and there is no
possibility of default. The size of the deficit in the first period is interpreted as the
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fraction of the average voter’s second-period resources that is pledged to the repayment
of the debt.17
The natural limit on debt corresponds to the total resources that can be mobilized
to repay debt. Formally, the debt level δ belongs to [−1, 1] if the reform is not imple-
mented. The lower bound represents the case where the maximal budget surplus of 1
is run and transferred from the first to the second period. The upper bound represents
the case where the total amount of resources available in the second period is trans-
ferred to the first period by debt. It corresponds to the natural debt limit in case of
no-reform. Implementing the reform increases the natural debt limit by the induced
increase in the second-period endowment. This increase corresponds to the proportion
of reform benefits that has a private good character, i.e. λe. Hence, when the reform
is undertaken, the maximal amount of resources that can be transferred to the present
increases by λe. The debt level δ then belongs to [−1 + c, 1 + λe].
Later on in the analysis, we also introduce the possibility that the amount of debt
that can be incurred is exogenously restricted. We interpret such a restriction as a
constitutional limit on debt, which we denote by δ¯.
In total, we denote by δiR ∈ [−1 + c,min{δ¯, 1 + e}] (resp. δiN ∈ [−1,min{δ¯, 1}]) the
debt level proposed by candidate i when the reform is (resp. is not) implemented by
this candidate.
3. Redistribution. We formalize the transfer offers that candidates make to voters
with offer distributions from which the actual transfer promises to voters are drawn.
A negative transfer corresponds to taxing a voter and the lowest possible transfer
offer of −1 corresponds to taxing away the full endowment of a voter. We denote the
cumulative distribution functions from which the transfer offers are drawn as F i(·), i ∈
{A,B}. Specifically, we follow Myerson (1993) and assume that the favors offered to
different voters are iid random variables with probability distribution F . We appeal
to the law of large numbers for large economies and interpret F (x) not only as the
probability that any one individual receive an offer weakly smaller than x, but also as
the population share of voters who receive such an offer. Therefore, F describes the
redistributive pattern resulting under the corresponding transfer scheme.
17We also allow for the possibility that the government runs a surplus which will, however, never
occur in equilibrium.
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Finally, we denote by F i1,R and F i1,N the first-period cumulative distribution func-
tions proposed by candidate i for the case where the reform is or is not implemented
by this candidate, respectively.
In total, a first-period strategy pi1 of candidate i is then given by {βi, δiR, δiN , F i1,R, F i1,N},
where βi was the probability with which candidate i proposes the reform.
A second-period strategy pi2 of candidate i consists only of the choice of the second-
period cumulative distribution function F i2. Denote by δ∗ the debt level realized after
the first period.
Feasible policies. Strategies are feasible if they satisfy the following budget con-
straints.
First-period budget constraint:
if the reform is not undertaken,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,N(x) = δiN ; (2.3)
if the reform is undertaken,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,R(x) = δiR − c; (2.4)
Second-period budget constraint:
if the reform is not undertaken,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i2(x) = −δ∗; (2.5)
if the reform is undertaken,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i2(x) = λe− δ∗. (2.6)
Thus in the first period, the additional resources that can on average be given to
each voter are the resources transferred from the future by debt, δi, minus the costs c
that have to be paid in case of reform. In the second period, the debt δ∗ of the winner
of the first-period election has to be repaid. However, in case of reform, the amount
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of resources that can be redistributed across voters increases by the amount of reform
benefits with private good character, λe.18 Note that in the second period, in addition
to the transfer offers, which are represented in the budget constraints above, each voter
will receive the public good utility (1− λ)e.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 1:
Stage 1 Each candidate i = {A,B} plays a strategy pi1 in order to win the election.
Stage 2 Each voter observes her draw (xA1 , xB1 ) from each candidate’s distribution plan,
the reform proposals, the proposals for debt, and then votes.19 When voters are
indifferent between the two candidates, they flip a coin to decide who to vote for.
At period 2 everybody observes the first-period debt level that has to be repaid and
whether the reform was undertaken so that the strategies are conditioned on the first-
period outcome; there are two stages:
Period 2:
Stage 1 Candidates choose distribution plans F i2(·), i = A,B.
Stage 2 Each voter observes her draw (xA2 , xB2 ) from each candidate’s distribution plan
and then votes.
18Note that since the budget constraints are formulated in terms of transfers, we look at changes
in the existing endowment of people. That is a transfer of -1 means that the person loses its full en-
dowment. We treat the targetable reform benefits λe not as an additional per-capita endowment, but
as a general increase in resources available for transfers (similar to the resources that are additionally
available in the first period if debt is raised). This is why the lower bound of the last integral is
−1: the whole per capita endowment of 1 is taken away and nothing from the additional pie is given
to the worst-off individual. We could also work with λe occurring as an additional person-specific
endowment, in which case this lower bound would become −(1 + λe) and λe would disappear from
the right hand side of the last budget constraint.
19Note that at stage 1, candidates potentially play a mixed strategy against each other in terms
of implementing the reform. However, at the stage when voters decide, each candidate is committed
to either reform or no-reform. This approach is taken because, in terms of finding the equilibrium of
the electoral game, we want to allow politicians to use mixed strategies in case there is no equilibrium
in pure strategies. On the other hand, in terms of the voter decision, we do not want to introduce
limited-commitment issues on the side of politicians.
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Vote-shares. We denote by Sit(pit, p
j
t) the share of the votes of candidate i in period
t ∈ {1, 2} if she chooses to play strategy pit and the other candidate j chooses to play
strategy pjt . Then, Sjt (pjt , pit) = 1− Sit(pit, pjt).
The solution concept used is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Second-period political equilibrium
We start by presenting the second-period equilibrium offer distributions.
Every voter has access to the public good part of the reform and thus receives at
least a utility of (1 − λ)e. All that candidates can compete over is redistributing all
available targetable resources. The amount of targetable resources is increased by the
reform benefits with private good character in the case that the reform was imple-
mented in the first period, and it is decreased by any debt that has to be repaid. We
define by µ2 the resources available in the second period for making transfer offers.
Specifically, µ2 corresponds to the right-hand side of the second-period budget con-
straints (2.5) or (2.6). When debt is raised, µ2 can take a negative value, which means
that resources that would otherwise be available for transfers have to be taken away
from the voters. The lowest value of µ2 occurs when the debt raised is so high that
all future resources are necessary for debt repayment. In that case, µ2 takes a value
of −1. The maximal amount of targetable resources in the second period is reached if
the elected first-period politician ran a full surplus and has implemented the reform.
Formally, µ2 ∈ [−1, 1 +λe− c]. The following proposition derives the equilibrium offer
distributions for any given µ2.
Proposition 2.4.1 In the unique second-period equilibrium, both candidates generate
offers to all voters from a uniform distribution on [−1, 1 + 2µ2].
The proof of Proposition 2.4.1 is similar to the one of Theorem 1 in Lizzeri (1999).20
We provide a sketch of the arguments. The resources that are available in the second
period for transfers are µ2 = −δ∗ when no reform is undertaken and µ2 = λe − δ∗
when the reform is undertaken. Therefore, in the second period, we are back to a
20Myerson (1993) shows a uniqueness proof in the class of symmetric equilibria.
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static version of the divide-the-dollar game where the average resources available for
making transfer offers are given by µ2. We show that both candidates playing an offer
distribution that is uniform on [−1, 1+2µ2] indeed constitutes an equilibrium. Suppose
politician A plays the uniform distribution on [−1, 1 + 2µ2]. Then the vote share of
politician B playing any budget balanced distribution is given by:
SB2 (pB2 , pA2 ) =
∫ +∞
−1
FA2 (x)dFB2 (x)
≤
∫ +∞
−1
x+ 1
2 + 2µ2
dFB2 (x)
= µ2 + 12 + 2µ2
= 12 ,
where the inequality in the second line is strict if candidate B makes any offer x >
1 + 2µ2 with positive probability.
Notice that, if all second-period targetable resources are necessary for debt repay-
ment, both candidates’ offer distribution are degenerate on µ2 = −1.
The crucial feature of the second-period election is the uncertainty for voters regard-
ing the outcome of the process of redistributive politics. Given a uniform distribution
on [−1, 1+2µ2], in period 2 each voter expects to get µ2 = −δ∗ in the case of no-reform.
In case of reform, each voter expects a transfer offer of µ2 = λe− δ∗, but additionally
she gets the public good utility (1−λ)e. In total, each voter therefore expects a utility
of e− δ∗ in case of reform. For the analysis of the first period, this expectation about
future utility fully captures how a voter evaluates the future effects of a proposed pol-
icy. However, the equilibrium distribution implies that some voters are treated very
well and others are treated very badly. The politicians have an incentive to “cultivate
favored minorities” as in Myerson (1993). This uncertainty is going to be a driving
force behind the electoral incentives to do the reform and accumulate debt in the first
period.
2.5 First-period political equilibrium
We turn to the analysis of the first-period equilibrium. We want to see how electoral
incentives shape the decision to reform, in particular when we focus on the interaction
of the reform decision with the decision to raise public debt. As it turns out, this
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interaction depends on the nature of reform benefits in the sense of them having a
private or a public good character.
2.5.1 Private good reform
As a benchmark, we first treat a polar case where the second-period reform benefits
are only of a private good nature, i.e. λ = 1. Therefore, they can be potentially
redistributed across voters. We provide a complete equilibrium characterization in
Corollary 2.5.2 below.
Proposition 2.5.1 When the reform benefits are of a private good nature, the unique
equilibrium is such that both candidates always reform and announce the maximum
debt level.
In our setup, the second-period reform benefits surmount the first-period costs of
the reform. Since all benefits have a private good nature, the reform will therefore lead
to an increase in the size of the total endowment of the economy and this increase is
potentially targetable to voters. However, resources that are left in the future cannot
be targeted to voters in the first period, because the outcome of the electoral game of
redistribution in the second period is uncertain. This is the reason why a no-reform
candidate might have an advantage: if such a candidate has more resources available in
the first period through saving on the costs of the reform, she can skew the distribution
of these resources to win a majority. However, by making use of public debt, a reforming
candidate can compensate for the targeting disadvantage that arises from covering the
first-period costs of the reform. Debt is only restricted by its natural limit: a reformer
can raise e more in debt than a non-reformer. Since the benefits surmount the costs, a
reformer then has more resources available for targeting voters in the first period than
a non-reformer. Through this advantage a reforming candidate will always be able to
convince a majority of voters to vote for her if she faces a non-reforming opponent. In
equilibrium, therefore, the reform is proposed by both candidates with probability 1.
The fact that both candidates raise the maximum debt follows the political forces
highlighted in Lizzeri (1999). Whatever amount of resources is left in the future is not
targetable to first-period voters. A candidate that does not run the maximal debt is
therefore forced to offer an egalitarian distribution for the resources that she leaves
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in the future. This goes against the incentive to skew the distribution of resources
in order to gain the electoral support of the voters that are treated favorably in the
process of redistribution. The electoral uncertainty is not an artifact of the assumption
that politicians are unable to commit to second-period transfers. Lizzeri (1999) shows
that allowing candidates to commit does not change the electoral incentives to run
debt: a candidate who commits to future transfers can only make promises about
her own future behavior, not about the transfers made by the other candidate. This
implies that, if a candidate does not run the maximal deficit, there is still an element of
redistributive uncertainty concerning the second-period outcome. This uncertainty is
enough to make voters view the outcome of the future election as relatively egalitarian.
From Proposition 2.5.1, we can draw two implications for the interaction between
public debt and the decision to reform when proposed by competing political candi-
dates. First, the reform increases the repayment capacity for debt and this can help
the reformer to compensate her targeting disadvantage from having to finance the re-
form costs. Second, since both candidates will go for the reform in equilibrium, this
will push both candidates to the maximal possible debt level under reform. If one
candidate did not reform, the other candidate would not need to go up to the maximal
debt under reform in order to win the election. For instance, against a non-reformer,
it is enough that the debt raised by the reformer surpass the debt under no-reform
by c, the costs of the reform. Then a reforming candidate has at least as many re-
sources available for targeting voters in the first period. On top of that, a reformer
can offer a higher expectation of future transfers. Through this, she would still beat
any non-reformer. However, in equilibrium, every candidate competes against another
reforming candidate. Therefore, both are pushed to transfer the full reform benefits to
the present by debt.
The following corollary provides a complete equilibrium characterization, including
the equilibrium transfer distributions.
Corollary 2.5.2 Suppose that the reform benefits are of a private good nature, i.e.
λ = 1. Then, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability 1: βA = βB = 1;
(ii) both candidates announce the maximum debt level: δA = δB = 1 + e;
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(iii) first-period offers to voters are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1, 3 +
2(e − c)]. That is both candidates draw first-period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
2+2(1+e−c) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3 + 2(e− c),
1, if x ≥ 3 + 2(e− c).
(2.7)
Second-period offers are degenerate on µ2 = −1.
In the electoral game considered here, any candidate has an incentive to skew the
distribution of resources in order to gain the electoral support of the voters. In the
first period, the total resources available from debt and first-period endowment minus
the cost of the reform are allocated as in Myerson (1993)’s analysis: the incentives
to “cultivate favored minorities” remains a feature of electoral competition as in the
second-period equilibrium outcome.
2.5.2 Reform with private and public good benefits
We now consider the case where the reform benefits partly have the character of a
public good, i.e. λ < 1. Since the proportion of benefits with private good character
can be potentially targeted to voters, we refer to λ also as the targetability of reform
benefits. The following proposition summarizes the outcome of the electoral game for
different compositions of reform benefits.
Proposition 2.5.3 (I.) When the reform has a large share of private good benefits λ
such that e − λe − 2(c − λe) > 0, in the unique equilibrium both candidates always
reform and announce the maximal debt.
(II.) When the reform has a low share of private good benefits λ such that H :=
2(c−λe)−(e−λe) > 0, in the unique equilibrium both candidates reform with probability
1− 12H < 1 and announce the maximal debt.
Decision to reform. When only a share λ of the reform benefits translates into an
increase in the second-period endowment, then the natural debt limit under reform
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increases only by λe compared to no-reform. This means that through using public
debt, the reformer can only make the part λe of reform benefits targetable to first-
period voters. For the remaining part, she is forced through the public good nature of
these benefits to offer them equally across all voters. However, Part (I.) in Proposition
2.5.3 subsumes the case where targetability λ is so high that that λe ≥ c. In this
case, the additional debt that a reformer can raise is high enough for her to completely
cover the reform costs, without having less targetable resources in the first period.
Furthermore, she will be able to offer the additional public good benefits created in
the second period. For this subcase, any reformer will therefore beat a non-reforming
opponent.
In the following, we focus on the case where λe < c. That is, even when using her
higher debt repayment capacity, the reformer cannot fully compensate for the targeting
advantage of the non-reformer, who saves the costs of the reform. However, the reform
is efficient in the sense that total benefits surmount total costs. Thus the reformer has
more to offer in total even if she is partly forced to distribute this bigger pie in an
egalitarian way. The question then is whether this efficiency gain combined with the
increased debt capacity is enough to compensate the first-period cost savings of the
non-reformer.
For the case λe < c, a no-reform candidate has more resources available in the first
period for targeting voters. Specifically, the additional per-capita amount available to
her equals the difference between the reform costs and the part of the future benefits
that can be transferred to the present through debt, c−λe. On the other hand, in case
of reform everyone expects a boost in future utility through the public good benefits
of the reform. More specifically, each voter expects additional utility e− λe in case of
reform. Since the reform is efficient in the sense that benefits e are greater than costs c,
the additional public good utility, e−λe, surmounts the loss in targetable resources in
the first period, c−λe. However, these public good benefits cannot be targeted. Hence,
the additional public good utility must be high enough so that the non-reformer cannot
convince a majority to vote for her. In particular, she should not be able through her
advantage in targetability to make at least half of the voters as well off as under reform.
This is exactly the condition of Proposition 2.5.3: e− λe > 2(c− λe). The factor “2”
on the right hand side of this inequality is explained by the fact that, in order to win a
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majority through targeting, a candidate can promise very low offers to 12 of the voters
in order to offer attractive benefits to the other half. If the condition e−λe > 2(c−λe)
is fulfilled, as in Part (I.) of Proposition 2.5.3, then the efficiency gain of the reform is
high enough to trump the targetability advantage of the non-reformer.21
In Part (II.) of Proposition 2.5.3, H = 2(c− λe)− (e− λe) > 0, and the additional
public good utility under reform is not enough to compensate for the fact that a
no-reform candidate has more targetable resources in the first period. We therefore
interpret H as the net targeting advantage of not doing the reform. If H > 0, the more
in targetable resources is enough to outweigh the efficiency gains from reform and the
reform cannot be offered with probability 1 in equilibrium. This means that we get a
failure of the political process to deliver the efficient outcome.
Note, however, that even with a net targeting advantage of no-reform, the reform
will still be played with positive probability in equilibrium as long as it is efficient,
i.e. e − c > 0. The reason for this will be discussed after having described the full
equilibrium in Corollary 2.5.4.
Decision to raise debt. In Proposition 2.5.3, the incentives to go for the maximal
possible debt persist and the intuition is similar to the one in Proposition 2.5.1. An
important insight from Proposition 2.5.3 is that the ability to raise higher debt under
reform ensures the implementation of the reform with certainty only when the benefits
of the reform are mainly of a private good nature. In the opposite case, when the
nature of the reform is such that only a small part of the reform benefits have a private
good aspect, a large share of the reform benefits are non-targetable to begin with and
cannot be targeted to first-period voters through the use of debt. Therefore, we are
getting into the trade-off between efficient (non-targetable) public good spending and
targetable transfer spending. This trade-off is at the core of the static setup of Lizzeri
and Persico (2001) and we discuss it after Corollary 2.5.4.
21Note that one way to fulfill this condition is the case where the reform benefits are higher than
double the costs of the reform, e > 2c. Hence if the net benefit of the reform is high enough, the
reform will always be implemented independent of the nature of the reform benefits. In that case, the
efficiency gain is so high that it can compensate for the targeting disadvantage of having to finance
the reform costs even if none of the reform benefits are targetable.
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In the following corollary, we characterize the full equilibrium including the equi-
librium transfer distributions.
Corollary 2.5.4 (I.) Suppose that the reform has mainly private good benefits, i.e. λ
is high enough such that e− λe− 2(c− λe) > 0. Then, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability βA = βB = 1;
(ii) announce the maximal debt: δA = δB = 1 + λe;
(iii) first-period offers to voters are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1, 3 +
2(λe − c)]. That is both candidates draw first period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
2+2(1+λe−c) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3 + 2(λe− c),
1, if x ≥ 3 + 2(λe− c).
(2.8)
Second-period transfer offers are degenerate on µ2 = −1. Additionally, everybody
receives utility (1− λ)e from the public good aspect of the reform. In total, using
the linear utility assumption, the second-period outcome is equivalent to a transfer
distribution that is degenerate on −1 + (1− λ)e.
(II.) Suppose that the reform has mainly public good benefits, i.e. λ is low enough
such that H := 2(c− λe)− (e− λe) > 0. Then, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability βA = βB = 1− 12H < 1;
(ii) both candidates announce the maximal debt: δiN = 1 in case of no-reform, δiR =
1 + λe in case of reform, i ∈ {A,B}.
(iii) When candidates do not reform, they draw first-period offers from the following
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distribution:
F ∗N(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
1
2
(
x+1
H
)
, if − 1 ≤ x ≤ −1 +H,
1
2 , if − 1 +H ≤ x ≤ 3−H,
1
2
(
1 + x−3+H
H
)
, if 3−H ≤ x ≤ 3,
1, if x ≥ 3.
(2.9)
Second-period offers are degenerate on µ2 = −1.
When candidates reform, they draw first-period offers from the following distri-
bution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
4−2(c−λe) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3− 2(c− λe),
1, if x ≥ 3− 2(c− λe).
(2.10)
Second-period transfer offers are degenerate on µ2 = −1. Additionally, everybody
receives utility (1− λ)e from the public good aspect of the reform.
When the reform has mainly private good benefits, the candidates can target these
benefits to particular voters in the first period: the reform is implemented with cer-
tainty and maximal debt is raised. Therefore, both candidates compete on redis-
tributing the same amount of resources in the first period. The form of the transfer
distribution follows again the insight of Myerson (1993).
When the reform has mainly public good benefits, the efficiency gain of doing the
reform cannot compensate for the targeting disadvantage of having to cover the reform
costs. Nevertheless, the reform will still be implemented with positive probability.
The underlying mechanism has been analyzed by Lizzeri and Persico (2001) in a static
setup. By still playing the reform option with some probability, a candidate can use
the efficiency gain of the reform to force her opponent to concentrate half of her offers
on relatively “expensive” voters: these voters can be convinced to vote against the
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reform by receiving at least a transfer that fully covers the public good utility loss
from the no-reform decision and also compensates for the additional transfer offered
by the reforming candidate. As can be seen from Corollary 2.5.4, the distribution
offered in case of no-reform, F ∗N(x), has a disconnected support with an upper and
a lower part. The upper part starts where any transfer on this part will ensure the
vote against the reform distribution: an offer in the upper part covers at least the
utility loss (1 − λ)e from not implementing the reform plus the best transfer offered
by the reforming candidate 3 − 2(c − λe). Due to the efficiency gain of the reform,
it does not make sense, in terms of maximizing the expected vote share, to attack a
reformer with offers that don’t beat her best offer for sure. In that sense, part of the
no-reform offers that lie above the best offer under reform are more “expensive” than
if reform were played with probability zero and a no-reform candidate could play a
uniform distribution with a connected support. Therefore, a candidate that reforms
with positive probability gains an advantage if her opponent were to never offer the
reform.
When the net targeting advantage H of the non-reformer decreases, the probability
of reform goes up. Ceteris paribus, H decreases when the targetability λ of reform
benefits goes up. That is, the more private good aspects a reform has, the more public
debt can help in overcoming the reformer’s targeting disadvantage from financing the
reform costs and the higher the chance of the reform to be implemented in electoral
competition. On the other hand, if a reform has a high share of public good benefits,
then public debt, which can only transfer the private good aspects to the present,
cannot help as much in overcoming the targeting disadvantage of a reformer. For the
same efficiency gain, such a reform will therefore be implemented with lower probability
as an electoral outcome.
2.6 Constitutional limit on debt
We now study how an exogenous restriction on the amount of debt that can be incurred
by politicians changes the chances of reform adoption. Limits on deficit and debt are a
popular response to the recent debt crisis and are present in many jurisdictions: most
U.S. states have a balanced-budget rule, the Stability and Growth Pact in the European
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Union limits gross government debt to sixty percent of the country’s GDP. Germany
adopted in 2009 a constitutional rule referred to as the debt brake that requires the
federal and state governments to run balanced budgets from 2016 and 2020 onwards
respectively (see Janeba (2012) for details).
2.6.1 Debt limit and the nature of reform benefits
We have seen in the last section, the nature of reform benefits and the availability
of public debt are the crucial determinants of the success of reforms in the political
process. We now focus on the effect of public debt only and study the case where
reform benefits are of a private good nature, i.e. λ = 1. That is, the nature of reform
benefits will not be the restrictive factor that makes reforms fail to be implemented.
We denote by δ¯ the first-period debt limit. In this subsection, we assume that
δ¯ ≥ 1. This implies that the debt limit is more restrictive than the natural debt limit
only in case of reform. This assumption will simplify the comparison with the results
in the previous section. In the following subsection, we will then consider the case
δ¯ < 1. Furthermore, we assume that δ¯ ≤ 1 + e. This is the interesting case to consider
since it implies that the exogenous debt limit is lower than the natural debt limit under
reform.
For the equilibrium characterization, we work with a modified definition of the debt
limit. We define ρ¯ = δ¯−1 so that ρ¯ > 0 implies a maximal debt of δ¯ = 1+ ρ¯. The term
ρ¯ captures the amount by which debt can be higher than the per-capita endowment of
1. By definition, it is possible to raise debt higher than the endowment only in case of
reform. For the reform case, this measure captures how easily the reform benefits e can
be drawn to the first period by debt. If ρ¯ > 0, then e− ρ¯ is the amount of the reform
benefits that cannot be drawn to the first period by debt and remains available in the
second period for transfers. If ρ¯ = 0, then the maximal debt δ¯ equals the endowment of
1. In case of reform, the full benefits e then remain available in the future for transfers.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategies in terms of reform
and public debt decisions. Corollary A.1.1 in the Appendix presents the complete
equilibrium characterization including the equilibrium offer distributions.22
22Corollary A.1.1 is analogous to Corollary 2.5.4 with the debt limit ρ¯ taking the place of the
fraction of reform benefits with private good nature λe.
32 CHAPTER 2. PUBLIC DEBT AND REFORMS
Proposition 2.6.1 Suppose that the reform benefits are of a private good nature, i.e.
λ = 1, and that there is a constitutional debt limit δ¯ = 1 + ρ¯ ≥ 1.
(I.) When the debt limit ρ¯ is such that e− ρ¯−2(c− ρ¯) > 0, in the unique equilibrium
both candidates always reform and announce the maximal debt.
(II.) When the debt limit ρ¯ is restrictive enough such that Ĥ := 2(c−ρ¯)−(e−ρ¯) > 0,
in the unique equilibrium both candidates reform with probability 1 − 12Ĥ < 1 and
announce the maximal debt.
Comparing these results to Proposition 2.5.3, we see that restricting public debt
has a similar effect as increasing the proportion of reform benefits with public good
nature. In particular, even if now the full reform benefits are potentially targetable,
any reform benefits that have to be left in the future due to the debt limit acquire the
characteristics of a non-targetable public good from the point of view of first-period
voters. The amount e− ρ¯ corresponds to the part of future reform benefits that cannot
be transferred to the present. Since the outcome of future redistribution is uncertain,
these resources cannot be skewed to specific voters. On the contrary, each voter expects
the same amount e − ρ¯ of additional second-period transfers under reform. The part
e− ρ¯ of the reform benefits that has to be left in the future is just like a public good
whose benefits cannot be targeted. The difference to Proposition 2.5.3 is that, if more
debt was allowed, this part could also be targeted to first-period voters. For the case
of Proposition 2.5.3, the public good characteristic was given through the nature of
the reform and could not be changed. Here, in contrast, it is created through the debt
limit combined with future electoral uncertainty.
Through this analogy, we get the same case distinction as before. If the debt limit
is not too restrictive such that enough future reform benefits can be targeted to first-
period voters, then the cost-saving advantage of the non-reformer is overcome and
reform is implemented with certainty in the political equilibrium. On the other hand,
if the debt limit becomes too restrictive, the no-reformer has a net targeting advantage.
Due to its efficiency gain the reform will still be implemented with some probability for
the same reason as discussed for Proposition 2.5.3. However, the reform will no longer
be implemented with certainty and the political process fails to deliver the efficient
outcome.
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Note, in particular, that the probability of reform decreases in ρ¯. That is, the
probability of reform is the lower, the more restrictive the debt limit. In this subsection,
the debt limit δ¯ = 1 + ρ¯ is restricted to be greater or equal to 1, the natural debt
limit under no-reform. Therefore, ρ¯ captures how much more debt the reformer can
raise compared to the non-reformer. Since the reformer creates additional resources
in the amount of e in the future, ρ¯ captures how much of these resources can be
made targetable to first-period voters by transferring them to the present. A more
restrictive debt limit means that this transfer is inhibited and therefore the reformer
has less possibility to compensate for the loss in targetable resources caused by the
reform costs.
If ρ¯ = 0 or equivalently δ¯ = 1, then both the reformer and the non-reformer can
raise the same amount of debt. In that case, none of the reform benefits can be
transferred to the present. If the debt limit becomes even more restrictive and drops
below the natural limit under no-reform (δ¯ < 1 or ρ¯ < 0), then both the reformer and
the non-reformer can still raise the same amount of debt. One could therefore expect
that the probability of reform does not change compared to the case δ¯ = 1, when the
debt limit is decreased below 1. Nevertheless, as we show in the following subsection,
making the debt limit more restrictive in this sense still decreases the probability of
reform.
2.6.2 Very restrictive debt limit
In the following, we consider the case δ¯ < 1. That is, the exogenous debt limit is
decreased below the natural debt limit under no-reform. This means that none of the
reform benefits can be transferred to the present. Therefore, the nature of the reform
benefits is immaterial and the results here apply both to a purely pie-increasing reform
as well as to a reform that creates only public good benefits. In the previous subsection,
we introduced the term ρ¯ = δ¯− 1 to capture by how much the exogenous debt limit is
higher than the natural limit under no-reform. For the case considered here, we define
σ¯ = 1− δ¯ to capture by how much the exogenous debt limit is lower than the natural
limit under no-reform.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the debt
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and reform decisions in the case δ¯ < 1. The full characterization of the equilibrium
including the equilibrium offer distributions can be found in Corollary A.1.2 in the
Appendix. The results resemble the ones in Proposition 2.5.3 and Proposition 2.6.1 but
the concepts used before need to be adjusted in the way explained below. Importantly,
in terms of interpretation, these adjustments will imply a second interaction between
restrictions on public debt and reforms that was not present in the previous subsection.
Proposition 2.6.2 Suppose that the exogenous debt limit is such that δ¯ = 1− σ¯ < 1.
(I.) When the reform benefits are high enough compared to the reform costs such
that e > 2c, in the unique equilibrium both candidates always reform and announce the
maximal debt.
(II.) When the reform benefits are low enough compared to the reform costs such
that H˜ := 2c− e > 0, in the unique equilibrium both candidates reform with probability
1− 12−σ¯ H˜ < 1 and announce the maximal debt.
Note first, that what we defined as the net targeting advantage of no-reform is now
given by H˜ = 2c− e. Recall that this concept relates the gain in targetable resources
from not doing the reform to the additional non-targetable resources that the reform
creates. In the case where the exogenous debt limit is more restrictive than the natural
debt limit under no-reform, the reformer cannot raise more debt than the non-reformer.
Thus the reformer’s loss in targetable resources in the first period corresponds to the
full reform costs.23 Furthermore, since none of the reform benefits can be transferred
to the first period, the additional non-targetable resources that the reform creates are
equal to the full reform benefits.
We have already discussed shortly in subsection 2.5.2 that, if the efficiency gain of
the reform is high enough, in the sense of the benefits surmounting the double amount
of the costs, then the reform will always be implemented. This is stated formally as
Part (I.) of Proposition 2.6.2. In that case, H˜ = 2c−e becomes negative, and hence the
non-reformer does not gain an advantage from saving on the costs of the reform. The
benefits are so high that, even though they are completely non-targetable, the reformer
will still be able to offer more to a majority of voters. In this case, the implementation
23Recall that the factor 2 in front of the reform costs accounts for the fact that targetable resources
can be shifted across voters and only 50 percent of voters must be convinced through such a shift in
order to win a majority.
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of the reform does not depend on issues of targetability and hence is also not affected
by the exogenous debt limit.
Part (II.) of Proposition 2.6.2 is the more interesting case, where the benefits are
low enough such that issues of targetability play a role for the implementation of the
reform. In this case, H˜ = 2c− e > 0, such that there is a net targeting advantage for
the non-reformer. However, this is no longer the only parameter that determines the
probability of reform. This probability is now given by 1 − 12−σ¯ H˜. As we can see, it
also depends on σ¯, the amount by which the exogenous debt limit is lower than the
natural debt limit under no-reform. In particular, a more restrictive debt limit, which
corresponds to an increase in σ¯, decreases the probability of reform. The intuition is the
following: the parameter σ¯ captures the part of the potentially targetable second-period
endowment that both the reformer and the non-reformer must leave in the future. Since
only resources in the first period are targetable to first-period voters, this decreases the
size of the targetable pie. Politicians compete on this targetable pie when implementing
their pattern of redistribution. Therefore, if the total size of the targetable pie shrinks,
the loss in targetable resources through financing a certain amount of costs is now
relatively bigger. In other words, a given net targeting advantage of the non-reformer,
H˜ = 2c− e > 0, puts the reformer in a relatively worse position, the lower the size of
the targetable pie. By decreasing the size of this targetable pie, a stricter exogenous
debt limit therefore makes reform less likely.
Here we can see a second reason why a more restrictive debt limit can be detrimental
to the implementation of reforms. In the previous subsection, where the debt limit was
higher than the natural debt limit under no-reform, a stricter debt limit decreased the
probability of reform by hampering the transfer of reform benefits to the present. In
this subsection, we have considered the case of a debt limit that is already so restrictive
that no reform benefits can be transferred to the present. Therefore, a more restrictive
debt limit now implies restricting the transfer of future resources that would exist even
in the absence of reform. As explained, this decreases the targetable pie on which both
candidates compete. The loss in targetable resources due to the reform costs then
becomes relatively more important. Therefore, the probability of reform still decreases
with a stricter debt limit. As noted at the beginning, the results here apply also to a
reform that only creates public good benefits. Even though public debt cannot ensure
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the implementation of such a reform, it can still make the reform more likely.
These results point to a new view on the trade-off between targeted pork-barrel
spending and efficient spending decisions, like the financing of a beneficial reform. As
long as the efficient policy creates benefits only in the next electoral cycle, allowing
enough debt-related targeted spending might be necessary in electoral competition to
incentivize spending on the efficient policy.24
2.7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we show that the interaction between the reform decision and the decision
to raise public debt is decisive in shaping electoral incentives for reform. We consider a
“pure” electoral game where politicians are office-motivated and compete for election
by targeting resources to subsets of voters at the expense of others. A reform that
costs resources today and yields higher benefits in the future forces a politician to
give up targetable resources today. Due to endogenously arising uncertainty about the
outcome of future elections, future resources cannot be targeted to specific voters in
the present as long as these resources remain in the future. This mechanism on its
own puts a reformer at a disadvantage to a non-reformer, since targetable resources
are more valuable for convincing a majority of voters today. However, public debt
potentially allows politicians to transform future reform benefits into resources that
can be targeted to today’s voters. This can help overcome the original disadvantage
that results from the dynamic distribution of reform benefits and costs.
We show that the reform is always implemented when sufficient debt can be raised.
This is the case if enough reform benefits are of a private good nature in the sense
of translating into an increase in the future endowment. Such reform benefits can
potentially be transferred to the present by debt.
We also show that restricting the use of public debt hampers the chances of a
reform to go through the political process. With a lower capacity to raise public
debt, a reforming politician can only commit to a lower present-day redistribution.
This makes it harder to sustain the implementation of beneficial reforms in electoral
24For the case of a purely pie-increasing reform, we also considered an extension to three periods
and showed that our results are robust in such a multi-period setup.
2.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 37
competition. This result holds even for reforms whose benefits cannot be transferred
to the present by their public good nature. This implies that constitutional restrictions
on public debt might be a hurdle for the implementation of reforms by politicians.
Our results point towards a new evaluation of the trade-off between targeted spend-
ing and efficient spending decisions. In particular, enough debt-related targeted spend-
ing might be necessary in electoral competition to incentivize efficient spending on
dynamic policies whose benefits only accrue in the next electoral cycle.
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Chapter 3
The Political Economy of Reforms
with Distortionary Public Debt1
3.1 Introduction
A recent paper by Boyer and Esslinger (2016)2 investigates the interaction between
the decision to raise public debt and the decision to implement growth-enhancing
reforms in an electoral setup of targeted redistribution.3 In this setup, politicians target
available resources to subsets of voters in order to maximize their vote share. Boyer and
Esslinger (2016) show that efficient dynamic policies, like growth-enhancing reforms,
might only have a chance in the political process if politicians have enough access to
public debt. The argument is that such reforms usually incur costs in the current
electoral cycle while yielding their benefits only in future electoral cycles. Therefore,
seen on their own, these reforms imply a disadvantage in terms of promising electoral
favors to current voters. This is because, first, expenditures for costly reforms in the
present cannot be used as electoral favors to current voters. Second, a reform-induced
increase in future resources, as long as it remains in the future, cannot be promised to
specific subsets of current voters due to uncertainty about the future electoral outcome.
However, if politicians can use public debt to shift resources that are the results of
present reform decisions from the future to the present, then this disadvantage in the
1I thank Pierre Boyer, Eckhard Janeba, and Andreas Peichl for very helpful comments, as well as
seminar participants at Mannheim University. The author gratefully acknowledges the Collaborative
Research Center 884 for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.
2This citation refers to the preceding chapter of this dissertation.
3This setup of electoral competition was first introduced by Myerson (1993).
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capacity to target electoral favors can be completely overcome. Indeed, Boyer and
Esslinger (2016) show that without any restrictions on public debt, the efficient policy
of implementing a growth-enhancing reform will always be carried out.4 Furthermore,
they show that introducing a limit on public debt prevents the certain implementation
of the efficient reform when the debt limit becomes restrictive enough. The probability
of reform then decreases continuously the more restrictive the debt limit gets.
The electoral setup of targeted redistribution creates a bias of the political process
towards high public debt.5 As already mentioned, resources that are left in the future
cannot be promised as electoral favors to current voters. By shifting future resources
to the present, these resources can be used to convince a majority of voters to win
the election. Since voters are self-interested, they prefer to be advantaged today and
secure their favors instead of leaving the distribution of future resources to a future
election whose outcome in terms of allocating favors is uncertain.6 This bias towards
high debt is therefore closely related to other political economic biases that also imply
the tendency for high debt, like a short-term horizon of policy makers or the common
pool problem. Actually, since only a majority of voters is advantaged in terms of the
distribution of future resources but everyone has to contribute to repaying the resulting
debt, we do have some form of a common pool problem here. Similarly, the interest
of politicians in winning the current election creates a short-term bias for them. The
previous literature that has focused on these political economic biases for high debt
has shown that they exist even when high public debt creates distortions and imposes
an efficiency loss compared to low debt levels.7
In contrast, one important assumption in Boyer and Esslinger (2016) is that public
debt has no direct efficiency implications itself. That is, raising high public debt
does not create any distortions that impose a cost to the economy. Instead, public
debt is merely a means of shifting money across time. Given the high costs that
arose for many European countries recently due to a high level of public debt, it
makes sense to investigate the effect of debt-related distortions in the above setup
4Note that in this paper, the focus is purely on growth-enhancing reforms that increase the pie of
potentially redistributable resources. Boyer and Esslinger (2016) additionally consider the case where
the reform can create public good aspects that cannot be redistributed.
5This was first shown by Lizzeri (1999).
6Note that this is not an argument about risk-aversion. Rather, when future resources are already
allocated today, the majority of advantaged voters gets more than what they would expect to get if
the distribution is left to a future election.
7See, for instance, Battaglini and Coate (2008) for a recent contribution to this literature.
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of political competition. This is the goal of the current paper. In the case of debt-
related distortions, the incentivizing effect of public debt on efficient reforms, which
was highlighted in Boyer and Esslinger (2016), has to be weighed against possible
negative effects of high public debt. These negative effects include, for instance, costs
related to sovereign default, which gets more likely with high public debt. A related
detrimental consequence of high public debt is less possibilities to smooth out tax-
related distortions across time. This happens when the further increase of public debt
gets more costly at high debt levels. Such a situation can prevent the use of public
debt exactly then when debt would be most necessary to avoid high taxes. In terms of
thinking about efficient policies, if a high level of public debt implies high distortions,
then investing into low public debt can be seen itself as an efficient dynamic policy
with costs in the current electoral cycle and benefits in future electoral cycles. It is the
only such policy which by its nature cannot be incentivized by the use of more public
debt.
The main insights from our analysis are the following. In a setup where high public
debt creates distortions, the most efficient policy bundle is to avoid high public debt
and to implement the pie-increasing reform. Together, this implies the maximization
of the total resources available to the economy. If the distortionary cost of raising high
public debt is very high, the political process eliminates high public debt on its own.
In particular, a majority of voters will only support a high-debt policy if at least this
majority can be compensated for the efficiency loss resulting from high public debt. If
the efficiency loss is so high that the advantaged majority is worse off compared to what
they would expect to get under a low-debt policy, then only low-debt policies will be
supported in electoral campaigns. In this case, the incentivizing effect of public debt on
the pie-increasing reform is not present and hence the reform will not be implemented
with certainty.
On the other hand, if the distortionary cost of raising high public debt is low
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform, then the reform will always be
implemented in electoral competition if no restrictions are placed on public debt. In
this case, the political process creates a bias for high public debt, but this debt unfolds
its incentivizing effect on reform implementation. In particular, with some probability
high public debt is raised and this allows the reform policy to be used in a high enough
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degree for targeting current voters. Due to the use of high public debt, we do have an
efficiency loss due to debt-related distortions, but this ensures efficiency on the side
of implementing the pie-increasing reform. This trade-off persists once we introduce
an exogenous debt limit into the analysis. Such a debt limit reduces the distortionary
costs of public debt. However, at the same time, not implementing the reform gets
more attractive since public debt cannot unfold its incentivizing effect on reforms as
well. Hence, when setting a debt limit, more efficiency on the side of public debt has to
be weighed against lower efficiency in terms of implementing the pie-increasing reform.
The setup we use to derive our results builds on Boyer and Esslinger (2016) but
makes the use of public debt distortionary. Specifically, we consider a model with two
periods and the same two politicians run for election in each period. These politi-
cians are purely office-motivated and voters are ex-ante homogenous with each voter
having a resource endowment of one in each period. Politicians compete for voters
by redistributing the available resources across voters. They are not restricted in the
tools available for redistribution of resources within a given period. In the first period,
politicians additionally decide whether to raise maximal public debt or no debt at all8
and on the implementation of a reform that costs some resources today but will in-
crease resources in the next period. Importantly, in the case of maximal public debt,
there are expected costs on the economy in the second period. Voters and politicians
know the reform benefits and reform costs and the costs related to a high level of
public debt. The reform is efficient in the sense that its benefits surmount its costs.
Raising high public debt is inefficient in the sense that the debt-related costs reduce
the total size of the resource pie. Finally, targeting resources to voters is a purely
tactical instrument and does not have any efficiency implication.
Our contributions are two-fold. First, on the methodological side, we develop the
necessary tools to deal simultaneously with two efficiency-related policy issues - pie-
increasing reform and distortionary public debt - and still keep the generality of the
setup in Boyer and Esslinger (2016) in terms of modeling electoral competition. The
two relevant factors determining the probabilities of different debt-reform policy bun-
dles in the optimal electoral strategy are efficiency - in terms of maximizing the total
8This binary modeling allows politicians to follow the tendency for maximal debt identified in
this electoral setup by Lizzeri (1999) and Boyer and Esslinger (2016) but allows at the same time an
avoidance of debt-related distortions through the possibility of a no-debt policy.
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size of the pie - and targetability - in terms of the capacity to transfer enough resources
to a majority of voters in order to win their votes. We show how these two factors
can be captured by two simple parameters of the transfer distributions that politicians
offer to voters under different debt-reform policies: the maximal transfer given to a
voter under the respective transfer distribution and the resource constraint of that
distribution. We show that, in order to study the effect of the debt and reform policy
choices on the electoral outcome, all that needs to be understood is how the combina-
tion of these policy choices determines the resource constraints and the upper bounds
of the transfer distributions that can be offered to voters. Given the complexity of the
constructive proofs, this insight is necessary to keep the derivations tractable.
This methodological contribution will have interesting applications beyond the
scope of the specific issue studied in this paper. Specifically, it allows to develop
general results for the above-employed setup of electoral competition following My-
erson (1993) when other policy issues besides redistributive transfers determine the
electoral outcome. That is, reform and public debt can be replaced by other policy
issues with direct efficiency implications and the resulting electoral outcome can be
studied. In contrast to the previous literature, our methods can deal with two ad-
ditional efficiency-related policy issues besides redistributive transfers instead of only
one.9 For instance, Lizzeri and Persico (2001) analyzed the additional provision of
a public good as the only policy issue besides redistributive transfers, while Lizzeri
(1999) introduced public debt as the one additional policy issue besides redistributive
transfers into the setup of Myerson (1993). Closely related to our study of debt-related
distortions is the paper by Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009), which deals with tax-related
distortions. Nevertheless, this paper also only deals with this one additional issue
besides redistributive transfers.10
Our second contribution lies on the substantive side. In particular, we deploy
the just mentioned tools to study the interaction between the two policy issues of
distortionary public debt and pie-increasing reforms in the setup of targeted electoral
competition. A detailed discussion of the related literatures on public debt and reforms
9The decisive difference to Boyer and Esslinger (2016) is that besides the reform, public debt now
also has efficiency implications.
10In their final section, Crutzen and Sahuguet (2009) discuss the issue of two different tax instru-
ments, but they do not solve for the equilibrium when both tax instruments are used at the same
time. A more detailed discussion of the literature following Myerson (1993) can be found in Boyer
and Esslinger (2016).
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can be found in Boyer and Esslinger (2016). As already mentioned, when debt-related
distortions are very high, the political process avoids public debt on its own. In con-
trast, for the case where debt-related distortions are low enough compared to the net
benefits of the reform, a political economic bias for high debt exists. For this case,
we show how reaching efficiency on the side of the reform has to be traded off against
efficiency on the side of public debt. In particular, when studying the introduction of
an exogenous limit on public debt, we identify a direct and indirect efficiency gain on
the side of public debt. First, restricting the level of public debt reduces directly the
distortionary costs that arise with a higher level of public debt. Second, since debt
is used to target future resources to current voters, a stricter debt limit reduces the
targetability advantage of debt-related policies. This implies that no-debt policies are
played with higher probability in the political equilibrium. Since such no-debt policies
incur no debt-related costs, this results in a further efficiency gain.
Nevertheless, these direct and indirect efficiency gains through a debt limit have to
be weighed against the efficiency losses in terms of implementing the reform. Specifi-
cally, when the debt limit becomes stricter, public debt cannot exert its incentivizing
effect on reform implementation as well. Specifically, it gets more difficult to target
future reform benefits to present voters. Therefore, with a stricter debt limit, the
pie-increasing reform will be played with lower and lower probability in the political
equilibrium. For a given amount of reform costs, we find that this negative effect of a
debt limit is more pronounced for reforms with a lower net benefit.
In terms of policy implications, our analysis implies that a careful evaluation and
weighting of the costs related to high public debt and the potential benefits of im-
portant growth-enhancing reforms is necessary to determine the optimal level of a
debt limit. Our analysis gives some first qualitative indications which factors tilt the
trade-off between reform-related efficiency and debt-related efficiency in a given di-
rection. Specifically, when expected debt-related distortions are at levels where the
political process exhibits a bias towards high public debt, a debt limit can help reduce
the resulting distortions from excessive public debt. When net benefits of potential
growth-enhancing reforms are substantial, a stricter debt limit does not decrease the
probability of reform that much. However, any given decrease in this probability is
worse, because higher net reform benefits are foregone. We also discuss that it is never
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optimal to restrict public debt below a level where distortions are unlikely to arise. In
that case, restricting public debt has no efficiency gains on the side of public debt and
only implies an efficiency loss in the sense that the pie-increasing reform is implemented
with lower probability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the formal
framework. Section 3.3 solves for the political equilibrium in the last period of the
game. Our main results are presented in Section 3.4, where we solve for the equilibrium
in the first period for low debt-related distortions, in Section 3.5, where we study
the implications of debt limits, and in Section 3.6, where we derive the first-period
equilibrium for the case of very high debt-related distortions. The last section contains
concluding remarks. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
3.2 The model
Our setup builds on Boyer and Esslinger (2016) who combine the decisions to raise
public debt and to implement a growth-enhancing reform in a model of redistributive
politics. Here, we add distortions resulting from high public debt.
The electorate. There are two periods and a continuum of voters of measure one.11
All voters are ex-ante homogenous. They are risk-neutral, live for the two periods, and
have a discount factor equal to 1. There is only one good, which for comparability to
Boyer and Esslinger (2016), we refer to as money. Voters have linear utility over this
good with the marginal utility normalized to one. All voters in each period have an
endowment of one unit of money which is perfectly divisible.
Political process. In each period, there is an election where voters choose between
two candidates. The set of candidates is the same for both dates. One candidate is
denoted by A, the other by B. Each candidate i ∈ {A,B} is purely office-motivated
and maximizes vote-shares.
11This is a convenient assumption that is meant to be an approximation for a game with a large
(but finite) number of voters.
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Policies. In the first period, a strategy pi1 has three elements: the decision to enact
a reform, a level of public debt, and promises of taxes and transfers to each individual
voter. We will define pi1 formally after introducing these three elements.
1. Reform. The possibility to enact a reform is present only in the first period.
The cost of this reform is incurred in the first period and the benefit occurs in the
second period. Denote by c the per capita cost and by e the per capita benefit from
the reform. Specifically, e corresponds to the increase in the per-capita endowment of
the economy for the second period. We assume that:
e− c > 0, (3.1)
c < 1, (3.2)
2c− e > 0. (3.3)
Assumption (3.1) states that the reform is beneficial and therefore should always be
implemented from an efficiency perspective. Assumption (3.2) ensures that there is
always enough first-period endowment to finance the reform. Assumption (3.3) ex-
cludes the rather uninteresting case of reforms whose net benefit is so high that they
would always go through the political process independently of redistributive politics
considerations.
2. Debt. Government debt is financed by borrowing from abroad and there is no
possibility of default.12 The size of the deficit in the first period is interpreted as the
fraction of the average voter’s second-period resources that is pledged to the repayment
of the debt. The natural limit on debt corresponds to the total resources that can be
mobilized to repay debt. In Boyer and Esslinger (2016), raising public debt did not
create any distortion, it was merely a way of shifting money across time. In their
model, the natural debt limit in case of no-reform is equal to 1 and corresponds to the
case where the total amount of resources available in the second period is transferred
to the first period by debt.
Here, we want to introduce distortions that arise when raising a high level of public
debt. Given the already high generality of the model setup in terms of electoral com-
petition, we do not model these distortions explicitly but capture them in a reduced
12While the distortion we introduce shortly could also be related to default in a more complex
setup, for reasons of tractability, we stick to the no-default assumption here.
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form parameter, which we introduce shortly. Politicians have the choice between two
debt levels: no debt and the maximal debt, where the latter corresponds either to the
natural debt limit defined above or a stricter exogenously imposed debt limit. This
binary modeling allows politicians to follow the tendency for maximal debt identified
in this electoral setup by Lizzeri (1999) and Boyer and Esslinger (2016) but allows
at the same time an avoidance of debt-related distortions through the possibility of a
no-debt policy.
We introduce a parameter γ that captures in a reduced form way distortions that
arise in the process of raising high public debt. In particular, we assume that, when
transferring 1 unit of money across time through public debt, γ units are lost in the
process, with 0 < γ < 1. The natural debt limit in case of no-reform is therefore
1 − γ and so the debt level δ belongs to {0, 1 − γ} if the reform is not implemented
and there are no exogenous restrictions on public debt. In a more complex world with
infinite horizon and distortionary taxes, γ could be interpreted as the loss in the future
productive capacity of the economy when tax distortions can no longer be smoothed
out very well at high debt levels due to the inability to increase debt much further. It
makes sense to assume that such distortions play a role only for fairly high debt levels.
When restricting public debt through an exogenous limit, one might therefore reach
debt levels for which these distortions no longer arise. We will discuss the implications
of this aspect in section 3.5.
Implementing the reform increases the natural debt limit by the induced increase
in the second-period endowment adjusted for the distortion. Hence, when the reform
is undertaken, the maximal amount of resources that can be transferred to the present
increases by γe. The debt level δ then belongs to {0, (1− γ)(1 + e)}.
We also allow for the possibility that the amount of debt that can be incurred is
exogenously restricted. We interpret such a restriction as a constitutional limit on
debt, which we denote by δ¯. To allow comparability to Boyer and Esslinger (2016),
we define δ¯ as the level of second-period resources that is allowed to be used for the
repayment of debt. This is because we want to indirectly capture through δ¯ how much
of the second-period resources are not transferred to the first period through debt and
remain in the future. With δ¯ defined like that, a distortion implies that debt in the
first period is actually restricted to be below (1 − γ)δ¯. In the following, we assume
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that δ¯ ≤ (1 + e).13
Finally, we denote by δi the debt level that is proposed by candidate i. When she
proposes a no-debt policy, then δi = 0. In case she goes for the maximal debt, then
this maximal debt level also depends on her decision about the reform. In case of
reform, we have δi ∈ {0,min{(1− γ)δ¯, (1− γ)(1 + e)}}, where the second term inside
the minimum operator is the natural debt limit under reform. In case of no-reform,
we have δi ∈ {0,min{(1 − γ)δ¯, 1 − γ}}, where the second term inside the minimum
operator is the natural debt limit under no-reform.
3. Redistribution. We formalize the transfer offers that candidates make to voters
with offer distributions from which the actual transfer promises to voters are drawn.
A negative transfer corresponds to taxing a voter and the lowest possible transfer offer
within one period is −1 and corresponds to taxing away the full endowment of a voter
in a given period. We denote the cumulative distribution functions from which the
transfer offers are drawn as F i(·), i ∈ {A,B}. Specifically, we follow Myerson (1993)
and assume that the favors offered to different voters are iid random variables with
probability distribution F . We appeal to the law of large numbers for large economies
and interpret F (x) not only as the probability that any one individual receive an
offer weakly smaller than x, but also as the population share of voters who receive
such an offer. Therefore, F describes the redistributive pattern resulting under the
corresponding transfer scheme.
Definition of strategies. Now we are in a position to formally define a first-period
strategy pi1 of candidate i. In total, there are four possible reform-debt bundles. To
simplify the reference to these four different bundles, we denote them by the following
capital letter notation:
{R; D} : Reform + Debt;
{R; ND} : Reform + No Debt;
{NR; D} : No Reform + Debt;
{NR; ND} : No Reform + No Debt.
As we will see shortly, the choices on reform and debt determine which transfers can
13The case δ¯ > (1 + e) is uninteresting because such an exogenous debt limit implies a maximal
debt that is higher than the natural debt limit under reform. Hence, such a debt limit would never
bind.
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be offered to the voting population. Therefore, we denote by F i1,Y the cumulative distri-
bution function for transfers in the first period by candidate i for the case where i imple-
ments reform-debt bundle Y , with Y ∈ {{R; D}, {R; ND}, {NR; D}, {NR; ND}}.
Similarly, we denote by βiY the probability with which bundle Y and the associated
transfer distribution is played by candidate i. A first-period strategy pi1 of candidate
i is then given by the choice of the probabilities for different reform-debt bundles and
the choice of the associated transfer distributions:
pi1 = (βi{R;D}, βi{R;ND}, βi{NR;D}, βi{NR;ND}, F i1,{R;D}, F i1,{R;ND}, F i1,{NR;D}, F i1,{NR;ND}).
A second-period strategy pi2 of candidate i consists only of the choice of the second-
period cumulative distribution function F i2. Finally, denote by δ∗ the debt level realized
after the first period.
Feasible strategies. Strategies are feasible if the first-period probabilities of the
different reform-debt bundles add up to one and if the transfer distributions satisfy
the following budget constraints.
First-period budget constraint:
if {NR; D} is chosen,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,{NR;D}(x) = δi = min{(1− γ)δ¯, (1− γ)}; (3.4)
if {NR; ND} is chosen,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,{NR;ND}(x) = δi = 0; (3.5)
if {R; D} is chosen,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,{R;D}(x) = δi − c = min{(1− γ)δ¯, (1− γ)(1 + e)} − c; (3.6)
if {R; ND} is chosen,
∫ +∞
−1
xdF i1,{R;ND}(x) = δi − c = −c; (3.7)
Second-period budget constraint:
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if the reform is not undertaken and for a debt level δ∗ ∈ {0,min{(1−γ)δ¯, 1−
γ}}, ∫ +∞
−1
xdF i2(x) = −δ∗ ·
1
1− γ ; (3.8)
if the reform is undertaken and for a debt level δ∗ ∈ {0,min{(1− γ)δ¯, (1−
γ)(1 + e)}},∫ +∞
−1
xdF i2(x) = e− δ∗ ·
1
1− γ . (3.9)
Thus, in the first period, the additional resources that can on average be given to
each voter are the resources transferred from the future by debt, δi, minus the costs
c that have to be paid in case of reform. In the second period, the debt δ∗ of the
winner of the first-period election has to be repaid. Given the distortion, this requires
a repayment of δ∗ · 11−γ . However, in case of reform, the amount of resources that can
be redistributed across voters increases by the amount of reform benefits e.14
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 1:
Stage 1 Each candidate i = {A,B} plays a strategy pi1 in order to win the election.
Stage 2 Each voter observes her draw (xA1 , xB1 ) from each candidate’s distribution plan,
the reform proposals, the proposals for debt, and then votes.15 When voters are
indifferent between the two candidates, they flip a coin to decide who to vote for.
At period 2, everybody observes the first-period debt level that has to be repaid and
if the reform was undertaken so that the strategies are conditioned on the first-period
outcome; there are two stages:
14Note that since the budget constraints are formulated in terms of transfers, we look at changes
in the existing endowment of people. That is a transfer of -1 means that the person loses its full
endowment. We treat the reform benefits e not as an additional per-capita endowment, but as a
general increase in resources available for transfers (similar to the resources that are additionally
available in the first period if debt is raised). This is why the lower bound of the last integral is −1:
the whole per capita endowment of 1 is taken away and nothing from the additional pie is given to the
worst-off individual. We could also work with e occurring as an additional person-specific endowment,
in which case this lower bound would become −(1 + e) and e would disappear from the right hand
side of the last budget constraint.
15Note that at stage 1, candidates potentially play a mixed strategy against each other in terms
of (not) implementing the reform and in terms of (not) raising public debt. However, at the stage
when voters decide, each candidate is committed to either reform or no-reform and to either the
maximal debt or no debt. This approach is taken because, in terms of finding the equilibrium of the
electoral game, we want to allow politicians to use mixed strategies in case there is no equilibrium
in pure strategies. On the other hand, in terms of the voter decision, we do not want to introduce
limited-commitment issues on the side of politicians.
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Period 2:
Stage 1 Candidates choose distribution plans F i2(·), i = A,B.
Stage 2 Each voter observes her draw (xA2 , xB2 ) from each candidate’s distribution plan
and then votes.
Vote-shares. We denote by Sit(pit, pht ) the share of the votes of candidate i in period
t ∈ {1, 2} if she chooses to play strategy pit and the other candidate h chooses to play
strategy pht . Then, Sht (pht , pit) = 1− Sit(pit, pht ).
The solution concept used is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.3 Second-period political equilibrium
We start by presenting the second-period equilibrium offer distributions.
In terms of the electoral game of the second period, there is no change compared
to a model without debt-related distortions. In case of maximal debt all resources
are necessary for debt repayment, and in case of no debt, the amount of resources
available for redistribution in the second period is also the same as in a model without
debt-related distortions. Following Boyer and Esslinger (2016), define by µ2 the re-
sources beyond existing endowments available in the second period for making transfer
offers. Specifically, µ2 corresponds to the right-hand side of the second-period budget
constraints (3.8) or (3.9). The following proposition derives the equilibrium offer dis-
tributions for any given µ2. The arguments for its proof can be found in Boyer and
Esslinger (2016).
Proposition 3.3.1 In the unique second-period equilibrium, both candidates generate
offers to all voters from a uniform distribution on [−1, 1 + 2µ2].
From the point of view of the first period, voters cannot anticipate which offer they
get in the second period. Therefore, they just anticipate what they get in expectation
in the second period under a certain policy proposed in the first period. Specifically,
if a policy implies resources beyond existing endowments of µ2 in the second period,
each voter has an expected transfer offer of µ2 in the second period.
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3.4 The interaction between public debt and re-
forms for low debt-related distortions
In the following, we analyze the first-period equilibrium, focusing on the interaction
of the reform decision with the decision to raise public debt. In Boyer and Esslinger
(2016), the only decision that has direct efficiency implications is the decision to im-
plement the pie-increasing reform. Due to the implied increase in overall resources
available to the economy, the implementation of the reform is Pareto efficient. On
the other hand, by incurring costs today and creating benefits only in the future, the
reform policy on its own implies a disadvantage in terms of targeting resources to first-
period voters. This is because only resources that are available in the first period can
be targeted to specific voters. By transferring reform-induced second-period resources
to the present, public debt can remedy this problem. Indeed, Boyer and Esslinger
(2016) show that for efficient policies, like the reform, that create their benefits only in
the next electoral cycle while having costs today, the use of public debt can overcome
this disadvantage in terms of targeting first-period voters.
Since raising public debt now creates distortions, the decision to raise debt also
has direct efficiency implications. In particular, avoiding public debt is itself an effi-
cient policy that, in terms of targeting resources to first-period voters, has costs today
and implies an overall increase in available resources realizing only in the future. Im-
portantly, running low public debt is by definition the only such policy that cannot
be incentivized through a higher use of public debt. Hence, it will be interesting to
see how the trade-off between the two efficient dynamic policies of implementing a
pie-increasing reform and avoiding debt-related distortions plays out in political equi-
librium.
Political equilibrium: Main results.
We first present the political equilibrium when there are no exogenous restrictions
on public debt. The following proposition summarizes the main results. A complete
equilibrium characterization can be found in Proposition 3.4.3 below. The proof of
this latter proposition hence also proves the following results.
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Proposition 3.4.1 When the distortion caused by raising the maximal debt is low
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform, γ < e−c1+e , then in equilibrium both
candidates always reform. The candidates mix over playing maximal debt and no debt.
This result shows that, as long as the debt-related distortion is not too high com-
pared to the net benefit of the reform,16 the reform is implemented with probability
one when public debt is not exogenously restricted. The important point is that this
outcome arises although we do not get maximal debt with probability one any more.
Instead, as the second result shows, the candidates mix over playing maximal debt and
no debt. In the setup of Boyer and Esslinger (2016) without debt-related distortions,
debt was always raised to the maximum. In the case of low debt-related distortions,
the incentivizing effect of public debt on reform implementation persists even when
maximal debt is not always employed.
The intuition is the following. In terms of the optimal electoral strategy, what
counts is which debt-reform bundle gives most in terms of efficiency and which bundle
gives most in terms of targetability. Specifically, the most efficient bundle maximizes
the size of the total pie and any strategy that plays this bundle with the right proba-
bility can capitalize on this efficiency advantage. On the other hand, the targetability-
maximizing bundle gives the highest capacity to target resources to a subset of voters at
the expense of others. Any strategy that employs this bundle with the right probability
can capitalize on this capacity.17 In total, the optimal electoral strategy combines both
efficiency and targetability in the best possible manner to maximize the vote share.
As long as there is a distortion caused by raising high public debt, the debt-reform
bundle that maximizes efficiency, in terms of maximizing the size of the total pie, is
reform and no debt, {R; ND}. Due to the distortion, it is actually necessary to raise
no debt in order to achieve the maximal possible efficiency gain.18 Additionally, this
maximal efficiency gain necessitates to implement the pie-increasing reform.
On the other hand, as will be explained in detail below, for a low enough distortion,
the bundle that yields most targetable resources in the first period is reform and
16We will discuss the case of very high distortions in section 3.6.
17A more detailed discussion of the term “targetability” in the context of this paper follows shortly.
Importantly, we use it in a slightly different accentuation than in Boyer and Esslinger (2016).
18In Boyer and Esslinger (2016), there was no need to reduce public debt to achieve maximal
efficiency, since public debt created no distortions.
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maximal debt, {R; D}.19 In terms of maximizing targetability, public debt is hence
necessary to make the implementation of the reform the optimal choice. Here, we can
see the incentivizing effect of public debt on reform implementation described in Boyer
and Esslinger (2016). We can understand this even better after looking at the full
characterization of the equilibrium. This will also help us explain why the no-reform
bundles are not used in the optimal electoral strategy.
Full characterization of equilibrium.
As a preliminary, note that in this and the following sections, when we refer to
transfer offer distributions, we always refer to the distribution of total expected offers.
When voters decide who the vote for in the first period, they vote for the candidate
whose proposal gives them the highest expected transfer offer over both periods. That
is, a voter evaluates candidate i by adding the transfer offer she gets from i in the first
period to the transfer offer she expects in the second period under the debt-reform
bundle proposed by i. This is what we call the total expected offer. That is, voters
anticipate the electoral equilibrium in the second period. Specifically, as we have argued
in section 3.3, the debt-reform bundle chosen in the first period determines the second-
period budget constraint and thereby the expected offer in the second-period electoral
campaign. Assume candidate i has chosen debt-reform bundle Y and an associated
first-period transfer distribution F i1,Y . The distribution of total expected offers, Fˆ i1,Y ,
is then obtained by adding to the first-period distribution of transfer offers, F i1,Y , a
degenerate distribution at µ2,Y . Thereby, µ2,Y denotes the expected transfer offer
in the second-period electoral equilibrium given debt-reform bundle Y was chosen in
the first period. Since the total expected offer over both periods determines the voting
decision in the first period, the distribution of total expected offers is the one politicians
ultimately care about when trying to win the first-period election. Note also that we
consider distributions of net transfers. That is, an offer of −2 means that a voter
completely loses both periods’ endowments, whereas an offer of +1 means that on top
of her endowments, the voter additionally gets a transfer of one unit of resources.
19Even with a continuous debt choice set, as long as the distortion is not too high, the bundle of
reform and maximal debt would still maximize targetability. Even with more than two possible debt
levels, maximal debt should hence always be played with some probability in order to capitalize on
this targetability advantage.
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Any reform-debt bundle Y is defined by three characteristics in terms of the dis-
tribution of total expected transfers that can be offered under this bundle. First,
denote by MY the additional resources that are available above the already existing
endowments under bundle Y .20 Therefore, MY = 0 means that any positive transfer
to one voter has to be financed by a negative transfer of the same absolute amount
to another voter. In the case of distortions, MY can also take a negative value when
debt-related costs make resources drop below the existing endowments. For efficiency
- in terms of maximizing the total size of the resource pie - only the resource constraint
matters. Hence, MY > MZ means that bundle Y has a higher efficiency than bundle
Z in the sense that the total amount of resources is bigger. Second, denote by lY the
lowest possible offer under bundle Y . This will be the lower bound of the support of
the transfer distribution that is played under this bundle. Third, denote by uY the
maximal offer that can be financed for 50 percent of voters given a lowest possible
offer lY and a budget beyond existing endowments of MY : uY = 2MY − lY . This will
be the upper bound of the support of the distribution that is played under bundle Y .
Since targetability refers to the capacity to benefit one subset of voters at the expense
of another subset, a comparison of these maximal offers under different debt-reform
bundles gives us a ranking of these bundles in terms of targetability. That is bundle
Y has higher targetability than bundle Z if uY > uZ . We define uY − uZ as the net
targetability advantage of bundle Y over bundle Z.
We summarize the above in the following definition:
Definition 3.4.2 Consider two debt-reform bundles Y and Z.
Efficiency: Define Mj as the additional resources that are available above the al-
ready existing endowments under debt-reform bundle j. Then bundle Y has a higher
efficiency than bundle Z if MY > MZ. The bundle that maximizes efficiency is indexed
by E for efficiency.
Targetability: Define uj as the maximal (total expected) offer that can be financed
for 50 percent of voters under bundle j given a lowest possible offer lj and a budget
beyond existing endowments of Mj: uj = 2Mj − lj. Then bundle Y has higher tar-
20In terms of the budget constraints (3.4) to (3.9), MY can be calculated by adding up the right-
hand sides of the first- and second-period budget constraints for a given debt-reform choice Y .
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getability than bundle Z if uY > uZ. The bundle that maximizes targetability is indexed
by T for targetability.
Net Targetability Advantage: uY − uZ is called the net targetability advantage
of bundle Y over bundle Z.
The reason for the terminology net targetability advantage is the following. When
relating targetability to the maximal total expected offer that can be financed for half
of the voters, higher (net) targetability refers to the following: A policy bundle has a
net targetability advantage, when the more in targetable resources of this bundle over
a more efficient bundle is enough to compensate at least a majority of voters for the
loss in total resources compared to the more efficient policy bundle. Seen the other
way, consider a policy bundle that has more targetable resources in the first period
than the efficiency-maximizing bundle E. At the same time, it loses so much resources
in terms of the total size of the pie that the highest total expected transfer that can
be offered to half of the voters under this bundle is lower than uE. Such a bundle will
have a net targetability disadvantage compared to bundle E. In the following, when
we talk about higher targetability, we always mean the just described advantage in
terms of net targetability.
We are now in a position to state the full characterization of the equilibrium. It
can be found in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.4.3 Suppose the debt-related distortion is low enough compared to the
net benefit of the reform such that γ < e−c1+e . Then we have:
(a) The bundle {R; ND} maximizes efficiency:21 E = {R; ND}. At the same time,
{R; ND} has the lowest targetability.
(b) The bundle {R; D} maximizes targetability: T = {R; D}.
(c) Furthermore, the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {R; D} has higher effi-
ciency than the no-reform bundles, {NR; ND} and {NR; D}.
This implies that in equilibrium:
21In this and the following propositions, when we refer to efficiency or targetability, we always refer
to them as defined in Definition 3.4.2
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(i) Both candidates play the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {R; D} with prob-
ability βT = 2HuT−lT , where H = uT − uE is the net targetability advantage of
the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {R; D} over the efficiency-maximizing
bundle E = {R; ND}.
(ii) Both candidates play the efficiency-maximizing bundle E = {R; ND} with prob-
ability βE = 1− βT .
(iii) Both candidates play the no-reform bundles {NR; D} and {NR; ND} with prob-
ability zero.
(iv) Both candidates play the distributions of total expected transfer offers illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Transfer offer distributions without debt limit
The complete proof of Proposition 3.4.3 relies on applying Proposition B.2.1 in
the appendix. More specifically, the above proposition follows from Corollary B.1.1 to
Proposition B.2.1, which are both stated and proven in the appendix.
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Intuition and interpretation of results.
As already mentioned in the discussion following Proposition 3.4.1, the two factors
that determine the use of different debt-reform bundles in the optimal electoral strat-
egy are efficiency and targetability. The bundle {R; ND} maximizes the size of the
pie by implementing the pie-increasing reform while at the same time avoiding any loss
of resources by not creating any distortions through public debt. This bundle hence
maximizes efficiency and is therefore indexed by E. The resources beyond existing
endowments under this bundle, ME, are higher than for any other bundle. Never-
theless, this efficiency gain comes at the expense of a loss in targetability. First, by
not transferring future resources to the present, these resources cannot be targeted to
current voters. Second, by implementing a reform that costs resources today, further
targetable resources in the first period are lost and the reform gains in the future are
again not targetable. In terms of Definition 3.4.2, bundle {R; ND} has the lowest
targetability in the sense that the highest possible offer uE that can be offered to half
of the voters under this bundle is lower than for all other bundles. Nevertheless, in
order to capitalize on the efficiency gain implied by bundle E = {R; ND}, the optimal
electoral strategy plays this bundle with a uniform transfer distribution with support
[lE, uE], reminiscent of the uniform distribution in Myerson (1993). Due to its dom-
inance in terms of total resources, bundle E = {R; ND} cannot be attacked on this
support by any other bundle.
The only chance for other bundles to be played with positive probability is to make
use of a targetability advantage and offer below and above the support of bundle E.
If the debt-related distortion is low enough compared to the net benefit of the reform,
as is the case in the above proposition,22 then the bundle {R; D}, which combines
the reform with the maximal debt, maximizes targetability and is therefore indexed
by T . Specifically, for low enough distortions, not too much is lost in the process
of transferring money across time and so transferring the existing endowment to the
present through debt implies a higher targetability than not raising debt. This means
that out of the no-reform bundles, the bundle with debt, {NR; D}, has a higher
targetability than the one without debt, {NR; ND}. Furthermore, when transferring
the reform benefits to the present through debt, still enough resources arrive in the
22We will discuss the case where the distortion γ is very high in section 3.6.
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the first period to compensate for the reform costs incurred in that first period. This
implies, in particular, that out of the debt bundles, the reform bundle, {R; D}, has
higher targetability than the no-reform bundle, {NR; D}. In total, bundle T = {R; D}
therefore dominates all other bundles in terms of targetability. In terms of Definition
3.4.2, bundle {R; D} has the highest targetability in the sense that the maximal total
expected transfer uT that can be offered under this bundle is higher than for all other
bundles.
In particular, the highest offer uT that can be financed under bundle T is greater
than uE, and we have H = uT − uE > 0. We defined H as the net targetability
advantage of T over E. In particular, bundle T can offer transfers in the interval
[uE, uT ] above the support of E and finance these by offers in the interval [lT , lT +
H], which lies below the support of E. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that
bundle T can only finance offers above the highest possible offer of E, because it can
take more away from the worst-off voters and shift these resources to the best-off
voters. Hence, the higher maximal offer of T comes purely from this higher ability
to shift resources.23 In terms of the optimal electoral strategy, it makes sense to
make use of this net targetability advantage of bundle T by playing half of the offers
uniformly distributed on [uE, uT ] above the support of E and finance these offers by
offers uniformly distributed on the interval [lT , lT + H], which lies below the support
of E. The equilibrium probabilities with which the two bundles E and T are played
are then constructed in a way such that it does not make sense to shift more than half
of the offers above uE for bundle T .24
Intuitively, the use of both bundles E = {R; ND} and T = {R; D} in the way
described in the Proposition makes optimal use of the efficiency advantage of bundle
{R; ND} and the net targetability advantage of bundle {R; D}. In particular, note
that as the net targetability advantage H of bundle {R; D} over bundle {R; ND} goes
down, the probability βT with which the targetability maximizing bundle T = {R; D}
is played goes down. Intuitively, the net targetability advantage of bundle {R; D}
then loses significance compared to the efficiency advantage of bundle {R; ND}.
23If T where restricted to offer lE as its lowest possible offer, it would only be able to finance a
maximal offer below uE because of lower total resources than bundle E.
24Specifically, such a shift would win more votes when the other candidate plays bundle E, but
would lose votes when the other candidate plays bundle T . With the equilibrium probabilities of
playing bundles E and T , the second effect dominates and the shift would imply a decrease in the
total expected vote share.
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We are now in a position to explain why only the bundles involving reform are
played with positive probability, while the no-reform bundles are played with proba-
bility zero for the case in Proposition 3.4.3. Since we always have that E = {R; ND}
dominates all other bundles in terms of efficiency, neither of the no-reform bundles,
{NR; D} and {NR; ND}, can attack the efficiency-maximizing bundle E = {R; ND}
on its support [lE, uE]. The only possibility for these bundles to be played is to make
use of their net targetability advantage against E and play offers in the intervals
[uE, u{NR;D}] or [uE, u{NR;ND}] above uE.25 However, these intervals lie inside the
support of bundle T = {R; D}, since T has the highest net targetability advantage
over bundle E. If the distortion fulfills the condition in the corollary, γ < e−c1+e , then
the net gain from the reform is high enough compared to the distortionary costs of
public debt to make T = {R; D} dominate both no-reform bundles not only in terms
of targetability but also in terms of efficiency. This efficiency advantage of T implies
that the no-reform bundles cannot attack bundle T = {R; D} an its support either.
Therefore, they are played with probability zero.
3.5 Constitutional limit on debt
We now want to see which effects the introduction of an exogenous restriction on public
debt has on the outcome of the electoral game. Since public debt creates distortions
in the above model, a debt limit should have a direct positive effect on efficiency by
reducing the costs incurred when using high public debt. On the other hand, as was
shown in Boyer and Esslinger (2016) for the case without debt distortions and as was
confirmed in the previous section for the case with distortions, public debt has an in-
direct positive effect on efficiency. In particular, a reform policy with costs today and
benefits in the future implies a targetability disadvantage when reform benefits are left
in the future. Public debt, through transferring the reform benefits to the present,
can turn this targetability disadvantage into a targetability advantage. As was shown
in the previous section for distortions that are not too high, the unrestricted use of
public debt allowed the policy bundle of reform and debt, {R; D}, to actually max-
imize targetability and therefore be played alongside the most efficient policy bundle
25Again, such offers would be financed by offers below uE .
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of reform and no debt, {R; ND}, as part of the political equilibrium. If we restrict
the use of public debt, a no-reform bundle might replace the reform bundle {R; D}
as the targetability-maximizing bundle and in that sense efficiency would be indirectly
decreased through a restriction on public debt. The following analysis investigates this
trade-off in more detail.
Recall that we defined the debt limit δ¯ as the level of second-period resources that
is allowed to be used for the repayment of debt. To allow comparability to Boyer
and Esslinger (2016), for the equilibrium characterization, we work with a modified
definition of the debt limit. We define ρ¯ = δ¯ − 1 so that ρ¯ > 0 implies that maximally
δ¯ = 1 + ρ¯ second-period resources can be used for the repayment of debt. The term ρ¯
then captures the amount of resources beyond the second-period endowment of 1 that
can be committed to the repayment of debt.26 Similarly, ρ¯ < 0 implies that maximally
δ¯ = 1 + ρ¯ < 1 second-period resources can be used for the repayment of debt. In
that case, ρ¯ captures the amount by which the debt repayment capacity lies below the
second-period endowment of 1.27
Political equilibrium: Main results.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategies in terms of reform
and public debt decisions. Proposition 3.5.2 below presents the complete equilibrium
characterization.
Proposition 3.5.1 Suppose the distortion caused by raising the maximal debt is small
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform such that γ < e−c1+e , and suppose that
there is a constitutional debt limit ρ¯ ∈ (−1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , e].
(I.) When the debt limit ρ¯ is not very restrictive in the sense that ρ¯ > 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 ,
then in equilibrium both candidates always reform and mix over playing no debt and
the maximal debt. With a stricter debt limit (i.e. when ρ¯ decreases), the probability
with which the efficient policy bundle {R; ND} is played increases.
(II.) When the debt limit ρ¯ is restrictive enough such that ρ¯ < 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , then in equi-
26Of course, only in the case of reform, more resources than the second-period endowment can be
committed to debt repayment. Specifically, the reform benefits provide such additional resources.
27Note that with a distortion, the repayment capacity does not correspond to how many resources
will arrive in the first period. Recall that a distortion implies that debt in the first period is actually
restricted to be below (1− γ)(1 + ρ¯).
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librium both candidates start playing the most inefficient policy bundle {NR; D} along-
side the reform bundles {R; ND} and {R; D}. With a stricter debt limit (i.e. when
ρ¯ decreases), the probability with which the most inefficient policy bundle {NR; D} is
played increases, while the probability of the reform bundle {R; D} decreases.
Before turning to the interpretation of the results, note the following preliminary.
By our assumptions, the cut-off 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 that separates non-restrictive from restrictive
debt limits lies in the interval (0, e). That is, above this cut-off, a debt limit only
restricts the transfer of reform benefits across time. Below this cutoff, once the debt
limit drops below zero, the debt limit also restricts the transfer of the second-period
endowment across time.
The first part of the proposition shows that if the debt limit is not too restrictive
and allows a high enough transfer of future reform benefits to the present, the reform
and debt policy bundle, {R; D}, still maximizes targetability and is played alongside
the efficiency-maximizing bundle {R; ND} in the political equilibrium. Nevertheless,
the net targetability advantage that the reform bundle with debt, {R; D}, has over
the reform bundle without debt, {R; ND}, decreases when the use of public debt
becomes more restricted. This implies that the efficiency advantage of bundle {R; ND}
gets a higher weight compared to the net targetability advantage of bundle {R; D}
in the optimal policy mix. Therefore, the probability of bundle {R; D} goes down.
Said differently, in the range where the debt limit is still so non-restrictive that only
reform bundles are played with positive probability, a stricter debt limit increases the
probability with which the most efficient policy bundle {R; ND} is played. Thus, a
debt limit in this range has two effects. First, there is a direct effect because allowing
a lower maximal level of public debt reduces the distortionary costs that go along
with this maximal debt level. Second, there is an indirect efficiency-enhancing effect
by reducing the net targetability advantage of the policy bundle involving debt and
increasing the probability with which the most efficient bundle involving no debt is
played. The full characterization of the equilibrium for part one of the proposition can
be found in Corollary B.1.2 in the Appendix. It corresponds closely to Proposition
3.4.3 presented in the previous section for the case without debt limit.
The second part of the proposition shows that the effects get more involved when
the debt limit drops below the level 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 > 0. In that case, the part of the reform
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benefits that can be transferred to the present is too low to compensate for the reform
costs and to keep the policy bundle {R; D} the targetability-maximizing bundle. In-
stead, the most inefficient bundle {NR; D}, which combines no reform with maximal
debt becomes the bundle with the highest net targetability advantage over the most
efficient bundle {R; ND}. This is an indirect negative effect on efficiency that was not
present for the non-restrictive debt limit in part one of the proposition. It is the effect
that was highlighted in Boyer and Esslinger (2016): The fact that reform costs occur in
the present while reform benefits realize only in the future gives non-reform policies a
targetability advantage when public debt becomes too restricted. To understand why
the {R; D} policy is still played with positive probability although it is now dominated
in terms of targetability by {NR; D}, it helps to look at the full characterization of the
equilibrium. This will also help us explain the comparative static results concerning a
change in the debt limit.
Restrictive debt limit: Full characterization of equilibrium.
The full characterization of the equilibrium for the case of a restrictive debt limit
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.2 Suppose the distortion caused by raising the maximal debt is small
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform such that γ < e−c1+e , and suppose that
there is a constitutional debt limit ρ¯ ∈ (−1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , e].
Suppose furthermore the debt limit ρ¯ is restrictive in the sense that ρ¯ < 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 .
Then we have:
(a) The bundle {R; ND} maximizes efficiency: E = {R; ND}. At the same time,
{R; ND} has the lowest targetability.
(b) The bundle {NR; D} maximizes targetability: T = {NR; D}. At the same time
{NR; D} has the lowest efficiency.
(c) The bundle {R; D}, which is indexed by I, dominates the remaining bundle
{NR; ND} in terms of efficiency and targetability.
This implies that in equilibrium:
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(i) Both candidates play the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; D} with
probability βT = 2H
′′
uT−lT , where H
′′ = uT − uI is the net targetability advantage of
the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {R; D} over bundle I = {R; D}, which
has the second highest targetability. This probability increases with a stricter debt
limit (with smaller ρ¯).
(ii) Both candidates play bundle I = {R; D} with probability βI = 2H′uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT
where H ′ = uI −uE is the net targetability advantage of bundle I = {R; D} over
the efficiency-maximizing bundle E = {R; ND}. This probability decreases with
a stricter debt limit (with smaller ρ¯).
(iii) Both candidates play the efficiency-maximizing bundle E = {R; ND} with prob-
ability βE = 1− βI − βT .
(iv) Both candidates play the remaining bundle {NR; ND} with probability zero.
(v) Both candidates play the distributions of total expected offers illustrated in Figure
3.2.
The complete proof of Proposition 3.5.2 relies on applying Proposition B.2.2 in
the appendix. More specifically, the above proposition follows from Corollary B.1.3 to
Proposition B.2.2, which are both stated and proven in the appendix.
Interpretation of results.
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, once the debt limit ρ¯ drops below 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , the
no-reform policy bundle {NR; D} achieves the highest possible offer uT and therefore
becomes the bundle that maximizes targetability. Since it has lower total resources
than the resource-maximizing policy bundle E = {R; ND}, the offer distribution
associated to bundle T = {NR; D} will again not be played on the support of bundle
E.
Nevertheless, we now get the situation that bundle I = {R; D}, which was the
targetability-maximizing policy bundle before, still dominates bundle E in terms of
targetability and can play offers above and below the support of E. Importantly,
bundle I = {R; D} has higher efficiency than bundle T = {NR; D}, because resources
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Figure 3.2: Transfer offer distributions for restrictive debt limit
are higher under reform than under no-reform, MI > MT . This means that bundle
T cannot attack bundle I on its support. Intuitively, in order to make optimal use
of the efficiency gain of bundle I = {R; D} over bundle T = {NR; D} and the net
targetability advantage of bundle I = {R; D} over bundle E = {R; ND} , it makes
sense to still play bundle I alongside the efficiency-maximizing bundle E and the
targetability-maximizing bundle T .
The last bundle {NR; ND} has lower efficiency than bundle E = {R; ND} and
can therefore only have offers outside the support of bundle E. At the same time, it
has lower targetability than bundle I = {R; D} in the sense that u{NR;ND} < uI .28
This is because, for low enough debt-related distortions,29 the gain in targetability
from raising debt versus not raising debt is higher than the gain in targetability from
not reforming versus reforming. Therefore, with u{NR;ND} < uI , bundle {NR; ND}
can only play offers inside the support of bundle I. However, bundle I = {R; D}
also dominates bundle {NR; ND} in terms of efficiency. Specifically, for low enough
debt-related distortions, as considered here, the efficiency gain from reforming versus
not reforming is higher than the efficiency gain from not raising debt versus raising
28This holds if the debt limit is not extremely strict, ρ¯ > −1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , as assumed in the above
proposition. Otherwise, potentially all four policies are played. For this case, further formal tools
beyond Propositions B.2.1 and B.2.2 need to be developed. This is left as a task for future research.
29Recall that, in this section, we are still considering a distortion that fulfills γ < e−c1+e .
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debt. With I = {R; D} dominating {NR; ND} in terms of efficiency, I hence cannot
be attacked by {NR; ND} on its support. As just argued, the support of I was the
last remaining option for offers of bundle {NR; ND}. That is why bundle {NR; ND}
is played with probability zero.
Comparative statics for probabilities of different policies.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the relationship between the equilibrium probabilities with
which the different bundles are played and the strictness of the debt limit for the
following parameter values: e = 0.4; c = 0.3; γ = 0.6 e−c1+e .
30 We plotted the same graph
for different parameter specifications, and we will discuss the difference across different
specifications at the end. The main effects we discuss here for Figure 3.3 are present
across all specifications, however the relative size of different effects varies.31
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium probabilities of policy bundles
30The values are chosen such that all our assumptions hold. For instance, 2c = 0.6 > 0.4 = e, or
γ = 0.6 e−c1+e <
e−c
1+e .
31Note that the intention here is still a qualitative analysis. In that sense, the above parametrization
should not be seen as capturing a realistic size of reform benefits compared to the endowment of an
economy. For such a quantitative analysis the above model is too stylized with its two-period setup
and the fact that here the full endowment is targetable across voters.
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The figure has to be read starting from the right at the highest possible debt limit
of ρ¯ = e = 0.4. As we can see, there is a range of debt levels for which only the reform
policy bundles {R; ND} and {R; D} are played with positive probability. This was
described in part (I.) of Proposition 3.5.1. It is the case as long as the debt limit is
non-restrictive in the sense that ρ¯ > 2c−e2(1−γ)−1(≈ 0.22). For this case, we have also
explained above that with a stricter debt limit, the net targetability advantage of the
policy bundle involving debt, {R; D}, goes down. Therefore, this bundle is played with
lower probability if we move to the left. Correspondingly, the most efficient bundle,
{R; ND}, which does not involve debt, is played with a higher probability.
When the debt limit ρ¯ drops below the cut-off 2c−e2(1−γ)−1(≈ 0.22), we enter the realm
of part (II.) of Proposition 3.5.1 and the most inefficient bundle {NR; D} becomes
the targetability-maximizing bundle. As we can see in Figure 3.3, if the debt limit
ρ¯ is in the range [0, 2c−e2(1−γ)−1), then a stricter debt limit implies that policy bundle
{NR; D} replaces policy bundle {R; D} in the sense that the probability of the latter
decreases in almost the same manner as the probability of the former increases. The
probability βE of the efficient bundle E = {NR; D} stays almost constant in this
range. Analytically, the reaction of βE to a stricter debt limit can actually go both
ways.
The intuition for these results is the following. In the range ρ¯ ∈ [0, 2c−e2(1−γ)−1), policy
bundle {NR; D} has the highest maximal offer uT and hence the highest degree of
targetability. In terms of Figure 3.2, this maximal offer as well as the maximal offer
uE of the efficient bundle stay the same as long as ρ¯ ∈ [0, 2c−e2(1−γ)−1). The only effect
is that with a stricter debt limit less reform benefits can be transferred to the present
and so the maximal offer uI under policy {R; D} decreases with a stricter debt limit.
This means that uT − uI , the net targetability advantage of the debt policy involving
no-reform, T = {NR; D}, over the other two policy bundles increases. Therefore,
policy bundle T = {NR; D} is played with higher probability, whereas the sum of the
probabilities of the other two bundles goes down. The relative size of the probabilities
of these other two bundles is then determined by the following. With less possibility to
transfer the reform benefits to the present, the net targetability advantage of bundle
I = {R; D} over the efficient bundle E = {R; ND}, uI − uE, decreases. Therefore,
the reform and debt bundle I should be played with lower probability relative to the
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efficient bundle E. Furthermore, recall from above that the sum of the probabilities
of E and I, βE + βI , decreases. Therefore, bundle I is unambiguously played with a
lower probability when the debt limit becomes stricter. For bundle E, there are two
countervailing effects. On the one hand, βE + βI decreases, on the other hand, bundle
E’s probability relative to bundle I’s probability increases. As Figure 3.3 illustrates,
for the range ρ¯ ∈ [0, 2c−e2(1−γ)−1), the two effects basically cancel for bundle E and it is
played with an almost constant probability.
As soon as the debt limit ρ¯ drops below zero, besides completely restricting the
transfer of reform benefits across time, the debt limit now also restricts how much of
the second-period endowment can be transferred across time.32 This implies that for
ρ¯ < 0, both debt policies I = {R; D} and T = {NR; D} lose targetability in the same
degree when the debt limit becomes stricter. Specifically, both lose targetability in the
degree that a stricter debt limit lets both of them only transfer a lower amount of the
existing second-period endowment to the present. This implies that uT − uI , the net
targetability advantage of the debt policy involving no-reform, T = {NR; D} over the
other two policy bundles stays constant when the debt limit becomes stricter. However,
uT − lT , the range of the support of the targetability-maximizing transfer distribution,
decreases. This range captures the maximal size of the targetable pie. When the size
of the targetable pie decreases, this implies that a given net targetability advantage
gains a higher relative importance. This effect has also been highlighted in Boyer
and Esslinger (2016) for the case without debt distortions. Therefore, for ρ¯ < 0, the
probability of the inefficient but targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; D} still
increases with a stricter debt limit compared to the other two bundles, because its
targetability advantage gains relatively more weight with a lower size of the targetable
pie.
For ρ¯ < 0, the net targetability advantage of the debt policy bundle I = {R; D}
over the efficient no-debt bundle E = {R; ND} also still decreases with a stricter debt
limit. Specifically, debt can be used less and less to gain a targetability advantage by
transferring future resources to the present. Therefore, the probability of I = {R; D}
decreases unambiguously, as was the case for ρ¯ ∈ [0, 2c−e2(1−γ)−1). For the efficient bundle
E = {NR; D}, there are again the two countervailing effects: its probability relative
32Recall from the definition of ρ¯ that for ρ¯ < 0, ρ¯ captures the amount by which the debt repayment
capacity lies below the second-period endowment of 1.
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to the probability of bundle I increases, but the combined probability of bundles E
and I decreases. Nevertheless, our numerical simulations show that for ρ¯ < 0, the first
effect seems to dominate. This might have to do with the fact that the increase of
the probability of the targetability-maximizing bundle is no longer based on a direct
increase in targetability compared to the other two bundles. Instead, it is only based on
the indirect effect of a decrease in the targetable pie, which makes a given targetability
advantage more important. Hence, for ρ¯ < 0, it seems that with a stricter debt limit
the most efficient policy is played with a higher probability.
Implications of results.
In total, when there are distortions related to raising high public debt, we have to
weigh several effects against each other. First, there is a direct efficiency-enhancing
effect of a debt limit, which was only shortly mentioned in the above discussion: With
a stricter debt limit, any policy bundle involving public debt can only raise lower public
debt and therefore will create a lower loss in resources due to distortions.33 However,
this effect has to be qualified in the following manner. For low enough levels of public
debt, debt-related distortions might no longer be present. For instance, if one thinks
of the distortionary costs coming from a reduced tax-smoothing capacity at high debt-
levels, then such costs will not arise for a moderate debt level. Hence, the above
efficiency-enhancing effect should be most prominent for still quite high debt limits.
This cautionary note applies to all effects that are linked to debt-related distortions,
and we will discuss it also for the following effects.34
Besides the just described direct efficiency-enhancing effect of a debt limit, there are
indirect effects. By determining the net targetability advantage of different policies, the
debt limit determines the probability with which different policy bundles are played.
In particular, once the debt limit becomes restrictive in the sense that ρ¯ drops below
2c−e
2(1−γ)−1 , the most inefficient policy of no reform and debt, {NR; D}, is played with
higher and higher probability. As we have seen, for ρ¯ < 0 this effect might be partly
compensated by the fact that the most efficient policy {R; ND} is also played with
33However, as long as ρ¯ > 0, the {NR; D} policy is not affected by a stricter debt limit in terms
of the maximal amount of debt that can be raised.
34Note that the arguments presented in this paper still go through if, instead of no debt, a debt
level below which no distortions arise can be played as the alternative to maximal debt.
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higher probability. However, let us take again into account that, below a certain level
of debt, no distortions should arise anymore. Then, as soon as the debt limit restricts
public debt below this level, we would again be in the no-distortions case from Boyer
and Esslinger (2016). That is, only the policies {NR; D} and {R; D} would be played.
In that case, Figure 3.3 would change to Figure 3.4. Once the debt limit reaches
the level below which no distortionary costs are to be expected (ρ¯ = −0.3 in Figure
3.4), policies that raise debt up to this limit have no efficiency disadvantage anymore
compared to no-debt policies. In particular, {R; D} would have the same efficiency
as {R; ND} but higher targetability and hence would always be played as the unique
reform policy bundle. Similarly, {NR; D} would be the unique no-reform bundle that
is played. In this range, the only effect of a debt limit is hence the one described in
Boyer and Esslinger (2016) that a stricter debt limit makes the more efficient reform
policy bundle less likely to be implemented.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium probabilities without distortions below a certain level of debt
In summary, we can draw the following policy recommendations from the above
analysis. First, when setting a debt limit, one should be careful only to restrict public
debt up to a point where debt-related distortions are no longer likely to arise. If debt
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is restricted below such debt levels, then there is no direct efficiency-enhancing effect
of a debt limit and the indirect effect is negative in the sense that a stricter debt limit
makes efficient reforms less likely to be implemented.
Second, in the range of debt levels where distortionary costs of public debt are
likely to arise, a debt limit has a direct efficiency-enhancing effect by reducing these
distortionary costs. Furthermore, by decreasing the targetability advantage of the
reform policy involving debt over the most efficient reform policy involving no debt,
there is a positive indirect effect by increasing the relative probability with which
the more efficient no-debt policy bundle is played amongst the reform policy bundles.
Nevertheless, these two efficiency-enhancing effects still are counterbalanced by the
effect that the most inefficient policy of no-reform and debt becomes the targetability-
maximizing policy and is played with higher and higher probability. In reality, these
effects hence have to be weighed against each other when setting a debt limit.
At this point, it makes sense to discuss how the shape of Figure 3.3 changes for
different parameter values.35 When increasing the net reform benefits e − c while
keeping reform costs c constant,36 the efficiency-decreasing effect of a debt limit is lower
in the sense that the inefficient {NR; D} policy is played with rather low probability.
Intuitively, due to the high implied efficiency gain, reforms with higher net benefits
are attractive even if they imply a loss in targetable resources. In this case, the main
effect of a debt limit is that among the reform bundles, the efficient no-debt policy is
played with higher and higher probability. For high benefits of contemplated reforms,
stricter debt limits hence do not harm as much in terms of the probability of reform
implementation. However, a given decrease in this probability is worse because higher
net reform benefits are foregone. Furthermore, one should still not overshoot the
goal and restrict debt below levels where distortions are no longer likely to arise. In
contrast, for lower reform benefits, the efficiency-decreasing effect in terms of increasing
the probability of the most inefficient policy bundle {NR; D} is quite pronounced.
However, the forgone net reform benefits in case of not implementing the reform are
35See Figures B.1 and B.2 in the appendix for alternative specifications of the reform benefits e
given fixed reform costs c.
36For all our parametrizations, the size of the net benefit e − c always respects assumption (3.3):
2c > e. If the net reform benefits are so high that e > 2c, then the reform will always go through
the political process, because its efficiency gain trumps any targetability considerations. In that case,
it therefore does not matter for reform implementation how much debt is allowed. In reality, these
highly beneficial reforms should however be rather rare.
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lower. Depending on the specific situation, it can make sense to allow a debt level
where distortions can still arise. These distortions are then counterbalanced by the
positive effect on reform implementation. Note, however, that the above model can
only give qualitative recommendations. It is not intended as a quantitative model that
can put specific sizes on the different effects.
3.6 The interaction between public debt and re-
forms for high debt-related distortions
Note that the results in the previous two sections have been derived under the assump-
tion that the debt-related distortion was not too high compared to the net benefit of
the reform: γ < e−c1+e . If the distortion rises above this level, possibly all four bundles
are played at the same time, especially when a debt limit gets involved. The formal
analysis of this case requires a further development of the tools presented in Proposi-
tions B.2.1 and B.2.2 in the appendix, and it is left for future research. Nevertheless, it
is possible to analyze the case of very high distortions and no debt limit with an appli-
cation of Proposition B.2.1. The results for this case are summarized in the following
proposition. This proposition follows from Corollary B.1.4 to Proposition B.2.1, which
are both stated and proven in the appendix.
Proposition 3.6.1 Suppose the debt-related distortion is so high that γ > 12 . Then
we have:
(a) The bundle {R; ND} maximizes efficiency: E = {R; ND}.
(b) The bundle {NR; ND} maximizes targetability: T = {NR; ND}
(c) Furthermore, the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; ND} has higher
efficiency than the debt bundles, {R; D} and {NR; D}
This implies that in equilibrium
(i) Both candidates play the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; ND} with
probability βT = 2HuT−lT , where H = uT − uE is the net targetability advan-
tage of the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; ND} over the efficiency-
maximizing bundle E = {R; ND}.
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(ii) Both candidates play the efficiency-maximizing bundle E = {R; ND} with prob-
ability βE = 1− βT .
(iii) Both candidates play the debt bundles {NR; D} and {R; D} with probability zero.
(iv) both candidates play the distributions of total expected offers illustrated in Figure
3.1. However, T is now the no-debt bundle {NR; ND}.
As these results show, with high enough debt-related distortions, the loss in re-
sources through the use of public debt is so high that the no-debt policy bundles are
the only bundles that are played in the political equilibrium. In particular, the bundle
that plays no reform and no debt, {NR; ND}, now dominates all other bundles in
terms of net targetability. This is because so much is lost of the second-period endow-
ment when transferring it to the first period, that the more in resources in the first
period cannot compensate for the high efficiency loss. The net targetability in the sense
of what can maximally be offered to 50 percent of voters is higher with {NR; ND}
than {NR; D}. Similarly, so much is lost when transferring the reform benefits to the
first period that it is not enough to compensate for the loss in targetable resources due
to the reform costs. In terms of net targetability, {NR; D} can offer more to voters
than {R; D}. Finally, clearly {NR; ND} must dominate the most efficient bundle
{R; ND} in terms of net targetability. This is because, when both bundles do not
raise debt, the no-reform bundle has more to target due to saving on the targetable
first-period reform costs in exchange for giving up the non-targetable second-period
reform benefits.
In terms of the equilibrium probabilities with which the different bundles are played,
the same reasoning as for Proposition 3.4.3 now applies. The efficient bundle E =
{R; ND} cannot be attacked on its support by any bundle, because it dominates in
terms of total available resources. The only chance for the debt bundles {NR; D} and
{R; D} to be played is to attack the targetability-maximizing bundle T = {NR; ND}
on its support, which lies above and below the support of E. However, due to the
high costs of public debt, bundle T also dominates these two debt bundles in terms of
efficiency. Therefore, the debt bundles {NR; D} and {R; D} have no chance against
bundle T on its support either. Therefore, the debt bundles are played with zero
probability.
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This implies that with high enough debt-related distortions the political process
takes care of eliminating public debt itself. In particular, since voters in the first
period are forward looking, they only promote a less efficient policy if the efficiency
loss can still be compensated for at least a majority of voters. Recall that, only under
the following condition does a less efficient policy bundle with more targetable resources
today have a net targetability advantage: The more in targetable resources in the first
period is enough to compensate at least 50 percent of the electorate for the efficiency
loss implied by that bundle. Otherwise, the more efficient bundle also dominates in
terms of net targetability. This is exactly what happens with very high debt-related
distortions. Even though the use of public debt gives more targetable resources today,
the implied efficiency loss is so high that in terms of net targetability a majority of
voters cannot be convinced to support such high inefficiency.
This result shows that, if voters are fully informed about an impending danger for
high debt-related distortions, they should support low-debt policies even in an envi-
ronment where each voter tries to get out as much as possible for herself in terms of
current electoral favors. In that vain, the recent European debt crisis can have a posi-
tive effect, because it clearly demonstrated such costs for several European economies.
Due to the involvement of the whole Eurozone in solving the crisis, these costs also
became imprinted in the awareness of European citizens whose country was not itself
directly hit by a debt crisis.
In terms of intermediate debt-related distortions, which are not quite as high as
discussed in this section, but higher as in the previous sections, we hypothesize a mix
of the highlighted mechanisms. On the one hand, with higher debt-related distortions,
the direct and indirect efficiency gains induced by a debt limit weigh stronger. On
the other hand, the dis-incentivizing effect on reform implementation still remains.
Additionally, the argument that a debt limit should never restrict debt below the point
where distortions do no longer arise still has full validity here. In particular, it also
applies when the distortions in the range of high debt levels are higher. Furthermore,
as shown in this section, the higher debt-related distortions become, the more no-debt
policies will become attractive on their own due to their higher efficiency and do not
need to be incentivized too much through a very strict debt limit. A full formal analysis
of the case of intermediate debt-related distortions is certainly an interesting task for
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future research.
3.7 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the interaction between distortionary public debt and growth-
enhancing reforms in a setup of electoral competition where politicians try to win votes
by targeting available resources to subsets of voters. The presence of distortions caused
by high debt levels gives any high-debt policy a direct negative impact on efficiency in
the sense of reducing the total size of the pie. On the other hand the growth-enhancing
reform has a positive effect on efficiency by increasing the total size of the pie. In an
electoral setup of targeted redistribution, the factor besides efficiency that determines
the electoral success of different policies is how well a given pie of resources can be
targeted to specific subsets of voters. Since the reform has costs today, while its benefits
only realize in the future, it gives politicians less possibility to target current voters.
This is because future resources cannot be promised in the present due to electoral
uncertainty between the present and the future. By allowing a transfer of future
resources to the present, public debt can help overcome this targetability disadvantage
of the reform. In terms of the capacity to target voters under a proposed policy bundle,
the interaction between public debt and reform is therefore essential.
A recent paper by Boyer and Esslinger (2016) has analyzed this interaction between
public and reforms for the case where high public debt did not create any distortions
and hence did not directly effect efficiency. In that case, a limit on public debt is
detrimental. This is because the only effect of public debt is the indirect efficiency-
enhancing effect in terms of increasing the probability of implementing a pie-increasing
reform. We have shown that in the presence of debt-related distortions, we still get the
dis-incentivizing effect of a debt limit on the implementation of an efficient reform. In
particular, among the policies that raise high debt, the no-reform policy is implemented
with relatively higher probability when the debt limit gets stricter. This negative effect,
however, now has to be weighed against positive effects of a debt limit in terms of
increasing efficiency through a reduction in debt-related distortions. Besides reducing
these distortions directly, we have also shown that a stricter debt limit can increase
the probability with which efficient no-debt policies are implemented.
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Chapter 4
State Capacity and Public Debt:
A Political Economy Analysis1
4.1 Introduction
The combination of high public debt and low capacities of the state to raise taxes
and to support markets can upset even developed economies. Countries with a low
level of fiscal capacity, the institutional infrastructure necessary to collect and enforce
taxes, usually exhibit a high level of shadow economic activities. Furthermore, low
property rights protection indicates a low level of legal capacity, the legal infrastructure
necessary to provide a secure investment climate. State capacity, the combination of
legal and fiscal capacity, is a crucial determinant of a state’s financial strength. A
country with low state capacity that has at the same time a tendency to accumulate
high public debt might run into severe problems. In light of this, it is important to
understand the mechanisms underlying the combined evolution of state capacity and
public debt.
However, the political economy literature of public debt2 usually takes the institu-
1This chapter has been co-authored with Cornelius Müller. We are grateful to Eckhard Janeba
for many insightful discussions. We thank Klaus Adam, Pierre Boyer, Océane Briand, Philippe De
Donder, Georg Dürnecker, Tore Ellingsen, Hans Peter Grüner, Hubert Kempf, Anke Kessler, Heléne
Lundqvist, Andreas Madestam, Torsten Persson, David Strömberg, Michele Tertilt, Johannes Voget,
Galina Zudenkova, conference participants at the 2013 PETMeeting, the 2013 IIPF Congress, the 2014
Second Annual TARC workshop, the EPCS 2014 Meeting, the 2014 Annual Congress of the Verein
für Socialpolitik, the 2015 EEA Congress, and seminar participants at the University of Mannheim
and the University of Stockholm for helpful comments. The first author gratefully acknowledges the
Collaborative Research Center 884 for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See Alesina and Passalacqua (forthcoming) and Battaglini (2011) for recent reviews of this liter-
ature. For a survey of the earlier contributions see Alesina and Perotti (1995).
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tional infrastructure necessary to raise taxes as given and does not consider this fiscal
capacity as an investment object of the government. The legal infrastructure necessary
for the proper functioning of a market economy is also not modeled as an endogenous
political choice in this literature. In contrast, the recent political economy literature
of state capacity, pioneered by Besley and Persson (2009), endogenizes fiscal and legal
capacity as investment objects of the state. However, this literature does not include
public debt. Analyzing the combined evolution of state capacity and public debt ne-
cessitates an integrated analytical framework. Otherwise, important aspects of the
interaction between these dynamic variables will remain unexplored. We provide such
an integrated model, and we uncover interactions between state capacity and public
debt that cannot be understood by studying the two issues separately.
We integrate a baseline model of state capacity investment building on Besley and
Persson (2010, 2011) with the strategic use of public debt, fluctuating incomes, and the
possibility of default. In a dynamic framework, an incumbent government cannot be
sure to remain in power in the future. It wants to benefit its own clientele, and decides
about investments in the future fiscal and legal capacities. The incumbent government
can additionally spend on a common-interest public good or channel money towards
its own clientele. The “cohesiveness” of institutions determines to what degree such
clientele politics are possible. Following Besley and Persson, we say a country has
low cohesiveness, when it is very easy to do clientele politics to the benefit of the
own group. Importantly, we allow the incumbent to also raise public debt. Debt is
restricted by future state capacity, because the latter determines the debt repayment
capacity in the second period. The income level attainable for a given legal support
as well as the value of public goods fluctuate over time, introducing a business cycle
component into the model. The implied possibility of default gives us a tractable way
to study the effects of increasing costs of debt financing.
We derive two main sets of results. First, in a simple basic model without fluc-
tuating incomes and without default, we show that the possibility to raise debt can
create an additional incentive to invest in state capacity. The intuition is that debt
allows to draw future tax resources to the present. This circumvents the problem of a
use of future public funds that is not in line with the current incumbent’s objective.
Specifically, high political instability and low cohesiveness make the first period in-
4.1. INTRODUCTION 79
cumbent afraid of giving additional state capacity to the future government. By high
political instability, this government is likely to be from the opposed group, and by low
cohesiveness, it can use the higher taxing power to heavily redistribute away from the
period-1 incumbent group. In the model without debt, the only possibility to protect
against such an adverse use of future public funds is to lower investments in fiscal and
legal capacity. We call this the low-investment mechanism. However, if debt can be
used to bring future public funds at the disposal of the first-period incumbent, then
this incumbent can decide about their use. Given that there are profitable uses of tax
resources in the first period, the incumbent now has higher incentives to invest in state
capacities in order to increase the amount of public funds at her disposal. We call this
the debt mechanism. The strength of this latter mechanism depends on how easily it
can be used. For the basic model without default, there are no restrictions on using
this mechanism. Therefore, it can completely cancel out the original low-investment
mechanism.
Our second set of results shows how the debt mechanism can be weakened, thereby
allowing the original low-investment mechanism to partly resurface. Specifically, with
fluctuating incomes, the cost of raising additional debt depends on the possibility of
default. When debt is raised to the point where default becomes possible, it becomes
increasingly expensive to use the debt channel to draw future public funds to the
present. To the extent that it is very costly to draw newly created future public funds
to the present, the low-investment mechanism resurfaces. Specifically, it resurfaces
the stronger, the higher are the income fluctuations. For high income fluctuations,
we therefore get results close to the original no-debt model. In particular, a polarized
country with low institutional protection of the non-ruling group and high political
instability will invest only little in state capacities. Furthermore, this ‘weak state’
situation is now worsened by a built-up of high debt and a positive probability of
default. Besley and Persson (2011) identified so-called development clusters with weak
states combining all the negative outcomes in terms of low investments in both forms
of state capacity, low income and higher internal violence. We show that, under high
income fluctuations, this notion of a negative cluster can be extended to include high
public debt and a high risk of default.
From these results, we can draw the following policy implications. Besides political
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instability, cohesiveness is identified as an important driving force behind the combined
evolution of state capacity and public debt. Cohesiveness enters as an exogenous pa-
rameter in our model, but our comparative static results show which implications
follow from changing it. In our model, a country with high cohesiveness will be close
to the social planner optimum. Increasing cohesiveness in the real world necessitates
deep reforms that go at the core of the functioning of the state. Examples of such
reforms include implementing a functioning system of checks and balances, establish-
ing an independent press that names and shames clientele politics, creating provisions
in the constitution that prevent clientele politics, or strengthening the constitutional
court in its power to enforce such provisions. Comprehensive reforms in these direc-
tions can prevent a country from running into a situation of high debt and low state
capacity. Importantly, our results highlight that, in order to put a country on a path
of investments for the future without making it run up high debt at the same time, it
is necessary to first incentivize deeper institutional reforms. Otherwise political eco-
nomic incentives will always push back towards using low investments or high public
debt to protect against a politically adverse future.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the relation of
this paper to the existing literature. Section 4.3 sets out a basic model of state capacity
and public debt which does not yet include fluctuating incomes or default. Building
on Besley and Persson (2010, 2011), we combine a workhorse model of state capacity
investment with the political economic incentive to strategically use public debt. In
Section 4.4, we analyze this model. Comparing the results to the model without debt,
we find that the possibility to raise debt can create a novel incentive to invest in state
capacity. In Section 4.5, we introduce exogenous income fluctuations into the model to
allow for sovereign default. We investigate under which circumstances the incentivizing
effect of public debt on state capacity investments can fade. In that case, countries
can run into the situation with low state capacity and high public debt. We also take
a short look at available cross-country data to see whether they give a clear indication
3Note that the clientele politics here do not correspond to the targeting of electoral favors during
an electoral campaign, which has been analyzed in the previous two chapters. Any democracy will
be characterized by some form of such an allocation of electoral favors to the majority of voters.
The clientele politics in this chapter correspond rather to a form of rent extraction for the benefit of
the own clientele once politicians are in power. In particular, in this chapter, we do not consider a
feedback of politicians’ decisions on the probability of being in power. We do not even take a stand
on whether a change in political power is determined by a democratic election. Therefore, the results
here do not contradict the result from before that targeted pork-barrel spending might be necessary
in electoral campaigns to secure the success of growth-enhancing reforms.
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in which direction the interaction between debt and state capacity investments plays
out. Section 4.6 concludes and discusses topics for future research. We relegate all
proofs to the Appendix.
4.2 Related Literature
Analyzing the political incentives behind investing in state capacity and raising public
debt, we bring together the two strands of the political economy literature that have
analyzed these concepts in isolation. The concept of state capacity was brought back
to the minds of economists by Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson in a series of recent
papers (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010).4 These were condensed into their book Pillars
of Prosperity (Besley and Persson, 2011). All of these models include two aspects of
state capacity, legal and fiscal capacity, in a tractable political economy model with
two periods.
Our model builds on the workhorse model in Besley and Persson (2011). This
model has been extended in several directions. Besley and Persson (2009), for instance,
provide a micro foundation for the growth-enhancing effect of legal support by explicitly
modeling a credit market whose effectiveness depends on the level of legal support.
Besley et al. (2013) drop legal capacity and extend the remaining fiscal capacity model
to comprise multiple periods and to include decreasing marginal benefits of public good
spending. They show that the main results from the two-period model generalize to
this setup.
The main novel feature of our paper is that we consider in one model the interaction
of the strategic use of public debt and the decision of an incumbent government to
invest in its future powers to raise taxes and to grant legal support. With regard to
the state capacity literature, we find that the possibility to raise debt can provide an
additional mechanism to incentivize state capacity investments that cannot be seen
in a model without debt. However, debt might be used to tie down the additional
investments for uses that are not in accordance with the social planner’s objective. We
also derive conditions under which the link between debt and state capacity investments
4Early studies concerning state capacity are the ones of Cukierman et al. (1992) regarding fiscal
capacity and Svensson (1998) regarding legal capacity. In recent years, Acemoglu (2005) and Acemoglu
et al. (2011) made further contributions to the literature on state building.
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is weak. In this case, the weak state situation of low investments in state capacity,
identified by Besley and Persson, is worsened by an additional buildup of high debt.
While the state capacity literature has not included the debt channel at all, the
debt literature usually includes taxes. Nevertheless, this latter literature takes fiscal
capacity as given. Implicitly, the institutional capacity to raise taxes is often assumed
to be maximal in this context. In particular, when labor taxes are considered, the
upper bound on taxation is given by the tax rate maximizing the resulting Laffer
curve. Therefore, fiscal capacity is not included as an endogenous dynamic variable in
this literature.
The strand of the debt literature closest to our setup is the literature on strate-
gic debt initiated by Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and
Tabellini and Alesina (1990).5 Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini
(1990) consider debt in the setup of distortionary labor taxes. The cost of raising
debt therefore involves higher tax distortions in the future. Both papers show that
in political competition between parties with differing objectives, too much debt is
raised compared to a normative benchmark. This happens because a currently ruling
government cannot be sure to remain in power in the future and therefore uses debt to
bind its successor’s hands. Since our model has non-distortionary taxation, it is more
closely related to the one of Tabellini and Alesina (1990). They examine a two-period
model with non-distortionary taxation and a group of heterogeneous individuals with
different preferences over two public goods. The social planner would run a balanced
budget, but in the political equilibrium, the uncertainty regarding the future median
voter leads to a positive debt level to bind the hands of the future median voter.
A similar trade-off as in these models also arises in our setup. The spending pur-
pose on which groups have differing preferences is now redistributive transfers for the
purpose of clientele politics. Also similarly, our model can produce the incentive to
over-accumulate debt compared to a social planner. Specifically, clientele politics are
not beneficial from a social planner’s point of view. A social planner will therefore only
spend money on public goods. This implies that the social planner will not raise debt
when the future value of public goods is expected to be higher than in the present. At
5Recent models in the field of political economy of public debt with rich dynamic frameworks
can be found in Battaglini and Coate (2008), Yared (2010), Song et al. (2012), and Battaglini and
Barseghyan (forhcoming).
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the same time, a political government might still accumulate debt in order to finance
redistribution towards its own clientele in the present.
The literature of borrowing with default goes back to the seminal study of Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981). Arellano (2008) extends their approach and applies it to sovereign
debt default, especially in the context of developing countries. Both studies use an in-
finite horizon model in which the borrower can choose to default. The incentives to not
default are given by an embargo on future borrowing, an additional penalty, or direct
output costs. Due to the two-period setting, our model does not include the embargo
on future borrowing. It is therefore somewhat in the spirit of Alesina and Tabellini
(1989), who also rely an a two-period model of sovereign debt default. Furthermore, we
only model ability-to-pay default and not willingness-to-pay default. The modeling of
default is used here mainly to include increasing costs of debt financing in a tractable
way. A more involved modeling of the default decision is left to future research.
4.3 Model Setup
Political Environment. The model set out here combines a workhorse model of
state capacity with the strategic use of public debt. Building on Besley and Persson
(2011), the model has two periods s = 1, 2 and considers a country consisting of two
equally sized groups of individuals. Total population size is normalized to 1. One of
the groups holds governmental power in the first period. Individuals that are a member
of the incumbent group in a given period are superscripted by the letter I, whereas
members of the opposition group are superscripted by the letter O. With exogenous
probability γ, power is transferred to the other group after the first period. Higher
γ thus captures higher political instability from the point of view of the first period
incumbent group.
Intra-temporal Policies. In period s, an individual of group J ∈ {I, O} has an
income of ω(pJs ), where ω(·) is an increasing and concave function of legal support pJs
granted to group J . More broadly, one can think of pJs as any kind of market supporting
policies that increase the private income of individuals of group J . Following Besley
and Persson (2009, 2010), we interpret pJs as legal enforcement which is conducive to
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a more efficient functioning of capital markets.6
The utility of an individual of group J ∈ {I, O} in period s is linear in private
consumption cJs and public good consumption gs:7
uJs = αsgs + cJs (4.1)
where αs parametrizes the marginal value of public good consumption relative to that of
private consumption.8 Income available for private consumption is determined by the
non-distortionary tax rate ts on income w and the per-capita transfers rIs , rOs awarded
by the government to the different groups. Therefore, individual utility in period s
becomes:
uJs = αsgs + (1− ts)ω(pJs ) + rJs (4.2)
Future utility is discounted with the factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
The value of public goods fluctuates over time. In a developing country setup, a
period with a high value of public good spending can be interpreted as a situation with
a high threat of an external war. For a developed country, it is harder to find a perfect
real world match for this assumption. Nevertheless, we can think of certain rescue
actions in times of an economic crisis whose benefit to the overall economy exceeds
possible additional private benefits by far. The stabilization of the economy can then
be interpreted as a quasi-public good, whose value is high in crisis times. One example
would be the nationalization of a system-relevant bank.
To model this fluctuation in the simplest possible way, the value of public goods is
drawn each period from a two-point distribution: αs ∈ {αH , αL}, with αH > 2 > αL >
1, and Prob[αs = αH ] = φ. As will become clear in the subsequent analysis, the high
value αH is chosen such that public good spending in this state of the world will be
preferable to transfer spending that benefits the incumbent group. In a situation with
αL, this is not necessarily the case. Since public goods benefit everybody the same,
the desired size of fiscal infrastructure will depend on the probability φ of ending up
in a situation where the state definitely spends on common-interest public goods.
6For a microfoundation of the above reduced form modeling, see Besley and Persson (2009).
7Our results are robust to an extension for quasi-linear utility where we introduce curvature in
the utility function on public good consumption.
8Note that the whole analysis is in per-capita terms.
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Inter-temporal Policies. The crucial feature of the model in Besley and Persson
(2011) is that it includes two aspects of state capacity, fiscal capacity τs and legal
capacity pis. Existing fiscal capacity τs puts an upper bound on the tax rate that
can be raised from income in period s: ts ≤ τs. In this simple model, (1 − τs) can
be interpreted as the fraction of income that an individual can earn in an informal
sector. To increase second period fiscal capacity τ2, the period-1 government can
invest in the built-up of [τ2 − τ1] additional units of fiscal capacity.9 For the sake of
parsimony, we assume zero depreciation of the stocks of state capacity, in contrast to
Besley and Persson (2011). We require [τ2 − τ1] ≥ 0, so disinvestment is not allowed.
There is an increasing and convex cost F (τ2− τ1) of carrying out the investment, with
F (0) = Fτ (0) = 0. Here, as in the following, subscripts on functions denote partial
derivatives, and the last equation can be interpreted as the first marginal investment
having negligible costs.
Legal capacity pis puts an upper bound on the legal protection for both groups:
pJs ≤ pis for J ∈ {I, O}. The idea is that the existing legal infrastructure restricts
the level of legal protection a government can grant to any group. The government in
period one can invest in the future legal capacity that becomes available in period two
via an increasing and convex cost function L(pi2 − pi1) with L(0) = Lpi(0) = 0. As for
fiscal capacity, we require [pi2 − pi1] ≥ 0, so disinvestment is not allowed.
Besides the dynamic decisions to invest in fiscal and legal capacities, we now add
a third dynamic decision to the policy set: the possibility to raise public debt. Specif-
ically, the country is assumed to start with a stock of debt equal to zero, b0 = 0. The
period-1 incumbent government can now issue one-period risk-free bonds b1 ≥ 0 on
an international bond market.10 These bonds have to be repaid in the second period.
The interest rate which has to be paid on bonds is given by ρ = 1/δ − 1 , where δ is
the discount factor of the individuals. Since the bonds are supposed to be risk-free,
the maximal amount of bonds is determined by the requirement that fiscal and legal
9There will be a technological maximum τ¯ < 1 above which fiscal capacity cannot be expanded
(τs ≤ τ¯). Here, this would be determined by the fact that some small black market jobs just cannot
be detected. Besley et al. (2013) interpret τ¯ as the highest technologically feasible tax rate (while τs
is the highest institutionally feasible tax rate) and argue that in a richer model with distortionary
taxation, τ¯ could be the peak of the Laffer curve. However, in the following, we focus on a situation
where the optimal level τ2 will not hit this upper bound.
10We make the assumption that a government cannot invest into assets and that the starting debt
level is zero just to keep the analysis focused. An extension that relaxes these assumptions does not
add significant insights to the analysis.
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capacity in the second period must be high enough to repay the bonds: b1 ≤ τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
The right-hand side of this inequality is the discounted maximal tax revenue that can
be raised in the second period. Following Besley and Persson (2011) we still assume
that the citizens themselves cannot save or borrow. Firstly, due to the linearity of the
utility function, this assumption does not alter the results. Secondly, for the developing
world, where the issue of state building is most pertinent, there is evidence for private
agents’ lack of access to credit markets (see Claessens, 2006).
Feasible Policies. The incumbent group government is assumed to maximize its
own group’s utility subject to a usual budget constraint and a constraint imposed
by the country’s “cohesiveness” of institutions. The budget constraint requires that
government revenues are enough to finance all government expenditures:11
∑
J∈{I,O}
tsω(pJs )
2 + bs ≥ gs +ms + ns +
rIs + rOs
2 + (1 + ρ)bs−1 (4.3)
where ms and ns represent the investment costs in fiscal and legal capacity, which only
occur in period 1, and hence are given by
ms =

F (τ2 − τ1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2
(4.4)
and
ns =

L(pi2 − pi1) if s = 1
0 if s = 2.
(4.5)
Since the groups have equal size, rIs+rOs2 is the average per-capita transfer that the
government pays out.
The institutional constraint requires that for each unit of transfers awarded by the
government to its own group it must transfer at least σ ∈ [0, 1] units to the other group.
Besley and Persson (2011) introduce the parameter θ = σ1+σ ∈ [0, 12 ] to describe the
“cohesiveness” of institutions. θ = 12 refers to completely cohesive institutions which
make sure that the opposition is treated in exactly the same way as the incumbent
group. For θ < 12 , clientele politics are possible that lead to a redistribution of money
11Recall that total population is normalized to 1.
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towards the incumbent group. Given that the incumbent government respects the
institutional setting as just another constraint but ultimately is only concerned about
its own group’s utility, it will set transfers to the opposition group as small as possible:
rOs = σrIs =
θ
1− θ r
I
s (4.6)
In the following, we therefore assume the government is choosing only transfers rIs to
its own group, while setting rOs according to (4.6).
Plugging (4.6) into the budget constraint (4.3), we arrive at a modified budget
constraint that already includes the constitutional constraint:
∑
J∈{I,O}
tsω(pJs )
2 + bs ≥ gs +ms + ns +
rIs
2(1− θ) + (1 + ρ)bs−1, (4.7)
with b0 = b2 = 0.
Timing. The timing of the whole two-period model is now as follows:
Period 1:
1. The initial stock of fiscal capacity is τ1 and group I1 is in power. Nature draws
the public good value α1.
2. The government from the currently incumbent group I1 chooses the set of period-
1 policies
{
t1, g1, r
I
1, r
O
1 , b1, p
I
1, p
O
1
}
and by its investment decision chooses the
period-2 stocks of fiscal capacity τ2 and legal capacity pi2.
Period 2:
1. I1 remains in power with probability 1− γ, and nature draws α2
2. The government from the future incumbent group I2 chooses period-2 policies{
t2, g2, r
I
2, r
O
2 , p
I
2, p
O
2
}
while honoring the debt commitments.
The applied solution concept is subgame perfect equilibrium.
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4.4 The Incentivizing Effect of Public Debt
Public debt as well as state capacity investments generate dynamic links across periods.
However, given the linear utility function, we can derive the optimal policy decision
between public good spending and transfer spending for any period taking as given
the levels of state capacity, state capacity investments and debt. Furthermore, the
non-distortionary nature of taxes makes the level of taxes in a given period depend
only on the level of fiscal capacity in that period. In a second step, the optimal
debt level will be determined using the optimal policy functions on public good and
transfer spending and still taking state capacity and state capacity investments as
given.12 Having derived the optimal policy decisions on spending and debt for different
levels of state capacity investments, the optimal level of these investments can then be
determined in a last third step.
Intra-temporal policies
Turning to the first step, legal protection will be set maximally for both groups:
pIs = pOs = pis. This is because, first, the incumbent group gains from an increase of
its own income. Second, it also benefits from an increase of the other group’s income,
because the resulting higher tax revenues can be used for additional public good or
transfer spending.
Taxes will be used up to the full fiscal capacity: ts = τs. The reason is the following:
The marginal benefit of public spending is always at least as high as the opportunity
cost of lost private consumption, since max{αs, 2(1− θ)} ≥ 2(1− θ) ≥ 1.
Compared to the model without debt, the introduction of debt does not change
the trade-off between public goods and transfers. This trade-off depends solely on the
constant marginal benefits of these two forms of spending. The only effect is on the
level of spending. Specifically, the residual revenues after investment spending have
to be adjusted for the net inflow of money through issuing new debt and repaying old
debt, bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1.
12The reason that the debt decision can be analyzed before the state capacity decisions has to do
with the constancy of the marginal value of spending in each period.
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The optimal policy function for public good spending becomes
G(αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs, bs−1) =

τsω(pis)−ms − ns + bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1 if αs ≥ 2(1− θ)
0 otherwise.
(4.8)
That is, public goods are provided at the maximal level if the gross marginal value
of public good spending, αs, exceeds the gross marginal value of transfers for the
incumbent group, 2(1 − θ). At the same time, transfers and therefore redistribution
towards the incumbent group are zero. If the ordering between the marginal values is
the opposite way, we only get redistributive transfers and no public goods.
Using the new budget constraint (4.7) with ts set to τs and pJs set to pis, the indirect
payoff function for group J ∈ {I, O} in period s becomes:
W (αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs−1, bs, βJ) (4.9)
= αsG+ (1− τs)ω(pis) + βJ [τsω(pis)−G−ms − ns + bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1]
where βI = 2(1− θ) and βO = 2θ can be interpreted respectively as the gross marginal
value of transfer spending for the incumbent (I) and for the opposition (O). Note that
we have suppressed the arguments of the G function. Furthermore, βJ [τsω(pis)−G−
ms − ns + bs − (1 + ρ)bs−1] ≥ 0 are the transfers to group J .
The “value functions” capturing the within-period utility in the second period for
a group that is the incumbent (I) or the opposition (O) become:
U I(τ2, pi2, b1) (4.10)
= φW [αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)]
= φ[αH(τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1) + (1− τ2)ω(pi2)]
+ (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)]
UO(τ2, pi2, b1) (4.11)
= φW [αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ] + (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ]
= φ[αH(τ2ω(pi2)− (1 + ρ)b1) + (1− τ2)ω(pi2)]
+ (1− φ)W [αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ]
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Note that, when the value of the public good is high, whatever is left after repaying
debt, (τ2ω(pi2)−(1+ρ)b1), will be spent on the public good. Finally, the total expected
utility of the period-1 incumbent group, as seen from the first period, is:
W (α1, τ1, pi1, F (τ2−τ1), L(pi2−pi1), 0, b1, 2(1−θ))+δ([1−γ]U I(τ2, pi2, b1)+γUO(τ2, pi2, b1))
(4.12)
Inter-temporal policies
Having solved for the optimal intra-temporal policies, we now turn to the inter-
temporal policies b1, τ2 and pi2. To make the following analysis easier, we define λ1,
the gross marginal benefit of public funds in period 1, and E(λ2), the expected gross
marginal benefit of public funds in period 2. We have
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)} (4.13)
and
E(λ2) ≡ φαH + (1− φ)λL2 (4.14)
with
λL2 =

αL if αL ≥ 2(1− θ)
(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ otherwise,
(4.15)
since E(λ2) depends on the use of public funds in the future, which is uncertain.
With this notation, the inter-temporal maximization problem of the incumbent
group in period s=1 becomes:
maxτ2,pi2,b1 EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (4.16)
s.t. τ2 ≥ τ1,
pi2 ≥ pi1,
b1 ≤ τ2ω(pi2)1 + ρ ,
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
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with:
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) = δ((1− γ)U I(τ2, pi2, b1) + γUO(τ2, pi2, b1)) (4.17)
Choice of debt
The three dynamic variables fiscal capacity, legal capacity and debt are interlinked
by the following fact. The amount of debt which can be raised is limited by the amount
of future fiscal and legal capacity. The latter two determine the money the state can
raise to repay debt. We now analyze the choice of debt taking the levels of fiscal and
legal capacity investments as given.
Note that the investment and debt decisions determine the amount of residual
revenue a government has at its disposal for financing public good spending or transfers
after all other expenditures are covered. The linear model has the advantage that,
in each period, the use of residual government revenues either on public goods or
transfers is exactly determined. Furthermore, the marginal benefit of that residual use
is constant in either case. This marginal benefit is what we referred to as the gross
marginal benefit of public funds and denoted by λs.
Debt allows to make future public funds available in the present. Therefore, the
optimal debt level can be found by a simple comparison of the gross marginal benefit
of public funds in the two periods. Specifically, if λ1, the gross marginal benefit in the
first period, is higher than E(λ2), the expected gross marginal benefit in the second
period, then it is optimal to raise the maximal debt that is allowed by future state
capacity: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . If E(λ2) > λ1, then no debt is raised: b1 = 0.
13,14
Summarizing the above analysis in a policy function for the debt level chosen in
period 1, we have:
B(α1, τ2, pi2) =

τ2ω(pi2)
1+ρ if λ1 > E(λ2)
0 otherwise.
(4.18)
13The implicit assumption behind b1 ≥ 0 is that the government cannot invest in assets on the
bond market.
14Furthermore, this result requires Assumptions (4.23) and (4.24) which will be introduced after
having derived the optimal state capacity investments. We need these additional technical assumptions
here because for E(λ2) > λ1, we could otherwise get that all first-period tax revenue is used for
investments in future state capacity. With low enough costs of investment, it could then be beneficial
to use debt for bringing future tax revenues to the present and finance even more future state capacity.
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Choice of fiscal and legal capacity
With this, we have arrived at the third step of the analysis, the decision about
fiscal and legal capacity investment. We substitute the policy function (4.18) for b1 in
(4.12) and maximize the resulting function with respect to future fiscal capacity τ2 and
legal capacity pi2, subject to the constraints that fiscal and legal capacity investments
cannot be negative, [τ2 − τ1] ≥ 0 and [pi2 − pi1] ≥ 0, and transfers must also be weakly
positive. From this, we get the following “Euler equations”
δ([1− γ]dU
I [τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dτ2
+ γ dU
O[τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dτ2
)
+Wb1 [α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)]
∂B(α1, τ2, pi2)
∂τ2
(4.19)
≤ −Wm[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)]Fτ (τ2 − τ1)
c. s. τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0
and
δ([1− γ]dU
I [τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dpi2
+ γ dU
O[τ2, pi2, B(α1, τ2, pi2)]
dpi2
)
+Wb1 [α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)]
∂B(α1, τ2, pi2)
∂pi2
(4.20)
≤ −Wn[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)]Lpi(pi2 − pi1)
c. s. pi2 − pi1 ≥ 0,
where dUI
dτ2
, dUO
dτ2
, dUI
dpi2
and dUO
dpi2
are total derivatives. The trade-off is between the
marginal benefit of future fiscal or legal capacity (left-hand side) against the marginal
cost of financing that fiscal or legal capacity (right-hand side). Analogously to the
model without debt:
λ1 ≡ −Wm[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)]
= −Wn[α1, τ1, pi1,m1, n1, 0, B(α1, τ2, pi2), 2(1− θ)] = max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
That is, the opportunity cost of using government revenues for financing investments
is the gross marginal benefit of period-1 public funds.15 It depends on the form of
residual spending (public goods or transfers) in period one.
15This result depends again on Assumptions 4.23 and 4.24. These technical assumptions exclude
the case where it is optimal (and through debt possible) that the marginal money to finance future
fiscal capacity actually comes from the future.
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The crucial difference to a model without debt are the left-hand sides of (4.19)
and (4.20). The left-hand side of (4.19) describes the marginal benefit of additional
future fiscal capacity, as seen from the first period. If no debt is raised, it is equal to
δω(pi2)[E(λ2)− 1]. E(λ2) is the expected gross marginal benefit of future public funds
and is given in (4.14) and (4.15). However, when debt is raised, it is raised maximally
and uses up all public funds in the second period. Therefore, the gross marginal value
of public funds is then determined by the use of debt. Since debt is used to finance
first-period expenditures on public goods or transfers, the gross marginal benefit of
future public funds becomes λ1, which was given in equation (4.13). The point is
that debt allows to make future public funds available in the present. Therefore, the
benefit of future public funds is then given by the present benefit of residual spending.
According to this discussion, the optimality condition (4.19) can be rewritten as:
δω(pi2) [max{λ1, E(λ2)} − 1] ≤ λ1Fτ (τ2 − τ1) (4.21)
c. s. τ2 − τ1 ≥ 0
Given the assumption Fτ (0) = 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for positive
investments in fiscal capacity is now max{λ1, E(λ2)} > 1, which is always satisfied.
This is a crucial difference compared to the model without debt and is discussed in
more detail in Section 4.4.2.
The left-hand side of (4.20) describes the marginal benefit of additional future
legal capacity, as seen from the first period. Following the same reasoning as for fiscal
capacity, the optimality condition (4.20) can be rewritten as:
δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2[max{λ1, E(λ2)} − 1]] ≤ λ1Lpi(pi2 − pi1) (4.22)
c. s. pi2 − pi1 ≥ 0
Given the assumption Lpi(0) = 0, there is always positive investment in legal capacity.
Considering the left-hand sides of equation (4.21) and equation (4.22), we notice
that an investment in one of the two state capacities increases the marginal return of
the other. This is because we have max{λ1, E(λ2)} > 1. So, fiscal and legal capacity
are complements. Note that the analogous condition in Besley and Persson (2011),
E(λ2) > 1, was not guaranteed to always hold. In contrast, the introduction of debt
implies that complementarity between the two forms of state capacity investment will
always hold.
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As in Besley and Persson (2011), this complementarity is not only an interesting
fact but also allows us to apply results on monotone comparative statics. By Theorem
5 and 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), any factor that increases the left-hand sides
of equation (4.21) and equation (4.22) leads to an increase of both fiscal and legal
capacity investments.16 This reasoning is used to establish the comparative statics
stated in the propositions in the following two subsections.
For all of the subsequent analysis, we make the following assumptions.
Assumptions
δω(pi2)[αH − 1] < αLFτ (τ¯2 − τ1) (4.23)
δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2[αH − 1]] < αLLpi(pi2 − pi1) (4.24)
for some τ¯2, pi2, so that L(pi2−pi1) +F (τ¯2− τ1) = τ1ω(pi1). That is, τ¯2, pi2 are levels
of future state capacity which can be financed if the current tax revenue is only and
fully used for that purpose. These assumptions mean that the curvature of the cost
functions F (·) and L(·) is high enough for the marginal cost of increasing fiscal and
legal capacity to surpass the marginal benefit at an interior level of investment. That
is, we don’t allow the marginal benefit of investment to still surpass the marginal cost
at the point where all possible tax revenues are only used for investments in fiscal and
legal capacity.17 These technical assumptions are only necessary in a linear model.
They can be dispensed with in a quasi-linear setup.18
In the following, we first analyze the normative benchmark of a social planner.
4.4.1 The Social Planner’s Solution
The maximization problem of a Utilitarian social planner who weights the utilities of
both groups equally is equivalent to the version of the model where full cohesiveness
(θ = 1/2) restricts the incumbent group in both periods to provide the same transfers
16For a more detailed formal treatment, see the proofs in the appendix.
17Note that the left-hand sides of (4.23) and (4.24) give the absolute maximum for the marginal
benefits of fiscal and legal capacity investment. The right-hand sides give the absolute minimum for
the marginal costs given investment levels pi2 − pi1 and τ¯2 − τ1 that use up all current tax revenues.
18The quasi-linear analysis is available from the authors upon request.
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to both groups. Then, since αL > 2(1 − θ) = 1, the social planner always uses all
residual money to provide public goods. For the basic model with debt, the results
about debt and state capacity investments of a social planner are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4.4.1 Suppose that the decisions about debt and state capacity invest-
ments are made by a Pigouvian planner with Utilitarian preferences. Then:
1. If α1 = αL:
(a) No debt is raised.
(b) No transfers are paid.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
2. If α1 = αH :
(a) Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
(b) No transfers are paid.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity and the invest-
ments are higher than when no debt can be raised.
For a social planner λ1 = α1. That is, the gross marginal value of public funds in
the first period corresponds to the value of public goods in the first period. Moreover,
for the social planner the gross marginal value of public funds in the second period is
E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)αL > 1.
For the first part, note that λ1 = αL < E(λ2) implies that no debt will be raised.
In a model without debt, the results of the first part are valid for both, α1 = αL and
α1 = αH as stated in Proposition 2.1 in Besley and Persson (2011).
In the model with debt, if α1 = αH , we have λ1 = αH > E(λ2) and debt will
be raised maximally in order to make future public funds available in the present.
Therefore, the net marginal benefit of future public funds is greater than it was without
debt, which raises incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. Basically, debt allows the social
planner to use the tax system of the future to finance a highly-valued public good today.
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Given a high need for public funds today versus a lower need tomorrow this increases
incentives to invest in fiscal capacity for the purpose of increasing spending today. By
complementarity, investments in legal capacity increase as well.
We now turn to the analysis of the political equilibrium.
4.4.2 Three Types of States Revisited
The outcome of the political game will depend on the interplay of the parameters
governing how cohesive political institutions are (θ) and how stable the political system
is (γ) with the public good parameters (φ, αH , αL) summarizing the main features
of the economic environment. In Besley and Persson (2011), the following condition
ensures that political institutions are sufficiently cohesive to make the political outcome
coincide with the outcome under a social planner:
Cohesiveness: αL ≥ 2(1− θ)
This condition will hold if the parameter governing the cohesiveness of political
institutions, θ, is close enough to 1/2, the value it takes for a social planner. Recall
that θ = 1/2 ensures that both groups have to be treated equally and therefore captures
perfectly cohesive political institutions.
If the cohesiveness condition fails, but the stability of the political system is high
enough, Besley and Persson (2011) get a state that still has positive investments in
state capacity. The corresponding stability condition is:
Stability: φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ] > 1
This condition will hold when the probability of staying in political power, 1 − γ,
is big enough. That is, from the point of view of the period-1 incumbent government,
the political system is stable in the sense of not endangering its power. However, the
condition goes further. In fact, it refers to stability in the sense of not endangering
the interests of the period-1 government. This can also be ensured by the economic
environment. For instance, if a high value of public good spending is expected with
certainty (φ → 1), the stability condition will also hold. The interest of the period-
1 government in high-valued future spending is then respected no matter who is in
power in the future. In order to compare our results to the ones in Besley and Persson
(2011), we consider the same three types of states that they derive and investigate if
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these types still arise after the introduction of public debt.
Common-Interest State
In the case where the cohesiveness condition holds, we get the following result:
Proposition 4.4.2 If Cohesiveness holds, then the outcome is the same as under a
social planner (see Proposition 4.4.1).
This result is analogous to the model without debt (Proposition 2.2 in Besley and
Persson (2011)). The reason is that high cohesiveness makes redistribution unattractive
compared to public good spending even when the latter has a low value. Therefore, by
choice, each government will provide only public goods thereby behaving exactly like
a social planner. The shifting of public resources over time also follows the structure
of the public good values and again coincides with the social planner behavior. In line
with Besley and Persson (2011), we call this state the common interest state.
Redistributive State
Assume that Cohesiveness fails, but Stability holds. We get the following results:
Proposition 4.4.3 If Cohesiveness fails and Stability holds, then:
1. If α1 = αL and 2(1− θ) < φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ]:
(a) No debt is raised.
(b) Residual revenues in period 1 are used to finance transfers.
(c) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(d) Higher φ increases investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
(e) A lower value of γ unambiguously raises investments, whereas an increase
in θ raises investments if γ > 1/2.
2. If α1 = αH or if α1 = αL and 2(1− θ) > φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ]:
(a) Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
(b) There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity and the invest-
ments are higher than when no debt can be raised.
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(c) If α1 = αH , the levels of fiscal and legal capacity investments are the same
as those chosen by a social planner in the same situation (see Proposition
4.4.1 Part 2).
(d) If α1 = αL, residual revenues in period 1 are used to finance transfers.
(e) Political instability γ does not have an influence on the investment decisions.
If α1 = αH , cohesiveness θ does not have an influence either.
In an environment with a low public good value in the first period, the incumbent
government prefers to spend on redistributive transfers in this first period. However,
when the condition in part 1 of the proposition holds, the expected value of future
public spending is still higher than the value of this first-period transfer spending.
The implied preference for future spending leads to the result that no debt is raised,
because this would mean taking resources from the future. Therefore, the remaining
results in the first part of the proposition are analogous to the model without debt.
When one of the conditions in part 2 of the proposition holds, there is a preference
for the present. Specifically, the incumbent group in period 1 can no longer be sure
that spending in the second period will be in its interest in expectation. However, with
debt, the period-1 government now has the possibility to bring future public funds at
its disposal. Thereby, it can decide about the spending purposes which these future
public funds will be used for. This will actually allow the incumbent group to solve the
problem of future redistribution against itself and hence raises incentives for investing
in fiscal and legal capacity.
Importantly, these bigger incentives can be driven by the desire to finance redis-
tributive transfers in the present, which is not in the spirit of a Utilitarian social
planner. Therefore, we do not only get spending on the ‘wrong’ intra-temporal is-
sues, we can even get the incentive to finance more of this ‘wrong’ intra-temporal
spending through the issuance of debt. In this case of the basic model, the additional
debt-induced incentive to invest in fiscal and legal capacity therefore creates a bigger
deviation of the political outcome from the social planner optimum.
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‘Weak’ State
The last possibility arises when both the cohesiveness and the stability condition
fail. Besley and Persson (2011) call such a state a weak state. In their model without
debt, such a state has no incentive to invest in fiscal capacity (Proposition 2.4 in Besley
and Persson (2011)).
As we have already seen, the introduction of debt can raise incentives to invest
because what drives these incentives is now the use that period-2 public funds can
be put to in the first period. This strongly suggests that the weak state situation,
which is based on the fear of future public funds being used against the own group,
will no longer arise in this basic model with debt. The next proposition confirms this
hypothesis:
Proposition 4.4.4 In the basic model without the possibility of default, if Cohesive-
ness and Stability fail, then:
1. There is positive investment in fiscal capacity which is higher than the zero in-
vestment in the case without debt. Moreover, there is positive investment in legal
capacity which is higher than in the case without debt.
2. If α1 = αH , the levels of investment in fiscal and legal capacity are the same
as those chosen by a social planner in the same situation (see Proposition 4.4.1
Part 2).
3. Debt is raised maximally: b1 = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ .
4. If α1 = αL, residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
So, the weak state situation as in Besley and Persson (2011) does no longer arise when
debt is allowed since the possibility to raise debt creates incentives for investing in
state capacity. We even get the social planner’s investment level if α1 = αH . For
the case α1 = αL, we also get positive investments in state capacity, potentially even
higher than the social planner’s investments. However, from the perspective of a social
planner, this case is now even worse than in the model without debt since all future tax
revenue is now drawn to the present and used for transfers directed to the incumbent’s
clientele.
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The arguments for all these results and their interpretations are the same as for
Part 2 of Proposition 4.4.3, which described a redistributive state.
This result of the weak state situation no longer arising will be qualified in the
following section. When we introduce the possibility of default, the costs of raising
high debt enter the analysis. In cases where these costs are prominent, we can re-
establish the possibility of a weak state.
4.5 Sovereign Default and Increasing Costs of Debt
Financing
4.5.1 Adjustments to Model Setup
Until now, the interest rate of government bonds was constant and independent of the
level of debt. Future income and tax revenues were perfectly predictable, government
default was impossible, and the model had a bang-bang solution, i.e. either maximal
debt or no debt at all. In this section, we extend the model by allowing income ω to
be subject to shocks. As we will see below, this leads to varying interest rates, the
possibility of government default, and interior solutions for the optimal level of public
debt.
In the following, we allow the income ωs(pis) of the economy in period s to fluctuate
so that tax revenues τsωs(pis) are also uncertain. The following can thus be interpreted
as a parsimonious way of including an exogenous business cycle component into the
model. Specifically, there are two possible income levels for any given level of legal
capacity, ω¯(pis) > ω(pis). We make the assumptions that ω¯′(pis) = ω′(pis) ≡ ω′(pis)19
and Prob (ωs(pis) = ω¯(pis)) = ψ.
In such a setting, the interest rate is endogenously determined by R(b) = ρ +
r(b). r(b) is the risk premium, which is nonzero if b exceeds a certain threshold b
characterized below. So far, the interest rate ρ = 1/δ − 1 was pinned down by the
discount factor δ of the consumers, and therefore it was independent of the debt level
19Note that this is equivalent to assuming ωs(pis) to have the following form: ω¯(pis) = w(pis) + v¯
and ω(pis) = w(pis) + v. This means we assume the income shock (e.g. due to business cycles) to be
additive and not depending on the level of legal capacity. Therefore, increasing legal capacity leads to
a higher expected income (a positive growth trend), around which the actual income fluctuates with
an amplitude that is constant with respect to pi.
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b. Now, the interest rate increases in the level of public debt. The higher interest
rate at higher levels of debt captures the risk premium due to a higher probability of
default.
Since the investment decision regarding state capacity might influence the solvency
of the state and therefore the credit terms, one has to be careful regarding the timing
of issuing debt and investing in state capacity. Let the timing be as described in
Section 4.3. We now divide stage 2 of the timing from Section 4.3 into two stages 2a
and 2b. We assume that in stage 2a the government makes the decision regarding the
investments in fiscal and legal capacity and in stage 2b all other decisions including
debt.20 This allows us to capture in an easy way the fact that the investors buying
government bonds condition their expectations regarding the future solvency of the
state on the future levels of fiscal and legal capacity, τ2 and pi2. Besides lending money
to the government, we assume that the international investors have the possibility to
invest in risk-less bonds which just compensate them for their time preference. These
risk-less bonds therefore have an interest rate of ρ = 1/δ − 1. Since investors are
assumed to be risk neutral, the risk premium has to be just high enough to make them
indifferent between lending money to the model country and investing in the risk-free
asset.
The threshold b is defined such that for b ≤ b, debt including interest can be fully
paid back even for the low income realization ω(pi2). In this case, there is no risk that
needs compensation, so R(b) = ρ. The threshold b is given by:
b(τ2, pi2) =
τ2ω(pi2)
1 + ρ (4.25)
For b > b, debt will be payed back fully in case of high income ω¯(pi2) but partially
else. The function for the risk premium, r(b), that makes investors indifferent between
lending to the country and investing in the risk-free asset is defined by
(1 + ρ)b1 = ψ · (1 + ρ+ r(b1))b1︸ ︷︷ ︸
repayment in case of ω¯(pi2)
+(1− ψ) · (τ2ω(pi2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
repayment in case of ω(pi2)
. (4.26)
Rearranging terms leads to the expression r(b1) = 1−ψψ (1 + ρ− τ2ω(pi2)b1 ).
20We can also think of these actions as taking place simultaneously under the constraint that the
bundle of debt, interest rate and state capacity investments is such that bond holders are indifferent
between holding the country’s debt and their outside option of investing into a riskless asset that
compensates for the discount factor δ.
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It is clear that there has to be a maximum level of debt b. This is defined by
the maximum debt that can be fully payed back including interest in the case of high
income ω¯(pi2). This level is given by b = τ2ω¯(pi2)1+ρ+r(b) . Solving for b, this leads to:
b(τ2, pi2) =
τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))
1 + ρ (4.27)
When debt is not completely paid back, which means that there is sovereign debt
default, the country incurs a penalty P . For reasons of tractability, the penalty is
assumed to reduce the after-tax income. It would certainly be more realistic to have
the penalty reduce gross income as in many models of sovereign debt default (e.g.
Alesina and Tabellini (1989), Arellano (2008), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)). However,
the above assumption is made to avoid technical complications. The penalty can
be interpreted, for instance, as credit restrictions on retailers which make it more
expensive to supply imported goods. The ensuing reduction in the purchasing power
of income is captured in our simple model by the direct reduction of after-tax income
through the penalty.
We assume that the penalty has the following form (where ∆ is the amount not
repaid):
P =

0 if ∆ = 0 (no default)
P (∆) if ∆ = (1 +R(b1))b1 − (τ2ω(pi2)) and ω2(pi2) = ω(pi2)
Pmax else.
(4.28)
This means, as long as the government shows good will, in the sense that it repays as
much debt as it can, the penalty depends on the amount of debt that is not repaid.
P (∆) is assumed to be increasing and convex for ∆ ∈ [0, (1 + R(b))b − (τ2ω(pi2))] =
[0, τ2(ω¯(pi2) − ω(pi2))] with P (0) = 0. If the country repays less than possible and
defaults purposely, we assume the punishment to be maximal, Pmax. We assume Pmax
to be high enough to prevent the government from defaulting purposely. That is, we
only consider ability-to-pay default and not willingness-to-pay default. This allows us
to model rising costs of debt financing without having to burden the analysis with a
more involved modeling of the default decision.
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4.5.2 The Effects of Increasing Costs of Debt Financing
Concerning the intra-temporal policies, with the same reasoning as in the model with-
out debt, fiscal and legal capacities are always fully employed. As for the policy
function for public good spending, it also looks analogous to before:
G(αs, τs, pis,ms, ns, bs, bs−1, ωˆ) =

τsωˆ(pis)−ms − ns + bs
−min {(1 +R(bs−1))bs−1, τsωˆ(pis)} if αs ≥ 2(1− θ)
0 otherwise,
(4.29)
where ωˆ can now be the high or low income realization ω or ω. For simplifying the
notation, the following contains the “expected” policy function G = ψG(ω) + (1 −
ψ)G(ω), where ψ is the probability for the high income realization ω.
The inter-temporal maximization problem of the incumbent group in period s=1
becomes:
maxτ2,pi2,b1 EV
I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (4.30)
s.t. τ2 ≥ τ1,
pi2 ≥ pi1,
b1 ≤ b(τ2),
λ1 ≡ max{α1, 2(1− θ)}
with
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) = δ((1− γ)U I(τ2, pi2, b1) + γU0(τ2, pi2, b1)) (4.31)
= δ((1− γ)(φEW (αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ))
+ (1− φ)EW (αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2(1− θ)))
+ γ(φEW (αH , τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ)
+ (1− φ)EW (αL, τ2, pi2, 0, 0, b1, 0, 2θ)))
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and
EW (α2, τ2, pi2,m2 = 0, n2 = 0, b1, b2 = 0, βJ) (4.32)
= α2G+ (1− τ2)(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))− (1− ψ)P
+ βJ [τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))−G− ψ(1 +R(b1))b1
− (1− ψ)min {(1 +R(b1))b1, τ2ω(pi2)}],
which is the indirect payoff function for group J ∈ I, O in period 2. This function
is now an expected value itself, because future income ω2(pi2) is uncertain. Note that
for the analysis here, we assume that the fluctuations in income and in the valuation
of public goods are independent. In a quasi-linear setup, we considered the other
extreme, a perfect correlation between the two in the sense that public good spending
has a higher value in times with low income.21 The most realistic modeling probably
lies at some intermediate level of correlation, but the extreme cases allow us to keep
the analysis tractable.
Plugging (4.32) into (4.31), leads to:
EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1) =δ[(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))(1− τ2)− (1− ψ)P (4.33)
+ [φαH + (1− φ)λL2 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡E(λ2)
·[τ2(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))
− ψ(1 +R(b1))b1 − (1− ψ)min {(1 +R(b1))b1, τ2ω(pi2)}]]
with λL2 defined by (4.15).
Regarding the solution of this optimization problem, several cases can arise:
- case a) : b1 = 022
- case b) : b1 ∈ (0, b)
- case c) : b1 = b
- case d) : b1 ∈ (b, b)
- case e) : b1 = b
The first order conditions with respect to b1 in case b) and d) allow us to determine
when the different cases arise. In case b), the first order condition with respect to b1
21As already noted, our results are robust to the extension with a quasi-linear utility.
22This is because we assume b0 = 0 and that governments cannot accumulate assets. If we allowed
for assets, governments would use their revenue to buy bonds in this case. If we additionally allowed
b0 > 0, revenues would be used to reduce debt (and possibly to buy bonds).
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gives us λ1 = E(λ2) and in case d) λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ . It follows that if E(λ2) <
λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
, we are in case c), if λ1 exceeds E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
,
we are in case e) and if λ1 is smaller than E(λ2), we are in case a).
Since the function R(b1) depends on the case and includes τ2 and pi2, also the first
order conditions that determine τ2 and pi2 vary over the cases. The following table
summarizes the expressions:23
Case Condition
a) λ1 < E(λ2)
b) λ1 = E(λ2)
c) E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
d) λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
e) λ1 > E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
Case FOC for τ2
a) δ {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)} (E(λ2)− 1) = λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
b) δ {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))} (E(λ2)− 1) = λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
c) δ {ψ[ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)](E(λ2)− 1) + ω(pi2)(λ1 − 1)} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
d) δ {ψ[ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)](E(λ2)− 1) + ω(pi2)(λ1 − 1)} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
e) δ{(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2))(λ1 − 1)
−(1− ψ) ∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2))} ≤ λ1 ∂F (τ2−τ1)∂τ2
Case FOC for pi2
a) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(E(λ2)− 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
b) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(E(λ2)− 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
c) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
d) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
e) δω′(pi2)[1 + τ2(λ1 − 1)] = λ1 ∂L(pi2−pi1)∂pi2
In the following analysis, we consider an economy that has a low value of public
good spending in the first period, α1 = αL. In this environment, a social planner will
23The FOCs for τ2 and pi2 in case d) have been rearranged by using the FOC for b1. The ≤ in the
FOCs for τ2 in case c), d) and e) are due to the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1, which might bind in these cases.
Note that pi2 ≥ pi1 does never bind.
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not want to raise debt. In particular, the social planner’s solution is clearly case a),
since the social planner has λ1 = α1 < (1 − φ)αL + φαH = E(λ2).24 We want to see
whether for such an environment, governments with a preference for the own group
could exhibit a bias towards the present and hence towards excessive debt. Such a
bias would make the political equilibrium differ from the social planner’s solution in a
significant way.
Furthermore, for the following analysis, we define ‘free future revenues’ as the
discounted expected future tax revenues minus debt, δE(τ2ω2(pi2)) − b1. Free future
revenues refer to the expected future tax revenues that are not bound by debt and
therefore measure the ‘free’ resources of the future government. We define this measure
in order to capture debt in relation to a state’s fiscal power, which is more informative
than the absolute debt level itself.
To analyze the political equilibrium, let us distinguish between countries with high
and low cohesiveness θ. Assume first that cohesiveness is sufficiently high, in the sense
that the cohesiveness condition of Section 4.3 holds: αL > 2(1− θ). Then the political
equilibrium is case a), since we have λ1 = α1 and E(λ2) = (1 − φ)αL + φαH , as it
was the case for the social planner. That is, high enough cohesiveness will make the
political equilibrium coincide with the social planner outcome.
Now, consider countries with low cohesiveness, in the sense that θ is sufficiently
below 1/2. These countries can end up in each of the cases a)-e), depending on the
parameters γ, φ and αH summarized in E(λ2).25
The following proposition summarizes the main results for the model with default.
More detailed comparative static results are collected in Corollary C.1.1 in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 4.5.1 Suppose an economy in the model with sovereign default starts in
the first period with α1 = αL. Moreover, suppose that the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1 does not
bind.26Then:
24If we had α1 = αH , we would have λ1 > E(λ2) for both the social planner and for a government
with own group bias. Both would have a preference for the present and an incentive to raise debt,
and we would end up in one of the cases c), d) or e).
25For the sake of completeness, further channels of influence are ψ, ω¯(·)− ω(·) and P (·).
26It turns out that this is not a very restrictive assumption. It would only be violated if the high
income realization ω(·) lied unrealistically high above the low income realization ω(·). A sufficient
condition for this assumption is that ω(·) ≤ 2ω(·).
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1. In the social planner’s solution as well as in the political equilibrium for αL ≥
2(1− θ)
I. No debt is raised. That is case a) holds.
II. The corresponding comparative static results for state capacity investments
are the same as in the no-default model.
2. In the following, consider the political equilibrium for αL < 2(1− θ). That is, we
have λ1 = 2(1− θ) and E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ].
(a) If λ1 < E(λ2)
I. No debt is raised. That is case a) holds.
II. The corresponding comparative static results for state capacity invest-
ments are the same as in the no-default model.
(b) If λ1 = E(λ2)
I. The debt level is indeterminate in the range [0, b]. That is case b) holds.
(c) If E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
I. b1 = b is the optimal debt level. That is case c) holds.
II. Debt and state capacity investments move in the same direction in re-
sponse to exogenous parameter changes.
III. Incentives to invest in state capacity are lower than in a no-default
world with the same expected income, ψω + (1− ψ)ω.
(d) If λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b˜
, with b < b˜ < b
I. b1 = b˜ is the optimal debt level. That is case d) holds.
II. There is sovereign default in the second period with probability 1− ψ.
III. Incentives to invest in state capacity are lower than in a no-default
world with the same expected income, ψω + (1− ψ)ω.
(e) If λ1 > E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
I. Debt is raised maximally, b1 = b. That is case e) holds.
II. There is sovereign default in the second period with probability 1− ψ.
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III. Incentives to invest in state capacity are lower than in a no-default
world with the same expected income, ψω + (1− ψ)ω, and lowest of all
the cases considered here.
Part 1 of the proposition establishes the social planner solution, which coincides
with the political equilibrium under the cohesiveness condition, αL ≥ 2(1 − θ). To
understand the comparative static results detailed in part 1 of Corollary C.1.1, we
can look at the respective first order conditions for fiscal and legal capacity in case
a). Recall that the left-hand side of these conditions gives the marginal benefit of
higher investments. Since no debt is raised and future tax resources are left in the
future, investment incentives are driven by the expected value of future public funds,
E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)αL, as in a world without default. Additionally, the benefit of
future fiscal capacity depends on the expected income base to which it can be applied,
which is now given by {ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)}. Since this is increasing in ψ, the
probability of a high income realization, investment incentives increase in ψ.
Part 2 of Proposition 4.5.1 illustrates the outcome of the political equilibrium when
the cohesiveness condition fails. That is, cohesiveness θ is low enough such that αL <
2(1 − θ). Part 2 of Corollary C.1.1 in the appendix contains the comparative static
results that can be shown using the techniques of monotone comparative statics. It
turns out that it is hard to get unambiguous comparative static results with respect
to cohesiveness θ, as soon as debt is used. Therefore, we concentrate, for the following
illustration, on parameter changes which do not alter cohesiveness θ. This implies that
we keep the value of present public funds λ1 = 2(1−θ) constant. Most of the remaining
parameters enter E(λ2), the expected value of future public funds. Therefore, we can
illustrate most comparative static results by considering the reactions to a change in
E(λ2), keeping λ1 constant. For a fixed and sufficiently low value of cohesiveness (and
α1 = αL as before), Figure 4.1 illustrates the relation between E(λ2), future fiscal
capacity τ2, future legal capacity pi2, debt b1 and free future revenues.27
27 The underlying comparative statics within the different cases are established in Corollary C.1.1.
So, we assume that τ2 ≥ τ1 does not bind. However, letting it bind up to some E(λ2) would not
change much. For the relevant values of E(λ2), τ2 and pi2 then would be horizontal lines from the
left, the dashed line for b1 in case d) would be solid and both b1 and free future revenues would be
constant in case c) (as long as τ2 ≥ τ1 binds). The continuity at the border between two cases can
be seen from the first order conditions. Free future revenues jump in case b) since debt jumps from b
to 0. Depending on the functional forms of F (·), L(·) and ω(·), the upward/downward sloping lines
of the diagram are not necessarily linear.
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium outcomes conditional on E(λ2) (holding cohesiveness fixed at
a low level)
The letters below the graphs refer to the different cases we identified above. Given
an expected value of future public funds, E(λ2), higher than the present value λ1, we
start on the right of the figure in case a). The corresponding results are summarized
in Part 2.(a) of Proposition 4.5.1 and of Corollary C.1.1. No debt is raised and the
comparative static results correspond to a model without debt. In particular, all
parameter changes that decrease E(λ2) will decrease investments in fiscal and legal
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capacity. One important possibility to lower E(λ2) is an increase in political instability.
Continuing to decrease E(λ2), at some point, we reach the knife-edge case b) with
E(λ2) = λ1.28 The debt level in this case is indeterminate in the range [0, b].
By lowering E(λ2) further, we move to case c). To understand the comparative
static results for case c), it is helpful to consider the respective first order condition for
fiscal capacity τ2. Note that ω(pi2) is the “low income part” of the expected future tax
base. This part will be available for sure in the future. In contrast, ψ[ω¯(pi2) − ω(pi2)]
describes the additional expected value of the income tax base since ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2) will
be additionally available if the high income realizes. We call ψ[ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2)] the “high
income part”.
In case c), it is optimal to exactly raise a debt level of b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . Because
of the ensuing penalty, it would be too expensive to raise more debt. This means that
the low income part of the future tax base is fully drawn to the present. For this part,
the marginal benefit of making more of it available to the state through fiscal capacity
investments is thus proportional to (λ1 − 1). For case c), E(λ2) < λ1, so future public
funds are more valuable when they can be used in the present through debt. Therefore,
investment incentives are higher than in a world without debt through the influence
of the low income part.29
In contrast, the high income part of expected future tax resources is not drawn to
the present. For this part of the future tax base, the marginal benefit of making more of
it available through fiscal capacity investments is thus proportional to (E(λ2)− 1). As
far as this part is concerned, we therefore have the same effects as in a model without
debt. For instance, given low cohesiveness, increasing political instability makes it
more likely that the current government’s group gets mistreated in the future by a
rival government. This decreases E(λ2) and, through the influence of the high income
part, decreases incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. By complementarity between the
two forms of state capacity investment, we also get less investments in legal capacity
pi2. Lower levels of fiscal and legal capacity decrease b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ . The latter is
just the present value of the low income part of future public funds. Since exactly this
part is drawn to the present in case c), the debt level decreases when investments in
28Note that, for this case, there are no comparative static results to derive.
29Note that the proposition does not contain results about this level comparison to a world without
debt.
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state capacity decrease. This is illustrated in the third panel of Figure 4.1. For case
c), we thus have debt and state capacity moving in the same direction in response to
exogenous parameter changes. Furthermore, through the influence of the high income
part, we have lower incentives to invest than in a model without default that has no
fluctuations in income but the same expected income, ψω+(1−ψ)ω. This is because in
a world without income fluctuations, the entire income could be drawn to the present.
Continuing to decrease the value of future public funds, E(λ2), we enter case d).
In this case, it is optimal to incur some penalty by risking default in case the low
income realizes. That is default will occur with probability (1 − ψ). The optimality
condition for debt implies that the optimal debt level lies a certain amount db above
b. Since optimal debt b1 is still lower than the maximal debt level b, there is still some
proportion of expected future tax resources which is left in the future. In particular, for
the marginal investment in fiscal capacity, the high income part of future tax resources
is not drawn to the present. Therefore, as in case c), the marginal benefit of additional
fiscal capacity contains a term proportional to (E(λ2)− 1). Lowering E(λ2) will thus
again decrease incentives to invest in fiscal and legal capacity. Since this decreases
b(τ2, pi2) = τ2ω(pi2)1+ρ , we have one force that pulls debt down. Specifically, for a fixed
level db of debt which is raised above b, the total amount of debt, b+ db, will go down.
The low income part of future public funds decreases and less debt is needed to draw it
to the present. This effect was the only effect at work in case c) and it was responsible
for debt and state capacity moving in the same direction. We call this effect the low
income effect.
In case d), we get a second effect. Specifically, from the first order condition for
debt in case d) we can see the following. If E(λ2) decreases, ∆ will adjust upwards
such that the first order condition holds again with equality. That is, the amount db
of debt which is raised above b will increase and trigger a higher penalty. Given, for
instance, an increasing level of political instability, the danger of getting mistreated
by a rival government in the future gets bigger. Therefore, it becomes optimal to raise
more debt and avoid the rival redistribution for a higher proportion of expected future
tax resources. In particular, for a higher proportion of fiscal capacity, the high income
part is now also drawn to the present.30 The higher penalty implied by this is justified
30Note, however, that as long as we are in case d), the high income part is not drawn to the present
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because the alternative of leaving money to the future also gets more expensive. We
call this the high income effect.
The overall effect on the level of debt is therefore ambiguous. However, if the
high income effect dominates the low income effect, we get an increase in debt if E(λ2)
decreases, as indicated by the dashed line in the third panel of Figure 4.1. In region d),
debt and state capacities can therefore start to move in opposite directions in response
to exogenous parameter changes.31
Decreasing the value of future public funds, E(λ2), further, we finally enter case
e). In this case, debt is raised maximally, so all future public funds are drawn to the
present. However, this comes at the price of a high penalty. Despite the high penalty,
these funds are drawn to the present due to the very low value of future public funds,
since E(λ2) = λ1 − (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
when we enter case e). If E(λ2) drops further,
investment incentives stay constant at the level implied by λ1 − (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
.
Even in case e), through the influence of the low income part, we still get higher
investment incentives than in a world without debt under realistic restrictions on the
income levels. However, investment incentives are lower than in a no-default world.
Especially case d) and e) can reestablish a weak state situation similar to Besley
and Persson (2011), where we get very low investments in fiscal and legal capacity.32
These low investments arise from a low value of future public funds, E(λ2). Given the
possibility to raise debt and letting E(λ2) be low enough that debt is chosen, E(λ2)
influences investment incentives only through the high income part. Therefore, state
capacity investments will be the lower, the higher the influence of the high income
part, in the sense that the difference between the income levels, ω(·) − ω(·), is bigger
while holding the expected income, ψω¯(·) + (1− ψ)ω(·), constant.33
for the marginal investment unit of fiscal capacity. That is why investment incentives are still driven
partly by E(λ2).
31Note that in case d), the absolute level of debt could also decrease if E(λ2) decreases. However,
this is rather an extreme scenario since this implies that b in case e) would be lower than b at the
border between case c) and d), which requires a very steep decrease of state capacities within case
d). In any case, decreasing E(λ2) in case d) will always lead to a decrease in the level of free future
revenues, that is of expected future public funds minus debt.
32Note that in Besley and Persson (2011), a weak state did not invest at all in fiscal capacity.
33The easiest way to see this is to look at the FOC for fiscal capacity in case e), which equals the
FOC of case d) for E(λ2) = λ1 − (1−ψ)ψ ∂P (∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
. If ω(·)− ω(·) increases while ψω¯(·) + (1− ψ)ω(·)
remains constant, the LHS clearly decreases since ∆ increases. So, τ2 decreases. For very high
ω(·)− ω(·), τ2 decreases until τ2 = τ1 is reached, which corresponds to a state which does not invest
at all in fiscal capacity like a weak state in Besley and Persson (2011).
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Furthermore, the situation of low investments in state capacity is now worsened by
a high debt level. Debt is bad here because in the political equilibrium, λ1 = 2(1−θ) >
αL holds. Therefore, in case e), debt is used to fully tie down future public funds for
clientele politics today. A social planner, on the other hand, would not draw future
public funds to the present but would use them instead for public good expenditures
in the future.
Note that the weak state situation in the preceding analysis arises for similar param-
eter values as in a model without debt. In particular, recall that the above analysis
was done for countries with low enough cohesiveness. Furthermore, a low value of
E(λ2) leading to case e) can be driven by high political instability γ. Low cohesiveness
and high political instability constitute the parameter constellation that defines a weak
state in the basic model without debt (Besley and Persson, 2011).34 The mechanism at
work has now already been highlighted several times: When the incumbent government
is afraid that future public funds will be used against its interest, it will not invest in the
additional creation of these public funds. We call this the low-investment-mechanism.
However, the preceding analysis also cautions that the low-investment-mechanism
is only partly at work in the default setup. Specifically, we have just argued that
the size of the difference between low and high income realizations plays a crucial role.
Note in particular that, as this difference goes to zero, we move back to the debt model
without default from Section 4.3. For this model, investment incentives were driven
by the present value of public funds as soon as the future value dropped low enough.
Therefore, the low-investment-mechanism was completely broken by the mechanism
of using debt to bring future public funds at the disposal of the present. We call the
latter the debt-mechanism.
The above analysis presents a first step in analyzing the relative strength of these
two mechanisms. Specifically, we have highlighted how the two effects interact in a
specific framework. ‘Crisis countries’ with very high public debt and low fiscal and
legal capacity can arise. In our model, these are countries with low cohesiveness θ,
a low value of future public funds, E(λ2), and high enough income fluctuations. A
low value of E(λ2) could be due, for instance, to high political instability γ. Since
34To be more precise, recall from the discussion of the stability condition in Section 4.4.2 that the
probability φ for a high value of public good spending also has to be low enough.
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E(λ2) < λ1 defines cases c)-e), only for sufficiently low cohesiveness we can ever end
up in the high debt - low state capacity situation of case e). Therefore, the lower is
cohesiveness, the more likely (i.e. for a larger range of parameter values) a country
will end up in such a situation.
From this analysis, we can already draw some policy implications. A crucial factor
that keeps a country from running into a debt trap, that is a situation with very high
debt and low state capacity, seems to be a sufficient level of cohesiveness. High cohe-
siveness entails provisions in a country’s constitution and other institutional features
which prohibit clientele politics by the political group in power. In a politically un-
stable political environment, non-cohesive countries, in which it is easy to benefit your
preferred clientele, will end up in the problematic situation of a debt trap. To avoid
to get back in such a situation, a reform of cohesiveness seems to be beneficial. This
necessitates deep reforms that go at the core of the functioning of the state. Examples
of such reforms include implementing a functioning system of checks and balances, es-
tablishing an independent press that names and shames clientele politics, establishing
provisions in the constitution that prevent clientele politics, or strengthening the con-
stitutional court in its power to enforce such provisions. These reforms go deeper than
the usually discussed economic reforms. Our analysis shows that in order to make such
economic reform efforts sustainable, they have to be preceded by these institutional
reforms. Otherwise, political incentives will constantly endanger an enduring success
of economic reforms.
Note that the clientele politics here do not correspond to the targeting of electoral
favors during an electoral campaign, which has been analyzed in the previous two
chapters. Any democracy will be characterized by some form of such an allocation
of electoral favors to the majority of voters. The clientele politics in this chapter
correspond rather to a form of rent extraction for the benefit of the own clientele once
politicians are in power. In particular, in this chapter, we do not consider a feedback of
politicians’ decisions on the probability of being in power. We do not even take a stand
on whether a change in political power is determined by a democratic election. As in
Besley and Persson (2011), such a change could be brought about by some kind of civil
war. Therefore, the results here do not contradict the result from the previous two
chapters that targeted pork-barrel spending might be necessary in electoral campaigns
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to secure the success of growth-enhancing reforms. Rather, the above results point to
the negative effect of clientele politics that take the form of rent extraction and that
are unrelated to sustaining the support of a majority of voters.
4.5.3 Cross-Country Correlations
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In the following, we take a short look at cross-country correlations. As in Besley
and Persson (2011), this subsection is therefore not intended as a convincing test of
the model’s predictions. The aim is just to illustrate the theory and to see whether
the presented correlations are somehow in line with results from the model. In more
detail, we like to mimic Figure 4.1 with real world data. Data for state capacities
and estimates for model parameters are taken from Besley and Persson (2011) and
debt data is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Joining the two datasets results
in a sample of 57 countries. In Figure 4.2 we plot fiscal capacity, measured as the
share of taxes in GDP in 1999 against political stability, measured as the index used
by Besley and Persson (2011).35,36 Since Figure 4.1 was derived under the assumption
35Detailed variable descriptions are provided in the appendix.
36Even though Figures 4.2, 4.3, C.1, and C.2 use only data of Besley and Persson (2011), these
figures are interesting since Besley and Persson (2011) do not plot the data in this dimension, i.e.
state capacities conditional on political stability. Due to the theoretical results from our model with
debt as summarized by Figure 4.1, these plots are desirable here.
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of low enough cohesiveness, Figure 4.2 focuses on countries with cohesiveness below
the 66th percentile. Figure C.1 in Appendix C.3.1 presents the corresponding scatter
plot including also highly cohesive countries. Cohesiveness is measured as the average
executive constraints from 1800 to 2000. The theory predicts that fiscal capacity should
increase with E(λ2). Since for non-cohesive countries, E(λ2) is increasing in political
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stability, the model predicts to observe a positive correlation between political stability
and fiscal capacity for non-cohesive countries. Excluding highly cohesive countries,
we find a positive correlation (+0.3200) as shown in Figure 4.2 which is statistically
significant (p-value 0.0502). We also find this significant positive correlation using
other measures of fiscal capacity, like the share of the non-shadow economy.
Turning to legal capacity and following the same reasoning as above, the model
predicts to observe a positive correlation between political stability and legal capacity
for non-cohesive countries. Figure 4.3 provides cross-country evidence, where we use
the property rights protection index from Besley and Persson (2011) as a measure
for legal capacity. Excluding highly cohesive countries, we find a positive correlation
(+0.4115) which is statistically significant (p-value 0.0103).37
Finally, as the part of Figure 4.1 regarding debt illustrates, it is ultimately an em-
pirical question whether we observe a positive or negative correlation between political
stability and debt for non-cohesive countries. As Figure 4.1 is drawn now, for part d,
debt is negatively correlated to stability. Hence, the incentive of raising more debt in
order to draw more public funds to the present in the high income case dominates the
effect of having to draw less public funds in the low income case. If the high income
effect dominates the low income effect, we therefore expect an overall negative corre-
lation between political stability and debt for non-cohesive countries. If the relative
strengths of the two mechanisms is reversed, we expect an overall positive correlation.
Figure 4.4 and Figure C.3 in Appendix C.3.1 show the corresponding cross-country
data. For medium and low cohesive countries we observe a slight negative correla-
tion (-0.1405), however, not statistically significant (p-value 0.4003). Therefore, the
crude cross-country data used here are not enough to determine which of the above
mentioned theoretical effects dominates in terms of the incentive to raise debt under
different values of political stability.
A comprehensive empirical analysis to test the theory convincingly remains a chal-
lenging task for future research. As Besley and Persson (2011) point out, this would
require data and empirical strategies that credibly isolate exogenous variations in the
underlying determinants that drive the combined evolution of state capacities. What
37Again, the corresponding scatter plot including highly cohesive countries can be found as Figure
C.2 in Appendix C.3.1.
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we have shown here is which additional interactions between state capacities and debt
these determinants imply. Furthermore, we have highlighted new determinants, like
the size of income fluctuations that impact on these interactions.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper presented an integrated analytical framework for analyzing the interaction
between public debt and state capacity, the power of a state to raise taxes and to
provide market supporting policies. We showed that the possibility to raise debt can
provide a novel incentive to invest in state capacity, because debt allows to bring future
state capacity at the disposal of the current government. As long as debt can be used
to protect the current government from an adverse use of future public funds, it is no
longer necessary to use low investments in state capacity as a protection device.
However, we also showed how this novel mechanism can be weakened in a world
with income fluctuations and the possibility of default. When high costs of raising
debt make it very expensive to draw all relevant future public funds to the present, the
mechanism of lowering investments resurfaces. Specifically, this mechanism is more
prominent for high income fluctuations, because they increase the proportion of public
funds that can only be drawn to the present at high costs. For such an environment,
we get results that are closest to the original no-debt model by Besley and Persson
(2011). In particular, an unstable political environment combined with insufficient
institutional provisions to prevent clientele politics can then lead to a situation of
low state capacity. Furthermore, this weak state situation is now worsened by a high
built-up of debt, increasing the probability of sovereign default.
Our model leaves room for several generalizations which should be investigated
by future research. First, to qualify the model results in light of the tax smoothing
literature, it would be interesting to allow for distortionary taxation. Second, the
modeling of default could be extended to a full-fledged model of willingness-to-pay
default. This would certainly allow to uncover additional interesting channels that
shape the interaction between debt and state capacity. Third, in light of this, it could
make sense to extend the model to more than two periods.
Finally, as highlighted in the last section, a comprehensive empirical test of the
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model’s predictions is a challenging, but promising path for future research. Such
an analysis will allow to quantify the relative strengths of the mechanisms we have
identified as driving forces behind the combined evolution of public debt and investment
in state capacities. As our analysis shows, it is important to gauge the size of these
effects correctly in order to determine whether the incentivizing effect of public debt
on state building is dominant or whether a country will only add the burden of high
debt to low investments in its fiscal and legal capacities.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Constitutional limit on debt: equilibrium char-
acterization
The following corollaries state the complete characterization of the results of Proposi-
tion 2.6.1 and Proposition 2.6.2.
Corollary A.1.1 Suppose the reform is purely targetable (i.e. λ = 1) and assume
there is an exogenous debt limit that is higher than the natural debt limit under no-
reform: δ¯ = 1 + ρ¯ ≥ 1.
(I.) Non-restrictive debt limit: When the debt limit ρ¯ is such that e − ρ¯ >
2(c− ρ¯), in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability βA = βB = 1;
(ii) announce the maximal debt: δA = δB = 1 + ρ¯;
(iii) first-period offers to voters are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1, 3 +
2(ρ¯ − c)]. That is both candidates draw first period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
2+2(1+ρ¯−c) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3 + 2(ρ¯− c),
1, if x ≥ 3 + 2(ρ¯− c).
(A.1)
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Second-period transfer offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1,−1+
2(e− ρ¯)].
(II.) Restrictive debt limit: When the debt limit ρ¯ is restrictive enough such that
Ĥ = 2(c− ρ¯)− (e− ρ¯) > 0, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability βA = βB = 1− 12Ĥ < 1;
(ii) both candidates announce the maximal debt: δiN = 1 in case of no-reform, δiR =
1 + ρ¯ in case of reform, i ∈ {A,B}.
(iii) When candidates do not reform, they draw first-period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗N(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
1
2
(
x+1
Ĥ
)
, if − 1 ≤ x ≤ −1 + Ĥ,
1
2 , if − 1 + Ĥ ≤ x ≤ 3− Ĥ,
1
2
(
1 + x−3+Ĥ
Ĥ
)
, if 3− Ĥ ≤ x ≤ 3,
1, if x ≥ 3.
(A.2)
Second period offers are degenerate on -1.
When candidates reform, they draw first-period offers from the following distri-
bution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
4−2(c−ρ¯) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3− 2(c− ρ¯),
1, if x ≥ 3− 2(c− ρ¯).
(A.3)
Second-period transfer offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1,−1+
2(e− ρ¯)].
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Corollary A.1.2 Assume the exogenous debt limit is more restrictive than the natural
debt limit under no-reform: δ¯ = 1− σ¯ < 1.
(I.) High benefit of reform: When the reform benefits e are high enough com-
pared to the reform costs c such that e > 2c, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability βA = βB = 1;
(ii) both candidates announce the maximal debt: δA = δB = δ¯ = 1− σ¯;
(iii) first-period offers to voters are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1, 3 −
2σ¯ − 2c]. That is both candidates draw first period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
2(2−σ¯−c) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3− 2σ¯ − 2c,
1, if x ≥ 3− 2σ¯ − 2c.
(A.4)
Second-period transfer offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1,−1+
2e+ 2σ¯].
(II.) Low benefit of reform: When the reform benefits e are low enough com-
pared to the reform costs c such that e < 2c, in the unique equilibrium
(i) both candidates reform with probability 1− 12−σ¯ H˜ < 1, where H˜ = 2c− e > 0;
(ii) both candidates announce the maximal debt: δA = δB = δ¯ = 1− σ¯.
(iii) When candidates do not reform, they draw first-period offers from the following
distribution:
F ∗N(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
1
2
(
x+1
H˜
)
, if − 1 ≤ x ≤ −1 + H˜,
1
2 , if − 1 + H˜ ≤ x ≤ 3− 2σ¯ − H˜,
1
2
(
1 + x−3+H˜
H˜
)
, if 3− 2σ¯ − H˜ ≤ x ≤ 3− 2σ¯,
1, if x ≥ 3− 2σ¯.
(A.5)
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Second-period transfer offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1,−1+
2σ¯].
When candidates reform, they draw first-period offers from the following distri-
bution:
F ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
x+1
2(2−σ¯−c) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 3− 2σ¯ − 2c,
1, if x ≥ 3− 2σ¯ − 2c.
(A.6)
Second-period transfer offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on [−1,−1+
2e+ 2σ¯].
A.2 Proofs
In the following, we prove the propositions in the paper along with the respective
corollaries. It turns out that proving proposition 2.6.1 and corollary A.1.1 first is most
convenient. The other results then follow through making the correct adjustments.
However, in terms of notation, the proofs are easiest to carry out for proposition 2.6.1
and corollary A.1.1.
A.2.1 Proof of Part (I.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary
A.1.1
The proof consists of three steps: in Step I, we show that in any equilibrium, both
candidates must reform with probability 1. In Step II, we show that in any equilib-
rium, both candidates must raise the maximal debt. In Step III, we characterize the
equilibrium distributions.
Step I: First, we show that in any equilibrium, both candidates must reform with
positive probability. Consider the case where candidate A does not reform, raises any
debt δA ≤ 1 and plays any associated distribution. We show that if candidate B
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follows the equilibrium strategy where he is doing the reform, he defeats candidate A
with probability 1.
The strategy of candidate B consists in doing the reform, running maximal debt,
and drawing first period offers to voters from a uniform distribution on [−1, 3+2(ρ¯−c)],
and second period offers are drawn from a uniform distribution [−1,−1 + 2(e− ρ¯)].
A voter votes for the candidate that gives him the highest total expected offer.
Assume candidate i offers xi to the voter in the first period and proposes a debt of
δi. The resulting total expected offer to the voter is the first period offer, xi, plus
the amount of transfers, µi2, the voter expects in the second period if candidate i is
elected. Given a debt proposal of δi, µi2 = −δi in case of no-reform, and µi2 = e − δi
in case of reform. Since the outcome of the future redistribution is uncertain, today
each voter expects µi2 for the second period if candidate i is elected. In terms of total
expected offers that a candidate proposes over both periods this means the following.
If µi1 is defined as the mean of the first-period offer distribution F i(·), candidate i is
effectively adding a degenerate distribution at µi2 to F i(·) to obtain the distribution of
total expected offers with mean µi1 + µi2. Define Fˆ i(·) to be this distribution of total
expected offers. A voter will vote for candidate A if A gives a higher total expected
offer than B. Candidate A’s share of vote is equal to the probability that any random
voter receives a total expected offer from candidate B which is lower than the offer he
receives from A:
SA =
∫ +∞
−1−δA
FˆB(x)dFˆA(x).
Since candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy, we obtain FˆB by adding the
equilibrium first period offer distribution (A.1) of corollary A.1.1 to the distribution
degenerate at µB2 = e− δB = e− (1 + ρ¯) = −1 + (e− ρ¯). The ex ante total expected
offers that voters get from candidate B are thus drawn from the following distribution:
FˆB(x) =

0, if x ≤ −2 + (e− ρ¯),
x+2−(e−ρ¯)
2+2(1+ρ¯−c) , if − 2 + (e− ρ¯) ≤ x ≤ 2(1 + ρ¯− c) + (e− ρ¯),
1, if x ≥ 2(1 + ρ¯− c) + (e− ρ¯).
Since candidate A does not reform, her budget constraint for the total expected
offers becomes
∫+∞
−1−δA xdFˆ
A(x) = 0.
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Suppose −1− δA ≥ −2 + (e− ρ¯), then
SA =
∫ +∞
−1−δA
FˆB(x)dFˆA(x) ≤
∫ +∞
−1−δA
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)
2 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)dFˆ
A(x)
= 2− (e− ρ¯)2 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c) <
1
2 ,
since e > c by assumption (2.1).
Suppose −1− δA < −2 + (e− ρ¯), then
SA =
∫ +∞
−1−δA
FˆB(x)dFˆA(x) ≤
∫ +∞
−2+(e−ρ¯)
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)
2 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)dFˆ
A(x)
= 12 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)
[∫ +∞
−1−δA
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)dFˆA(x)
−
∫ −2+(e−ρ¯)
−1−δA
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)dFˆA(x)
]
= 12 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)
[
2− (e− ρ¯)−
∫ −2+(e−ρ¯)
−1−δA
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)dFˆA(x)
]
,
where − ∫−2+(e−ρ¯)−1−δA x+2−(e− ρ¯)dFˆA(x) is a positive term that is maximized for δA = 1
and by offering −2 to half of voters, the other half of voters getting strictly more that
−2 + (e− ρ¯) so that FˆA(−2 + (e− ρ¯)) = 12 .1 Hence,
SA ≤ 12 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)
[
2− (e− ρ¯)−
∫ −2+(e−ρ¯)
−1−δA
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)dFˆA(x)
]
≤ 12 + 2(1 + ρ¯− c)
[
2− (e− ρ¯) + 12[e− ρ¯]
]
<
1
2 ,
The last in equality is equivalent to the condition e− ρ¯ > 2(c− ρ¯), which was assumed
for Part (I.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1. Therefore, a candidate that
plays reform with zero probability can be beaten for sure. In any equilibrium strategy,
reform must therefore be played with positive probability.
We now show that the reform must be played with probability 1 in any equilibrium.
Assume therefore that candidate A reforms with positive probability βA < 1, and for
this case of reform raises any debt δAR ≤ 1 + ρ¯ and plays any associated distribution.
Similarly he does not reform with probability 1 − βA, and for this case of no-reform
raises any debt δAN ≤ 1 and plays any associated distribution. Candidate B follows the
same strategy as above. Then by the above analysis candidate B wins for sure if A does
not reform. Furthermore, it can be shown that the vote share of candidate B is equal to
1Offering −2 to more than half of the voters would result in a vote share SA < 1/2 anyway and
is therefore excluded for the above derivation.
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1
2 if A reforms and plays any debt δ
A
R ≤ 1 + ρ¯ and any possible distribution. Therefore,
candidate B’s total probability of winning is (1− β) + β · 12 > 12 . This cannot happen
in equilibrium, where both candidates should win with equal probability. Hence, in
any equilibrium both candidates must reform with probability 1.
Step II: We follow Lizzeri (1999) and show that if both candidates reform with
probability 1 and candidate A does not run the maximal debt, in the sense that δA <
1 + ρ¯, then candidate A can be beaten for sure.2 Define ρi = δi − 1 as the amount
by which the debt raised by candidate i is higher than the endowment 1. Note that
ρA < ρB = ρ¯. Candidate B can beat candidate A for sure by choosing the maximal
debt δB = 1 + ρ¯ and the following first period distribution plan:
FB(x) =

0, if x ≤ −1,
1+ρ¯−(1+ρA)
5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA) , if − 1 ≤ x ≤ −1 + ρ¯− ρA,
1+ρ¯−(1+ρA)
5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA) if − 1 + ρ¯− ρA ≤ x
+ 2(2+ρ¯−c)(x+1−(ρ¯−ρA))(3+ρ¯−2c+(1+ρA))(5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA)) , ≤ 3 + 2(ρ¯− c),
1, if x ≥ 3 + 2(ρ¯− c).
(A.7)
Given that candidate B chooses the maximal debt, ρB = ρ¯, from equation (A.7)
we get
FˆB(x) =

0, if x ≤ −2 + (e− ρ¯),
1+ρ¯−(1+ρA)
5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA) , if − 2 + (e− ρ¯) ≤ x ≤ −2 + (e− ρA),
1+ρ¯−(1+ρA)
5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA) if − 2 + (e− ρA) ≤ x
+ 2(2+ρ¯−c)(x+2−(e−ρA))(3+ρ¯−2c+(1+ρA))(5+3ρ¯−2c−(1+ρA)) , ≤ 2(1 + ρ¯− c) + (e− ρ¯),
1, if x ≥ 2(1 + ρ¯− c) + (e− ρ¯).
(A.8)
Note that candidate A will never offer more than the upper bound of candidate B’s
distribution, 2(1+ρ¯−c)+(e−ρ¯). Offering exactly this upper bound to a voter is enough
2We drop the reform subscript R here, since both candidates reform with probability one.
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to get the vote for sure since candidate B is offering less than 2(1 + ρ¯ − c) + (e − ρ¯)
with probability 1.
The share of the votes of candidate A is given by:
SA =
∫ 2(1+ρ¯−c)+(e−ρ¯)
−2+(e−ρA)
FˆB(x)dFˆA(x)
=
∫ 2(1+ρ¯−c)+(e−ρ¯)
−2+(e−ρA)
1 + ρ¯− (1 + ρA)
5 + 3ρ¯− 2c− (1 + ρA)
+ 2(2 + ρ¯− c)(x+ 2− (e− ρ
A))
(3 + ρ¯− 2c+ (1 + ρA))(5 + 3ρ¯− 2c− (1 + ρA))dFˆ
A(x)
= 8− (ρ¯− ρ
A)2 + 2(ρ¯− c)(4 + ρ¯− c)
(3 + ρ¯− 2c+ (1 + ρA))(5 + 3ρ¯− 2c− (1 + ρA)) .
To obtain this expression we used distribution (A.8), and the fact that, by the
budget constraint for the reform option,
∫ 2(1+ρ¯−c)+(e−ρ¯)
−2+(e−ρA) xdFˆ
A(x) = e− c.
SA achieves a maximum of 12 for ρ
A = ρ¯ and is strictly less than 12 for ρ
A < ρ¯. This
can be seen by taking the derivative of SA with respect to ρA
∂SA
∂ρA
= 4(2 + ρ¯− c)(ρ¯− ρ
A)
(3 + ρ¯− 2c+ (1 + ρA))2(5 + 3ρ¯− 2c− (1 + ρA))2
the sign of which is determined by (ρ¯− ρA) since c < 1 by assumption.
Therefore, if candidate A chooses less than the maximal debt, she is beaten for sure.
This implies that in any equilibrium both candidates must run the maximal debt.
Step III: We have shown that in equilibrium both candidates reform and raise the
maximal debt level 1 + ρ¯. The latter also corresponds to the per-capita resources that
are additionally available for first-period transfer offers. Therefore, we are back to a
divide-the-dollar game with an exactly specified amount of resources to divide. We
can therefore apply Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri (1999), and construct the first-period
offer distribution analogously to the second-period offer distribution in section 2.4.
Using the first-period budget constraint (2.4) for the case of reform, we can calculate
the upper bound of the distribution as in section 2.4. In total we then find that
both candidates will draw first period offers to voters from a uniform distribution on
[−1, 3 + 2(ρ¯− c)]. That this is the unique equilibrium in such a divide-the-dollar game
has been established by Myerson (1993) for symmetric equilibria and by Lizzeri (1999)
for the general case.
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Furthermore, the amount of resources available after debt repayment in the second
period is e − ρ¯ and second period offers are drawn from a uniform distribution on
[−1,−1 + 2(e− ρ¯)]. Each candidate then wins with probability 12 .
A.2.2 Proof of Part (II.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary
A.1.1: Existence of equilibrium
In the following, we show that the stated strategies indeed are an equilibrium. The
proof of existence of the equilibrium follows similar steps as the proof of Theorem 5
in Lizzeri and Persico (1998), but adjusts for the dynamic setup and the use of public
debt.
Preliminaries. For the proof we will again work with distributions Fˆ ∗ that add to
the equilibrium first-period distributions the expected value of transfers that each voter
expects in the second period if the maximal debt is raised. The resulting equilibrium
distributions of total expected offers are:
Fˆ ∗N(x) =

0, if x ≤ −2,
1
2
(
x+2
H
)
, if − 2 ≤ x ≤ −2 +H,
1
2 , if − 2 +H ≤ x ≤ 2−H,
1
2
(
1 + x−2+H
H
)
, if 2−H ≤ x ≤ 2,
1, if x ≥ 2;
(A.9)
and
Fˆ ∗R(x) =

0, if x ≤ −2 + (e− ρ¯),
x+2−(e−ρ¯)
4−2(c−ρ¯) , if − 2 + (e− ρ¯) ≤ x ≤ 2−H,
1, if x ≥ 2−H.
(A.10)
We will show that these distributions along with the equilibrium probability of
reform constitute the unique equilibrium. Since the above distributions combine the
equilibrium first-period distributions with running the respective maximal debt level,
this proves the optimality of a maximal debt level along the way. The reason is that,
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without the maximal debt level, the above distributions of total expected offers are
infeasible.
Existence of equilibrium The proof of existence has three steps: Step I shows that
there is no profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from Fˆ ∗N ,
step II shows that it is also not profitable to deviate on Fˆ ∗R. Finally, step III argues
for the optimality of the equilibrium probability of reform.
Step I: Optimality of Fˆ ∗N . Consider candidate A when he decides not to reform
and assume he deviates from the equilibrium distribution under no-reform, Fˆ ∗N , to
another distribution FˆN . When this candidate A meets a candidate B not reforming
and offering money according to Fˆ ∗N , the vote share of candidate A is:3
S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆN) =
∫ 2
−2
Fˆ ∗N(x)dFˆN(x) (A.11)
=12
{
MLN +MHN
H
+ −2 +H
H
[
FˆN(2−H)− FˆN(−2 +H)
]
+
(2H − 4
H
) [
1− FˆN(2−H)
]
+ 2
H
}
,
where H = 2(c− ρ¯)− (e− ρ¯),
MLN =
∫ −2+H
−2
xdFˆN(x), (A.12)
and
MHN =
∫ 2
2−H
xdFˆN(x). (A.13)
Equations (A.12) and (A.13) capture the money spent on transfers in the low interval
[−2,−2 + H] and high interval (2 − H, 2], respectively. We choose the high interval
to be open to the right, because the continuous equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗N puts zero
mass on the single offer 2−H. In order to win a positive mass of voters in the upper
interval, the respective offers must therefore be strictly higher than 2−H.
Candidate A chooses FˆN under the constraint that
MLN +MHN +MMN = 0, (A.14)
3Without loss of generality, we exclude a mass point at the lower bound −2 of the support.
Whenever necessary later on, we deal with this case separately.
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where
MMN =
∫ 2−H
−2+H
xdFˆN(x) (A.15)
is the money spent on transfer offers in the middle interval (−2 +H, 2−H].
In the following, we will argue that when checking for profitable deviations from
the equilibrium no-reform distribution Fˆ ∗N , we can concentrate on distributions FˆN
that have no offers in the middle interval. We will do so by showing that if FˆN has a
positive mass of offers in the middle interval which are not concentrated at the upper
bound 2 − H of this interval, then the vote share can be increased by shifting that
mass up towards 2 − H. As a last step, it can then be shown that if a distribution
only has offers in the middle interval concentrated as a mass point at 2−H, then such
a distribution can always be approximated by another distribution Fˆ ′N that has no
offers in the middle interval and achieves the same vote share against the equilibrium
strategy. This will establish that, when looking for deviations from the no-reform
distribution Fˆ ∗N , it is enough to focus on distributions FˆN that have no offers in the
middle interval.
Therefore, assume that FˆN is a best response to the equilibrium strategy and spends
a positive amount on offers in the interval (−2 + H, 2 − H]. First, it is easy to see
that candidate A will not make offers in the interval (−2 +H,−2 + (e− ρ¯)]. With
such offers, candidate A cannot win additional votes against Fˆ ∗N , because Fˆ ∗N contains
no offers in the middle interval. Furthermore, −2 + (e − ρ¯) is the lowest offer that
the equilibrium distribution in case of reform, Fˆ ∗R, contains. Therefore in order to win
additional votes, candidate A must provide definitely more than −2 + (e− ρ¯). In the
following, we therefore refer to (−2 + (e− ρ¯), 2−H] as the middle interval.
We will now argue that if FˆN contains offers in the interval (−2 + (e− ρ¯), 2−H),
then FˆN is actually not a best response to the equilibrium strategy. This is less
straightforward to argue, because offers in this interval are made to some voters under
the equilibrium reform distribution Fˆ ∗R. Suppose hence that FˆN is a best response
to the equilibrium strategy and spends a positive amount on offers in the interval
(−2+(e−ρ¯), 2−H). Then we can arrive at a contradiction by constructing a profitable
deviation F˜N .
In particular, note that if FˆN has only offers in the middle interval (−2+(e− ρ¯), 2−
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H], then it will tie against the equilibrium no-reform distribution Fˆ ∗N and it will lose
against the equilibrium reform distribution Fˆ ∗R. Therefore, FˆN must have offers in the
low or high interval, max{|MLN |,MHN} > 0. We can then construct a deviation from
FˆN to F˜N such that F˜N(−2+(e− ρ¯)) = FˆN(−2+(e− ρ¯)) and F˜N(2−H) = FˆN(2−H),
but M˜MN > MMN .4 We now show that the expected vote share increases when using
this deviation F˜N . When candidate B, who plays the equilibrium strategy, chooses
not to reform, then for candidate A a deviation from FˆN to F˜N is detrimental. As we
can see from (A.11) combined with the budget constraint (A.14), increasing MMN to
M˜MN , decreases candidate A’s vote share by 12
M˜MN−MMN
H
.
When candidate B chooses to reform, then candidate A’s vote share is
S(Fˆ ∗R, FˆN) =1− FˆN(2−H) +
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)
4− 2(c− ρ¯) dFˆN(x)
= MMN4− 2(c− ρ¯) +
2− (e− ρ¯)
4− 2(c− ρ¯) [FˆN(2−H)− FˆN(−2 + (e− ρ¯))]
+ 1− FˆN(2−H).
By the first term, a deviation of candidate A from FˆN to F˜N increases his vote share
by M˜MN−MMN4−2(c−ρ¯) .
In total, it is beneficial to increase MMN to M˜MN if and only if
(1− β)12
1
H
< β
1
4− 2(c− ρ¯) . (A.16)
Recall that the equilibrium probability of reform was β = 1 − 12H. With this the
above equation is equivalent to e > c, which holds by assumption (2.1).
We have therefore shown that a best response FˆN to the equilibrium strategy cannot
have offers in the middle interval expect at the upper bound 2 − H. It can now be
shown that a distribution FˆN with a mass point at 2−H can always be approximated
by a another distribution Fˆ ′N that has no offers in the middle interval and achieves
the same vote share against the equilibrium strategy.5 Therefore, when checking for
profitable deviations from the equilibrium no-reform distribution, we can concentrate
4 That is, we shift the offers in the middle interval upwards towards 2−H without changing the
mass of offers in the middle interval. This can be achieved because there are offers in the upper or
lower interval that can be shifted downwards within the respective interval. Strictly speaking, we
therefore need to exclude the case where there are offers in the lower interval only at the lower bound.
The argument for this case is worked out in Esslinger (2016). This reference refers to the third chapter
of this dissertation.
5The detailed argument can be found in Esslinger (2016).
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on distributions FˆN that have no offers in the middle interval and hence satisfy FˆN(2−
H)− FˆN(−2 + (e− ρ¯)) = 0.
For deviations that fulfill this requirement, equation (A.11) for candidate A’s vote
share against the equilibrium no-reform distribution Fˆ ∗N becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆN) =
∫ 2
−2
Fˆ ∗N(x)d
ˆˆ
FN(x)
=12
[
MLN +MHN
H
+ 2
(2−H
H
)
FˆN(2−H)
−2
(2−H
H
)
+ 2
H
]
.
Candidate A chooses FˆN to maximize this expression under the constraint MLN +
MHN ≤ 0. It is clear that this constraint will not be slack, so MLN + MHN = 0 and
the vote share becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆN) =
1
2
[
2
(2−H
H
)
FˆN(2−H)− 2
(2−H
H
)
+ 2
H
]
.
If candidate B, who plays the equilibrium strategy, chooses reform instead, then
candidate A’s vote share is
S(Fˆ ∗R, FˆN) = 1− FˆN(2−H).
Candidate B chooses reform with probability β = 12(2 − H) and non-reform with
probability 1−β = H2 . Therefore, candidate A’s expected vote share when playing FˆN
is
1
2(2−H)(1− FˆN(2−H))
+ H2
1
2H [2(2−H)FˆN(2−H) + 2H − 2]
=12 .
If candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy, candidate A’s vote share is therefore
1
2 for any distribution FˆN that has no offers in the middle interval and is budget
balanced. In particular, it is 12 when playing the equilibrium no-reform distribution
Fˆ ∗N . This shows that candidate A cannot profitably deviate from the equilibrium
strategy by deviating from the equilibrium no-reform distribution Fˆ ∗N .
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Step II: Optimality of Fˆ ∗R. We will now show that it is also not profitable to deviate
from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from Fˆ ∗R to another reform distribution FˆR.
A candidate who reforms must optimally allocate the net benefits that are tar-
getable in the first period, ρ¯ − c. In doing so, he takes into account that the debt
limit implies that every voter expects to get additional resources of e− ρ¯ in the second
period which are not targetable.
Define
MMR =
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
xdFˆR(x) and MHR =
∫ 2
2−H
xdFˆR(x).
Then the problem of candidate A, if she opts for reform, is to choose FˆR under the
constraints MMR +MHR ≤ e− c and FˆR(−2 + (e− ρ¯)) = 0.6
When meeting the equilibrium reform distribution Fˆ ∗R, the vote share of candidate
A using FˆR is
S(Fˆ ∗R, FˆR) =1− FˆR(2−H) +
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
x+ 2− (e− ρ¯)
4− 2(c− ρ¯) dFˆR(x) (A.17)
=1− FˆR(2−H) + e− c−MHR4− 2(c− ρ¯) +
2− (e− ρ¯)
4− 2(c− ρ¯) FˆR(2−H).
When meeting the equilibrium no-reform distribution Fˆ ∗N , A’s vote share is
S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆR) =
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
1
2dFˆR(x) +
∫ 2
2−H
1
2
(
1 + x− 2 +H
H
)
dFˆR(x) (A.18)
1
2 +
1
2
∫ 2
2−H
x− 2 +H
H
dFˆR(x)
=12
[
1 +
∫ 2
2−H
−2 +H
H
dFˆR(x) +
MHR
H
]
=12
[
1 +
(−2 +H
H
)
(1− FˆR(2−H)) + MHR
H
]
.
In the following we argue that, if FˆR is supposed to be a best response to the
equilibrium strategy, it cannot have offers in the high interval. To do so, we show
that any distribution FˆR that has offers in the high interval performs worse against
6It can be argued that any distribution FˆR with a mass point at −2+(e− ρ¯) either looses for sure
against the equilibrium strategy or can be approximated with a distribution without a mass point
that wins the same expected vote share.
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the equilibrium strategy than a distribution F˜R that deviates from FˆR by shifting all
the offers from the high to the middle interval. This will allow us to concentrate
on distributions that have no offers in the high interval when checking for profitable
deviations from the equilibrium reform distribution Fˆ ∗R.
Therefore, take any FˆR that hasMHR > 0 and FˆR(2−H) < 1. We can then consider
a deviation to a distribution F˜R that shifts all the offers from the high interval to the
middle interval. In terms of the above vote share formulas (A.17) and (A.18), this
corresponds to decreasing MHR to zero and increasing FˆR(2 − H) by the necessary
amount ∆ such that it takes a value of 1.
Recall that the total expected vote share of candidate A playing against the equi-
librium strategy is
βS(Fˆ ∗R, FˆR) + (1− β)S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆR),
where β = 1− 12H is the equilibrium probability of reform.
The above described shift in MHR changes this total expected vote share by
MHR
[
β
1
4− 2(c− ρ¯) − (1− β)
1
2
1
H
]
. (A.19)
On the other hand, the above described shift in FˆR(2 − H) changes this total
expected vote share by
−∆(2−H)
[
β
1
4− 2(c− ρ¯) − (1− β)
1
2
1
H
]
. (A.20)
We have already argued above that for β = 1− 12H, the term in square brackets is
positive. Now note that MHR > ∆(2 −H), because 2 −H is the upper bound of the
middle interval and offers in the high interval must hence lie above this value. In total,
we can then conclude that effect (A.19) dominates effect (A.20). Therefore, the shift
towards the middle interval increases the total expected vote share and any distribution
with offers in the high interval cannot be a best response to the equilibrium strategy.
Therefore, when checking for profitable deviations from the equilibrium reform
distribution, we can concentrate on distributions FˆR that have no offers in the high in-
terval and hence satisfy MHR = 0 and FˆR(2−H) = 1. As can be seen from (A.17) and
(A.18), the vote share of any such reform distribution when meeting the equilibrium
reform or no-reform distribution is 12 in either case. In particular, also the equilibrium
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reform distribution Fˆ ∗R achieves the same outcome, and hence there is no profitable
deviation from Fˆ ∗R.
Step III: Optimality of β = 1 − 12H. Finally, when candidate B plays the equi-
librium strategy, candidate A is indifferent between offering reform and no-reform: In
the previous two steps, we have shown that for all reform and no-reform distributions
that are potential best responses to the equilibrium strategy, the total expected vote
share is 12 when playing against the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, candidate A is
happy to play reform with a probability of β = 1− 12H.
A.2.3 Proof of uniqueness of equilibrium for Part (II.) of
Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1
We prove that the equilibrium described in the above proposition and corollary is
unique in the class of equilibria characterized by a probability of doing the reform
βi, debt levels in case of no-reform and reform, δiN , δiR, and distributions in case of
no-reform and reform, F i1,R, F i1,N . This proof follows a similar sequence of steps as the
uniqueness proof in Lizzeri and Persico (1998). However, they proved uniqueness only
for a static model where the reform is a pure public good and uses up all resources in
the economy. In their case, the reform distribution is therefore degenerate at the net
value of the public good. In our proof, we need to account for the fact that, in case of
reform, candidates can play a non-degenerate offer distribution.
Denote by (βi∗, δi∗N , δi∗R , F i∗1,R, F i∗1,N) an equilibrium strategy. For the following proofs,
instead of working directly with the first-period distributions F i∗1,R, F i∗1,N , we work again
with the distributions Fˆ that add to the above distributions the expected value of
transfers that each voter expects in the second period given the respective debt level
δ.7 Furthermore, recall that for the part of the above proposition and corollary that
we consider here, we have H = 2(c− ρ¯)− e− ρ¯ > 0.
7Recall from the proof of existence, that the the equilibrium distributions of total expected offers
Fˆ ∗R and Fˆ ∗N combine the equilibrium first-period distributions with running the maximal debt level.
Since Fˆ ∗R and Fˆ ∗N are only feasible with the maximal debt level, if we prove their uniqueness, we have
also shown that in equilibrium the maximal debt must be raised.
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Lemma A.2.1 For any feasible no-reform distribution Fˆ iN that is different from a
uniform distribution on [−2, 2], there exists a feasible no-reform distribution Fˆ jN such
that S(Fˆ iN , Fˆ
j
N) > 12 .
8
Proof See Lizzeri (1997). As for the case where the difference from a uniform distri-
bution on [−2, 2] comes from the fact that the debt is less than the maximal one, the
corresponding proof is analogous to Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 2.6.1 Part (I.).
Lemma A.2.2 The probability of reform fulfills 0 < βi∗ < 1 for i = 1, 2.
Proof
Step 1: βi∗ > 0
Suppose βA∗ = 0, that is candidate A plays no-reform for sure. Case 1: Suppose
FˆA∗N is uniform on [−2, 2]. Then if candidate B plays the equilibrium reform strategy
Fˆ ∗R, she gets a vote share of
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−e¯) Fˆ
A∗
N (x)dFˆ ∗R(x) =
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−e¯)
x+2
4 dFˆ
∗
R(x) = 12 +∫ 2−H
−2+(e−e¯) xdFˆ
∗
R(x) = 12 + (e− c) > 12 . Case 2: Suppose FˆA∗N is different from a uniform
on [−2, 2]. Then by Lemma A.2.1, candidate B can find a no-reform distribution that
beats candidate A for sure and choose to play it with probability 1. Candidate B
would then again get a vote share greater than 12 , which cannot happen in equilibrium.
Step 2: βi∗ < 1
Suppose βA∗ = 1, that is candidate A plays reform for sure. We will show that for any
debt δAR and any distribution FˆAR that candidate A chooses, candidate B can beat her
for sure by reforming with probability βB = 0, choosing the maximal debt δBN = 1 and
playing the following distribution:
FˆBN (x) =

0, if x ≤ −2,
4−H
8−H , if − 2 ≤ x ≤ 2−H,
4−H
8−H +
4
(8−H)H (x− 2 +H) if 2−H ≤ x ≤ 2
1, if x > 2.
(A.21)
8Note that for a no-reform debt less than the maximal one, δiN < 1, the resulting no-reform
distribution Fˆ iN must be different from a uniform distribution on [−2, 2].
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where H = 2(c− ρ¯)− (e− ρ¯). Recall that H > 0 in the case we are considering here.
Note that candidate A will never offer more than the upper bound of candidate
B’s distribution, 2. Offering exactly this upper bound to a voter is enough to get the
vote for sure since candidate B is offering less than 2 with probability 1.
The vote share of candidate A is given by:
SA =
∫ 2
−2+(e−ρ¯)
FˆBN (x)dFˆAR
=4−H8−H +
4
(8−H)H
∫ 2
2−H
(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR
=4−H8−H +
4
(8−H)H
[∫ 2
−2+(e−ρ¯)
(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR −
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR
]
=4−H8−H +
4
(8−H)H
[
e− c− 2 +H −
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR
]
The term − ∫ 2−H−2+(e−ρ¯)(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR is positive and can be maximized by offering
−2 + (e − ρ¯) to a maximal fraction γ of voters, while offering 2 to the remaining
fraction.9 Note that in order to do this, candidate A must raise the maximal debt ρ¯.
When respecting the budget constraint and the constraint that no offer should be
higher then 2, the maximal fraction γ of voters to which −2 + (e− ρ¯) can be offered is
γ = 2− (e− c)4− (e− ρ¯) .
With this result we can evaluate the vote share of candidate A:
SA =4−H8−H +
4
(8−H)H
[
e− c− 2 +H −
∫ 2−H
−2+(e−ρ¯)
(x− 2 +H)dFˆAR
]
≤4−H8−H +
4
(8−H)H
[
e− c− 2 +H + 2− (e− c)4− (e− ρ¯)(2− (e− ρ¯)
]
=1− 8(2− (e− c))(8−H)H(4− (e− ρ¯))
The last expression is smaller than 12 if and only if
8
(8−H)H
(2− (e− c))
(4− (e− ρ¯)) >
1
2
9Recall that candidate A will optimally never offer more than 2 to any voter.
A.2. PROOFS 139
This holds because, from our assumptions, in particular c < 1 and e > c, it follows that
H = 2(c− ρ¯)− (e− ρ¯) = (c− ρ¯)− (e− c) < 1 and therefore 8(8−H)H > 1. Furthermore,
it can be shown that (2−(e−c))(4−(e−ρ¯)) >
1
2 whenever H > 0, which is the case considered here.
Therefore, under our assumptions, we have SA < 12 , and so indeed candidate A can
be beaten for sure if he plays reform with probability one. This completes the proof
that βi∗ < 1 for i = A,B
Lemma A.2.3 Denote by W i∗N the upper bound of the support of Fˆ i∗N and by W i∗R the
upper bound of the support of Fˆ i∗R . For all i, (1) Fˆ i∗N (2−H) = 12 , and (2) W i∗R = 2−H,
(3) W i∗N = 2.
Proof The proof proceeds in 5 steps whose sequence is determined by the requirement
to use results from the earlier steps in subsequent steps.
Step 1: W i∗R ≤ 2−H:
Assume candidate A plays as part of his equilibrium strategy a reform distribution
with WA∗R > 2 − H and candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy. We have shown
in the existence proof that, when playing against the equilibrium strategy, as long as
money for the reform distribution is spent in [2 − H, 2], then the vote share can be
increased by shifting that money down to the interval [−2 + (e − ρ¯), 2 − H]. But if
A’s reform distribution only has offers in the interval [−2 + (e − ρ¯), 2 −H], then A’s
expected vote share from playing the reform distribution is 12 . Therefore, any reform
distribution with W i∗R > 2−H will win a vote share of less than 50%.
Furthermore, we know that any no-reform distribution that A plays cannot win
more than 50% of votes because otherwise the equilibrium strategy could be beaten
by playing this no-reform distribution with probability one.
Hence we can conclude that a strategy containing a reform distribution withW i∗R >
2 − H can be beaten by the equilibrium strategy and therefore cannot be part of an
equilibrium. Hence, any reform distribution that is played as part of an equilibrium
strategy has W i∗R ≤ 2−H.
Step 2: W i∗N ≥ 2:
Assume candidate A plays as part of his equilibrium strategy a no-reform distribution
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with WA∗N < 2. Then candidate B can choose to play with probability one a no-reform
distribution that offers slightly more than WA∗N to more than 50% of voters. With
this strategy he wins more than 12 of votes against A’s no-reform distribution. Since
A’s strategy is supposed to be an equilibrium strategy, A’s reform distribution has
W i∗R ≤ 2 −H (see step 1), and so B’s strategy also beats A’s reform distribution. In
total, any strategy containing a no-reform distribution with W i∗N < 2 can be beaten
and therefore cannot be part of an equilibrium.
Step 3: Fˆ i∗N (2−H) = 12 :
In can be shown that playing reform must exactly tie against playing no-reform for
0 < βi∗ < 1 to be part of an equilibrium. Given this, the proof now proceeds in two
substeps. In Step (3a), we prove that any no-reform distribution with Fˆ i∗N (2−H) < 12
will not tie against any reform distribution that would be played in an equilibrium.
Similarly, in step (3b), we show that any strategy with Fˆ i∗N (2 − H) > 12 will not tie
against any reform distribution that would be played in an equilibrium.
(3a) Assume that FˆA∗N (2 − H) < 12 , that is more than 50 percent of the mass of
voters gets offers above 2−H. In part (1) we have shown that W i∗R ≤ 2−H for all i.
Hence any reform distribution that is part of an equilibrium strategy will lose against
such a no-reform distribution that has 50 percent of offers above 2−H. As has been
pointed out at the outset of step 3), this cannot happen in equilibrium.
(3b) Assume that FˆA∗N (2 − H) > 12 . We know from step (2) that FˆA∗N must have
offers in the interval [2 − H, 2] or above that interval. But then we also know from
the existence proof that FˆA∗N cannot have offers in the middle interval [−2 +H, 2−H]
except for a mass point at 2 −H. Additionally, in the uniqueness proof here, we are
only considering potential equilibrium distributions. Therefore, we can apply Myerson
(1993)’s argument that a potential equilibrium distribution in this setup of electoral
competition cannot have a mass point.10 Together, this implies that more than 50% of
offers lie below −2 +H when FˆA∗N (2−H) > 12 . It follows that any equilibrium reform
distribution, which has a support contained in the interval [−2 +H, 2−H], will beat
this FˆA∗N , instead of tying against it.
10See the proof of Theorem 2 in Myerson (1993).
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Step 4: W i∗R ≥ 2−H:
Assume WA∗R < 2 − H. Then candidate B can play a budget-balanced reform distri-
bution which is 2-part and offers uniform on [−2 + (e − ρ¯),−2 + (e − ρ¯),+∆V ] and
uniform on [WA∗R ,WA∗R + ∆V ], where ∆V < (2−H)−WA∗R .
The assumption on ∆V together with the assumption of budget balance imply that
more than 50% of the mass of this reform distribution is located above WA∗R and so it
beats A’s reform distribution (whose support has upper bound WA∗R ) for sure.
Assume that, other than that, B plays the equilibrium strategy. That is he plays the
equilibrium probability of reform and the equilibrium no-reform distribution. Since A’s
strategy is supposed to be an equilibrium strategy, we know from the existence proof
combined with Myerson (1993)’s no-mass-point argument for equilibrium distributions
that the no-reform distribution FˆA∗N played as part of this strategy has no offers in
the middle interval [−2 + (e− ρ¯), 2−H]. Since A’s no-reform distribution FˆA∗N is also
supposed to be a best-response to B’s strategy, it will not have any offers above 2.
Any such best-response no-reform distribution of A that fulfills the requirements of
no offers in the middle interval [−2 + (e − ρ¯), 2 − H] will tie against B’s no-reform
distribution. A’s reform distribution will tie against B’s no-reform distribution. A’s
no-reform distribution will tie against B’s reform distribution, using the result in step
3) that any equilibrium no-reform distribution must have Fˆ i∗N (2−H) = 12 . Finally, as
argued above, A’s reform distribution will lose to B’s reform distribution. Given that
in any equilibrium, reform must be played with positive probability, this means that on
total A would lose to B’s strategy if he played a reform distribution withWA∗R < 2−H.
Therefore such a distribution cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy.
Step 5: W i∗N ≤ 2:
Assume candidate A plays as part of his equilibrium strategy a no-reform distribution
withWA∗N > 2. Then candidate B can beat candidate A by playing the equilibrium no-
reform distribution with probability one. We know that for A to play an equilibrium
strategy his reform distribution must have W i∗R ≤ 2−H (see step 1). The equilibrium
no-reform distribution ties against such a reform distribution. Therefore, it remains to
be shown that the equilibrium no-reform distribution will beat a no-reform distribution
with WA∗N > 2.
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For calculating the vote share of candidate A playing such a no-reform distribution,
we can safely assume that FˆA∗N has no offers in the middle interval [−2 + H, 2 − H],
because when playing against the equilibrium no-reform distribution, a distribution
with offers in this interval does worse than one that would downgrade all these offers
down to −2 + H in order to increase offers in the interval above 2 − H. With this,
candidate A’s vote share becomes:
SA(Fˆ ∗N , FˆA∗N ) =
∫ WA∗N
−2
Fˆ ∗NdFˆ
A∗
N
=
∫ −2+H
−2
1
2
x+ 2
H
dFˆA∗N +
∫ 2
2−H
1
2
(
1 + x− 2 +H
H
)
dFˆA∗N +
∫ WA∗N
2
dFˆA∗N
<
1
2
[
1
H
∫ −2+H
−2
(x+ 2)dFˆA∗N +
∫ WA∗N
2−H
dFˆA∗N +
1
H
∫ WA∗N
2−H
(x− 2 +H)dFˆA∗N
]
=12
1
H
[∫ −2+H
−2
(x+ 2)dFˆA∗N +
∫ WA∗N
2−H
xdFˆA∗N + (H − 2 +H)
∫ WA∗N
2−H
dFˆA∗N
]
=12
1
H

∫ −2+H
−2
xdFˆA∗N +
∫ WA∗N
2−H
xdFˆA∗N︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ 2
[
FˆA∗N (−2 +H)− FˆA∗N (−2)
]
+ (2H − 2)
[
1− FˆA∗N (2−H)
]]
=12
1
H
H − FˆA∗N (−2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0

=12
The last step has used the fact proven in step 3) that any equilibrium distribution
must have Fˆ i∗N (2 − H) = 12 . Together with the fact that FˆA∗N has no offers in the
middle interval [−2 + H, 2 − H], this implies that FˆA∗N (−2 + H) = FˆA∗N (2 − H) =
1
2 . Fˆ
A∗
N (−2) = 0 follows again from Myerson (1993)’s no-mass-point argument for
equilibrium distributions.
As intended, we have thus shown that the equilibrium no-reform distribution will
beat a no-reform distribution with WA∗N > 2.
Lemma A.2.4 For all i, Fˆ i∗N is strictly increasing and continuous on [2−H, 2]
Proof A similar result is proven in Lizerri and Persico (1998) for the case of a binary
public good. The question is whether the setup here is analogous to the binary public
good case. In the binary public good case, when the public good is provided, every
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voter gets a utility increase (above the consumption value of his one unit of money
endowment) of G− 1. Furthermore, 50 % of the transfer distribution lies above G− 1.
Specifically, the transfer distribution has 50 % of offers in the interval [G− 1, 1].
In our case, when the reform is implemented, we don’t have a degenerate distri-
bution. Instead, we have a real distribution. However, as has been established in the
previous lemma, the support of this distribution has upper bound W i∗R = 2−H. Fur-
thermore, Fˆ i∗N (2 −H) = 12 , that is 50 % of the mass of the no-reform offers lie above
this upper bound of the reform distribution. More specifically, since W i∗N = 2, these 50
% lie in the interval [2−H, 2]
If we interpret G − 1 in the binary public good case as the upper bound of the
support of the degenerate“public good distribution”, then our setup here is exactly
analogous to the binary public good case. To proof the form of the no-reform dis-
tribution on the interval [2 − H, 2], we can therefore refer to the analogous proof in
the binary public good case which proved the form of the transfer distribution on the
interval [G− 1, 1].
Lemma A.2.5 For all i, Fˆ i∗N satisfies equation (A.9) on [2−H, 2].
Proof The proof is still about proving the exact form of the no-reform distribution
on the interval [2−H, 2]. Therefore, what has been argued in the previous lemma still
applies here. Insofar as it is about proving the exact form of the no-reform distribution
on the interval [2−H, 2], our setup is exactly analogous to the binary public good case,
where an analogous proof was done to proof the exact form of the transfer distribution
on the interval [G− 1, 1]. Therefore, the proof of the above result is analogous to the
proof of Lemma 10 in Lizerri and Persico (1998).
Lemma A.2.6 For all i, Fˆ i∗N satisfies equation (A.9) on [−2,−2 +H].
Proof Interpreting this time G−1 in the binary public good case as the lower bound of
the support of the degenerate“public good distribution”, it is possible to use the result
in Lizzeri (1997) to show that Fˆ i∗N must be uniform on [−2, q] for some q ≤ −2+(e− ρ¯),
where −2 + (e− ρ¯) is the lower bound of the support of the reform distribution. Given
this, the proof of the above result can proceed analogously to the proof of Lemma 11
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in Lizerri and Persico (1998).
Corollary A.2.7 For all i, Fˆ i∗N is the distribution described in equation (A.9).
Lemma A.2.8 For all i, Fˆ i∗R satisfies equation (A.10) on [−2 + (e− ρ¯), 2−H].
Proof Given the previously established results, we know that the equilibrium reform
distribution Fˆ i∗R has support contained in [−2 + (e − ρ¯), 2 − H]. Given the form of
the equilibrium no-reform distribution established in the previous proofs, we know
that no matter what its exact form, any reform distribution on this support will tie
against the equilibrium no-reform distribution. All that determines the exact form of
the equilibrium reform distribution is then the requirement that there should be no
profitable deviation when both candidates play reform. Indeed, when both candidates
play a reform distribution with support [−2+(e−ρ¯), 2−H], then the unique equilibrium
is that both play the uniform distribution described in equation (A.10). But the proof
of this result is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 in Lizerri (1999).
Lemma A.2.9 In equilibrium the probability of doing the reform is 1− 12H.
Proof In the previous lemmas up to now, we have established that the unique equi-
librium no-reform distribution and the unique equilibrium reform distribution are the
ones described in equations (A.9) and (A.10) and that both are played with positive
probability in equilibrium. Therefore, to pin down the exact value βi∗ with which the
equilibrium reform distribution is played, we can use the fact that for this βi∗, it should
not be possible to reach a vote share greater than 12 by choosing another no-reform
distribution than Fˆ ∗N . In particular, it should not be possible to increase the vote share
by altering the equilibrium no-reform distribution through changing Fˆ ∗N(2−H) away
from 12 . Therefore assume that candidate A plays a no-reform distribution Fˆ
A
N with the
same support as Fˆ ∗N but considers changing the distribution of mass across this support
through a change in FˆAN (2 − H). We have shown before that for such a distribution
FˆAN , candidate A’s vote share when meeting the equilibrium no-reform distribution is
S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆAN ) = 12H [2(2−H)FˆAN (2−H) + 2(H− 1)], and his vote share when meeting the
equilibrium reform distribution is S(Fˆ ∗R, FˆAN ) = 1− FˆAN (2−H). Given a probability of
reform β his total expected vote share when playing FˆAN is:
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(1− β)S(Fˆ ∗N , FˆAN ) + βS(Fˆ ∗R, FˆAN )
=(1− β) 12H [2(2−H)Fˆ
A
N (2−H) + 2(H − 1)] + β[1− FˆAN (2−H)]
We need this expected vote share to be independent of FˆAN (2 −H). Otherwise, it
would pay to either increase or decrease FˆAN (2−H) as much as possible and we could
not have FˆAN (2−H) = 12 , as must be the case in equilibrium. Therefore we need:
(1− β) 12H 2(2−H)Fˆ
A
N (2−H)− βFˆAN (2−H) = 0
⇔(1− β) 12H 2(2−H)− β = 0
⇔β = 1− 12H.
This concludes the proof that the equilibrium probability of reform is 1− 12H.
From all this, we can conclude that equilibrium is unique and is the one described
in Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.5.1 and Corollary 2.5.2
Recall that in Proposition 2.5.1, we did not impose any exogenous debt limit. We can
also think of this situation as an exogenous debt limit that is equal to the natural debt
limit under reform, δ¯ = 1 + e. Due to the definition of ρ¯ = 1 − δ¯, this means ρ¯ = e.
Replacing ρ¯ with e in the proof of Part (I.) of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1
the results follow.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5.3 and Corollary 2.5.4
Replacing ρ¯ with λe in the proof of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary A.1.1 the results
follow.
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6.2 and Corollary A.1.2
This proof follows again the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2.6.1 and Corollary
A.1.1. However, besides redefining ρ¯ and H an appropriate adjustment in the support
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of the equilibrium distributions must be made.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
Recall that any reform-debt bundle Y is defined by 3 characteristics in terms of the
distribution of total expected transfers that can be offered under this bundle. First, lY
is the lowest possible offer under bundle Y . Second, MY are the additional resources
that are available above the already existing endowments under bundle Y . Third, uY
is the maximal offer that can be financed for 50 percent of voters given a lowest offer lY
and a budget beyond existing endowments of MY : uY = 2MY − lY . Recall that bundle
Y has higher (net) targetability than bundle Z if uY > uZ . Furthermore, MY > MZ
means that bundle Y has a higher efficiency than bundle Z in the sense that the total
amount of resources is bigger.1
B.1 Equilibrium characterization for special cases
Corollary B.1.1 Suppose the debt-related distortion is small enough such that γ <
e−c
1+e . Then Proposition B.2.1 applies with {R; ND} the efficiency-maximizing bun-
dle E, {R; D} the targetability-maximizing bundle T , {NR; ND} taking the place of
bundle Q, and {NR; D} taking the place of bundle I.
Specifically, the lowest possible offer l, the maximal financeable offer for half of the
voters, u, as well as the resource constraint M under the different bundles are:
1See Definition 3.4.2 and the corresponding discussion in chapter 3.
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E = {R; ND}:
lE = −1 + e
ME = e− c
uE = 1 + e− 2c
T = {R; D}:
lT = −2
MT = (1− γ)e− c− γ
uT = 2(1− γ)(1 + e)− 2c
I = {NR; D}:
lI = −2
MI = −γ
uI = 2(1− γ)
Q = {NR; ND}:
lQ = −1
MQ = 0
uQ = 1
This implies that in equilibrium
(i) both candidates play bundle E = {R; ND} with probability βE = 1− 2HuT−lT , where
H = uT − uE; they play bundle T = {R; D} with probability βT = 1− βE;
(ii) both candidates play bundles I = {NR; D} and Q = {NR; ND} with probability
zero: βI = βQ = 0
(iii) both candidates play the distributions of total expected transfer offers illustrated
in Figure 3.1.
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Corollary B.1.2 Suppose the distortion caused by raising the maximal debt is small
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform such that γ < e−c1+e , and suppose that
there is a constitutional debt limit ρ¯ ∈ (−1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , e].
Non-restrictive debt limit: Suppose the debt limit ρ¯ is not very restrictive in
the sense that ρ¯ > 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 > 0.
2 Then we are still in the case of Corollary B.1.1. The
only things that change are lT , uT ,MT .
T = {R; D}:
lT = −2 + (e− ρ¯)
MT = e− c− (1 + ρ¯)γ
uT = 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c
This still implies that in equilibrium:
(i) both candidates play bundle E = {R; ND} with probability βE = 1− 2HuT−lT , where
H = uT − uE; they play bundle T = {R; D} with probability βT = 1− βE;
(ii) the probability βE with which the most efficient bundle {R; ND} is played in-
creases when the debt limit gets stricter (when ρ¯ falls);
(iii) both candidates play bundles I = {NR; D} and Q = {NR; ND} with probability
zero: βI = βQ = 0;
(iv) both candidates play the distributions of total expected offers illustrated in Figure
3.1.
Corollary B.1.3 Suppose the distortion caused by raising the maximal debt is small
enough compared to the net benefit of the reform such that γ < e−c1+e , and suppose that
there is a constitutional debt limit ρ¯ ∈ 1(−1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , e].
Restrictive debt limit: Suppose the debt limit ρ¯ is restrictive in the sense that
ρ¯ < 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 . Then Proposition B.2.2 applies with {R; ND} the efficiency-maximizing
2The fact that this cut-off level for the debt limit is positive is implied by the assumption made
at the beginning of the corollary, γ < e−c1+e and by Assumption (3.3), 2c− e > 0.
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bundle E, {NR; D} the targetability-maximizing bundle T , {R; D} taking the place of
bundle I, and {NR; ND} taking the place of bundle Q.
Specifically, the lowest possible offer l, the maximal financeable offer for half of the
voters, u, as well as the resource constraint M under the different bundles are:
E = {R; ND}:
lE = −1 + e
ME = e− c
uE = 1 + e− 2c
T = {NR; D}:
for ρ¯ ≥ 0 : lT = −2 for ρ¯ < 0 : lT = −2− ρ¯
MT = −γ MT = −(1 + ρ¯)γ
uT = 2(1− γ) uT = 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯)− ρ¯
I = {R; D}:
lI = −2 + (e− ρ¯)
MI = e− c− (1 + ρ¯)γ
uI = 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c
Q = {NR; ND}:
lQ = −1
MQ = 0
uQ = 1
This implies that in equilibrium
(i) both candidates play bundle T = {NR; D} with probability βT = 2H′′uT−lT , where
H ′′ = uT − uI ; this probability increases with a stricter debt limit (with smaller
ρ¯);
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(ii) both candidates play bundle I = {R; D} with probability βI = 2H′uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT ,
where H ′ = uI − uE; this probability decreases with a stricter debt limit (with
smaller ρ¯);
(iiii) both candidates play bundle E = {R; ND} with probability βE = 1− βT − βI =
uI−lI−2H′
uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT ;
(iv) both candidates play bundle Q = {NR; ND} with probability zero: βQ = 0;
(v) both candidates play the distributions of total expected offers illustrated in Figure
3.2.
Corollary B.1.4 Suppose the debt-related distortion is so high that γ > 12 . Then
Proposition B.2.1 in the appendix applies with {R; ND} the efficiency-maximizing
bundle E, {NR; ND} the targetability-maximizing bundle T , {R; D} taking the place
of bundle Q, and {NR; D} taking the place of bundle I. In particular, the ranking
in terms of resource constraints is the second alternative stated in Proposition B.2.1:
ME > MT > MI > MQ. The ranking in terms of maximal offers is the last alternative
stated in Proposition B.2.1: uT > max{uI , uQ, uE}, lI ≤ lT , and lQ ≤ lT .
Specifically, the lowest possible offer l, the maximal financeable offer for half of the
voters, u, as well as the resource constraint M under the different bundles are:
E = {R; ND}:
lE = −1 + e
ME = e− c
uE = 1 + e− 2c
T = {NR; ND}:
lT = −1
MT = 0
uT = 1
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I = {NR; D}:
lI = −2
MI = −γ
uI = 2(1− γ)
Q = {R; D}:
lQ = −2
MQ = (1− γ)e− c− γ
uQ = 2(1− γ)(1 + e)− 2c
This implies that in equilibrium
(i) both candidates play bundle E = {R; ND} with probability βE = 1− 2HuT−lT , where
H = uT − uE; they play bundle T = {NR; ND} with probability βT = 1− βE;
(ii) both candidates play bundles I = {NR; D} and Q = R+N with probability zero:
βI = βQ = 0
(iii) both candidates play the distributions of total expected offers illustrated in Figure
3.1. However, bundle T is now {NR; ND}.
B.2 Equilibrium characterization in general form
The following propositions state the complete characterization of the equilibrium in a
general form.
Proposition B.2.1 Suppose the 4 reform-debt bundles T,E, I,Q fulfill the following
criteria:
1. uT > uI > uQ > uE, i.e. the ranking in terms of targetability is T, I,Q,E
(the ranking between uI and uQ can also be flipped).
Alternatively, suppose uT > max{uI , uQ, uE}, lI ≤ lT , and lQ ≤ lT .
2. ME > MT > MQ > MI , i.e. the ranking in terms of efficiency is E, T,Q, I
(the ranking between MI and MQ can also be flipped).
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Hence, T is the targetability-maximizing bundle and E is the efficiency-maximizing
bundle. Additionally, T dominates the other bundles I and Q in terms of efficiency.
Then, in equilibrium:
(i) both candidates play bundle E with probability βE = 1 − 2HuT−lT , where H =
uT − uE = lE − lT − 2(ME − MT ); they play bundle T with probability βT =
1− βE = 2HuT−lT ;
(ii) both candidates play bundles I and Q with probability zero: βI = βQ = 0;
(iii) When candidates play bundle T , they draw total expected offers from the following
distribution:
Fˆ ∗T (x) =

0, if x ≤ lT ,
1
2
(
x−lT
H
)
, if lT ≤ x ≤ lT +H,
1
2 , if lT +H ≤ x ≤ uT −H,
1
2
(
1 + x−uT+H
H
)
, if uT −H ≤ x ≤ uT ,
1, if x ≥ uT .
(B.1)
When candidates play bundle E, they draw total expected offers from the following
distribution:
Fˆ ∗E(x) =

0, if x ≤ lE,
x−lE
uE−lE , if lE ≤ x ≤ uE = uT −H,
1, if x ≥ uE = uT −H.
(B.2)
Proposition B.2.2 Suppose the 4 reform-debt bundles T,E, I,Q fulfill the following
criteria:
1. uT > uI > uQ > uE, i.e. the ranking in terms of targetability is T, I,Q,E.
2. ME > MI > MQ > MT , i.e. the ranking in terms of efficiency is E, I,Q, T .
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Hence, T is the targetability-maximizing bundle and E is the efficiency-maximizing
bundle. Additionally, T is dominated by all other bundles in terms of efficiency, and
bundle I dominates bundle Q in terms of efficiency and targetability.
Then, in equilibrium:
(i) both candidates play bundle T with probability βT = 2H
′′
uT−lT , where H
′′ = uT−uI =
lI − lT − 2(MI −MT );
(ii) both candidates play bundle E with probability βE = uI−lI−2H
′
uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT where
H ′ = uI − uE = lE − lI − 2(ME −MI);
(iii) both candidates play bundle I with probability βI = 1−βT−βE = 2H′uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT ;
(iv) both candidates play bundle Q with probability zero: βQ = 0;
(v) When candidates play bundle T , they draw total expected offers from the following
distribution:
Fˆ ∗T (x) =

0, if x ≤ lT ,
1
2
(
x−lT
H′′
)
, if lT ≤ x ≤ lT +H ′′,
1
2 , if lT +H
′′ ≤ x ≤ uT −H ′′,
1
2
(
1 + x−uT+H′′
H′′
)
, if uT −H ′′ ≤ x ≤ uT ,
1, if x ≥ uT .
(B.3)
When candidates play bundle I, they draw total expected offers from the following
distribution:
Fˆ ∗I (x) =

0, if x ≤ lI ,
1
2
(
x−lI
H′
)
, if lI ≤ x ≤ lI +H ′,
1
2 , if lI +H
′ ≤ x ≤ uI −H ′,
1
2
(
1 + x−uI+H′
H′
)
, if uI −H ′ ≤ x ≤ uI ,
1, if x ≥ uI .
(B.4)
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When candidates play bundle E, they draw total expected offers from the following
distribution:
Fˆ ∗E(x) =

0, if x ≤ lE,
x−lE
uE−lE , if lE ≤ x ≤ uE = uI −H,
1, if x ≥ uE = uI −H.
(B.5)
B.3 Proofs
B.3.1 Proof of Corollary B.1.1
In order to be able to apply Proposition B.2.1, we just have to show that the rankings
of the resource constraintsM and the maximal offers u for the specific case of Corollary
B.1.1 are as stated in Proposition B.2.1.
Therefore, we first have to argue for the correctness of the parameters lY , uY , and
MY for any possible debt-reform bundle Y . We always have the relation: u = 2M−l. It
can be verified that for all possible debt-reform bundles, this relation holds in Corollary
B.1.1. For instance, uE = 1 + e − 2c = 2(e − c) − (−1 + e) = 2ME − lE. Hence, we
just have to argue for the correctness of lY and MY for a given debt-reform bundle Y .
Recall that lY gives the lowest possible offer that can be offered to a voter under
bundle Y . In the case of the bundle combining reform and no-debt, E = {R; ND},
since there is no debt, second period resources cannot be targeted. Given that the
reform is implemented, any voter expects a transfer of e in the second period, which
cannot be taken from her in terms of expected offers from the point of view of the
first period. Additionally, in the first period, maximally her endowment of 1 can be
taken away, leading to a lowest total expected offer of lE = −1 + e. Since the reform
is implemented, the resources available over both periods beyond existing endowments
correspond to the reform-induced net increase in the pie, ME = e− c.
For the bundle where reform is combined with the maximal debt, T = {R; D},
the costs of the debt-related distortions reduce these resources. In particular only a
fraction (1 − γ) of the gross reform benefit remain when they are transferred across
time. Additionally, a fraction γ is lost when transferring the second-period endowment
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of 1 across time. Hence the total resources beyond existing endowments shrink to
MT = (1− γ)e− c− γ. However, with maximal debt all resources become targetable
in the following sense: There are no resources left in the second period that cannot be
redistributed across voters from the point of view of the first period. This implies that
the worst-off voter can lose her complete endowments: lT = −2.
The latter fact does not change for bundle I = {NR; D}, which still raises maximal
debt but does no longer implement the reform. The only effect is on the resource
constraint, which no longer includes any reform-related resource gains. Instead, there is
only a total loss γ in resources, which corresponds to the cost of transferring the existing
second-period endowment across time. Finally, in the case of bundle Q = {NR; ND},
which combines no reform with no debt, there are no resource losses through debt and
no gains through reform, so that there are no resources available for transfers beyond
existing endowments, MQ = 0. The lowest possible offer is then only the first period
endowment that can be taken from the worst-off voter, lQ = −1.
Turning to the ranking in terms of the maximal offers, we have:
uT > uI
⇔ 2(1− γ)(1 + e)− 2c > 2(1− γ)
⇔ (1− γ)e > c
⇔ γ < e− c
e
.
The last line is implied by the assumption in Corollary B.1.1 that γ < e−c1+e .
Note that Assumption (3.3), 2c−e > 0, is equivalent to e−c
e
< 12 . Together with the
just mentioned assumption from Corollary B.1.1, we therefore have: γ < e−c1+e <
e−c
e
<
1
2 . Hence in the case considered, less than 1/2 is lost in transferring resources across
time through public debt. Now, γ < 12 implies the ranking uI = 2(1 − γ) > 1 = uQ.
Finally, uQ = 1 > 1 + e− 2c = uE is again implied by Assumption (3.3), 2c− e > 0.
In terms of the resource constraints, we have: ME = e− c > (1− γ)e− c− γ = MT
as soon as there exists a distortion, γ > 0, as is the case in this paper. Furthermore,
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we have:
MT > MQ
⇔ (1− γ)e− c− γ > 0
⇔ γ < e− c1 + e,
where the last line is exactly the assumption made in Corollary B.1.1. Finally, MQ =
0 > −γ = MI again follows immediately since there is a distortion, γ > 0.
B.3.2 Proof of Corollary B.1.2
Since nothing changes compared to Corollary B.1.1 except for uT and MT , we only
have to make sure that all relationships including bundle T still fulfill the respective
rankings compared to the other bundles. As before, let us first argue for the correctness
of the specific values of lT and MT (it can be seen immediately that the relationship
uT = 2MT− lT holds). With a debt limit ρ¯, an amount e− ρ¯ of resources remains in the
second period and hence cannot be taken from any voter from the point of view of the
first period. Therefore he lowest possible offer increases from −2, the full loss of both
periods’ endowments, to lT = −2 + (e− ρ¯). In terms of the resources beyond existing
endowments, the reform implemented implies additional resources of e − c. However,
with maximal debt, which under the debt limit is (1 + ρ¯), there are distortionary costs
of (1 + ρ¯)γ. Therefore, MT = e− c− (1 + ρ¯)γ.
In terms of the rankings, we have:
uT > uI
⇔ 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c > 2(1− γ)
⇔ ρ¯ > 2c− e2(1− γ)− 1 ,
where the last line is exactly the assumption made about the debt limit in this corollary.
Furthermore, since a distortion exists in the sense that γ > 0, we still haveME = e−c >
e − c − (1 − ρ¯)γ = MT . Finally, under the assumption on the size of the distortion
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made, γ < e−c1+e , we have:
MT = e− c− (1− ρ¯)γ
> e− c− (1− ρ¯)e− c1 + e
= (e− ρ¯)(e− c)1 + e ≥ 0 = MQ,
where the last (weak) inequality holds due to ρ¯ ≤ e as also specified in the corollary.
The additional fact that this corollary proves compared to Corollary B.1.1 is the
comparative static result concerning the effect of a change in the debt limit on the
probability with which the most efficient policy bundle is played. We have:
βE = 1− βT
=1− 2(uT − uE)
uT − lT
=1− [2(1− γ)− 1](1 + ρ¯)(1− γ)(1− ρ¯) + 1− c.
Therefore, we get:
∂βE
∂ρ¯
= −∂βT
∂ρ¯
=− [2(1− γ)− 1](1− c)[(1− γ)(1− ρ¯) + 1− c]2 < 0.
The negative sign of the last expression follows from the fact γ < 1/2 derived in the
proof of Corollary B.1.1 and assumption (3.2), c < 1. This proves that with a fall in ρ¯
(a stricter debt limit) the probability βE with which the most efficient bundle is played
increases. This concludes the proof of Corollary B.1.2.
B.3.3 Proof of Corollary B.1.3
In the same vain as in the previous proofs, we show that the rankings of the maximal
offers and resource constraints hold as described in Proposition B.2.2. Before turning
to these rankings, let us quickly argue once more for the correctness of lY , uY , andMY
for any bundle Y . The bundles E = {R; ND} and Q = {NR; ND}, which raise no
debt, are not affected by a debt limit. Therefore, nothing changes for these bundles
compared to the case without a debt limit in terms of the parameters that define their
transfer distributions. This case was handled in Corollary B.1.1 above.
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Similarly, the bundle that plays no reform and debt, T = {NR; D},3 is only affected
in terms of its transfer distribution once ρ¯ drops below zero. This is because for ρ¯ ≥ 0,
debt is only restricted by an amount higher than the natural debt limit under no
reform and hence the debt limit does not bind. Recall that for ρ¯ < 0, ρ¯ captures
how much resources less than the second-period endowment of 1 can be used for debt
repayment. These resources are left in the future and therefore cannot be taken from
any voter from the point of view of the first period. That is why, for ρ¯ < 0, the
lowest possible offer, lT , rises from −2 to −2 − ρ¯. Similarly, the amount of second-
period resources which are affected by the debt-related distortion decrease from the
full endowment of 1 to only 1 + ρ¯ < 1. Therefore, the total loss in resources below
existing endowments, which corresponds to the resource constraint for bundle T =
{NR; D}, becomes MT = −(1 + ρ¯)γ. The maximal offer is then calculated as before:
uT = 2MT − lT . The arguments for bundle I = {R; D} can be found in the proof
of Corollary B.1.2. Note that in this latter corollary {R; D} took the role of the
targetability-maximizing bundle T .
Turning to the ranking in terms of maximal offers we have for ρ¯ ≥ 0:
uT > uI
⇔ 2(1− γ) > 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c
⇔ ρ¯ < 2c− e2(1− γ)− 1 ,
where the last line is exactly the assumption made about the debt limit in this corollary.
Similarly, we have for ρ¯ < 0:
uT > uI
⇔ 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯)− ρ¯ > 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c
⇔ 2c > e,
where the last line is exactly Assumption (3.3).
3Note, that compared to Corollary B.1.1, the roles of different bundles in terms of which bundle
maximizes targetability are changed.
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Furthermore, we have:
uI > uQ
⇔ 2(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + (e− ρ¯)− 2c > 1
⇔ ρ¯ > −1 + 2c− e2(1− γ)− 1 ,
where the last line is exactly the lower bound imposed on the debt limit in this corollary.
Finally, by Assumption (3.3), we still have uQ = 1 > 1 + e− 2c = uE.
In terms of the resource constraints, note that we have ME = e − c > e − c −
(1 − ρ¯)γ = MI , as long as, first, a distortion exists in the sense that γ > 0, and as
long as, second, the debt limit ρ¯ does not prohibit debt completely in the sense that
ρ¯ > −1. Both these restrictions are fulfilled by assumption. Under these same two
restrictions, for ρ¯ > 0, we also have MQ = 0 > −γ = MT . The same holds then for
ρ¯ < 0: MQ = 0 > −(1 − ρ¯)γ = MT . Finally, analogous to Corollary B.1.2, under the
assumption on the size of the distortion made, γ < e−c1+e , we have:
MI = e− c− (1− ρ¯)γ
> e− c− (1− ρ¯)e− c1 + e
= (e− ρ¯)(e− c)1 + e ≥ 0 = MQ,
where the last (weak) inequality holds due to ρ¯ ≤ e as also specified in the corollary.
The final claims that need to be proven are the comparative static results concerning
the effect of a change in the debt limit on the probability with which the different policy
bundles are played. We have for ρ¯ ≥ 0:
βT =
2(uT − uI)
uT − lT
=2c− e− [2(1− γ)− 1]ρ¯2− γ .
Therefore, we get:
∂βT
∂ρ¯
= − [2(1− γ)− 1]2− γ < 0.
The negative sign of the last expression follows from the fact γ < 1/2 derived in the
proof of Corollary B.1.1. Similarly, for ρ¯ < 0, we have:
βT =
2(uT − uI)
uT − lT =
2c− e
(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + 1 .
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Hence, we get:
∂βT
∂ρ¯
= − (1− γ)(2c− e)[(1− γ)(1 + ρ¯) + 1]2 < 0,
where the negative sign follows again from γ < 1/2 and Assumption (3.3), 2c > e.
This proves that with a fall in ρ¯ (a stricter debt limit) the probability βT with which
the targetability-maximizing bundle is played increases.
Note that uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT = βE + βI = 1 − βT . The above result on the comparative
statics of βT then implies that uT−lT−2H
′′
uT−lT decreases with a stricter debt limit. Hence,
one factor in the terms of the probabilities of βE and βI decreases with a stricter debt
limit. The comparative statics of these probabilities are hence determined by the first
term in their formulas. For βI this first term is:
2(uI − uE)
uI − lI = −
[2(1− γ)− 1](1 + ρ¯)
(1− γ)(1− ρ¯) + 1− c.
Therefore, we get:
∂βI
∂ρ¯
= [2(1− γ)− 1](1− c)[(1− γ)(1− ρ¯) + 1− c]2 > 0.
The positive sign of the last expression follows from the fact γ < 1/2 derived in the
proof of Corollary B.1.1 and assumption (3.2), c < 1. This proves that with a fall in
ρ¯ (a stricter debt limit) the probability βI decreases since both terms in its formula
decrease. On the other hand, the first term in the formula for βE is just 1− 2(uI−uE)uI−lI and
by the above result decreases with a stricter debt limit. Therefore, the comparative
statics for βE are indeterminate. This concludes the proof of Corollary B.1.3.
B.3.4 Proof of Corollary B.1.4
We have to show that the rankings of resource constraints and maximal offers hold
as stated in the corollary, along with the two assumptions lI ≤ lT and lQ ≤ lT . the
formulas for the parameter values lY , uY , and MY of a given bundle Y correspond
exactly to the ones in Corollary B.1.1.
Let us start with the two assumptions on the lowest possible offers: We have
lI = lQ = −2 < −1 = lT .
Turning now to the ranking in terms of maximal offers, we need to show that bundle
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T has the highest maximal offer. We have:
uT > uI
⇔ 1 > 2(1− γ)
⇔ γ > 12 ,
which is just the defining assumption of this corollary. Furthermore, we have:
uI > uQ
⇔ 2(1− γ) > 2(1− γ)(1 + e)− 2c
⇔ (1− γ)e < c
⇔ γ > e− c
e
.
Note that Assumption (3.3), 2c − e > 0, is equivalent to e−c
e
< 12 . Together with the
above mentioned defining assumption of this corollary, we hence have γ > 12 >
e−c
e
, and
hence indeed uI > uQ. But combining the two above rankings we have: uT > uI > uQ.
It just remains to show that uT = 1 > 1 + e − 2c = uE, which is again implied by
Assumption (3.3), 2c− e > 0.
In terms of the resource constraints, we have ME = e − c > 0 = MT , which holds
by assumption (3.1). MT = 0 > −γ = MI again follows immediately since there is a
distortion, γ > 0. Finally, we have:
MI > MQ
⇔ − γ > (1− γ)e− c− γ
⇔ (1− γ)e < c.
Now for γ > 12 , (1− γ)e < 12e < c, where the last inequality holds due to Assumption
(3.3), 2c− e > 0. This concludes the proof of Corollary B.1.4.
In the following, we prove the two propositions that give a general equilibrium
characterization. These propositions underly all other propositions and corollaries in
this paper.
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B.3.5 Proof of Proposition B.2.1
In the following, we show that the stated strategies indeed are an equilibrium. The
proof of existence of the equilibrium generalizes the corresponding proof in Boyer and
Esslinger (2016), and adjusts for the fact that the debt choice now also has direct
efficiency implications.
The proof of existence has four steps: Step I shows that there is no profitable
deviation from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from Fˆ ∗T , step II shows that it is
also not profitable to deviate on Fˆ ∗E. Step III shows that bundles Q and I are played
with probability zero. Then, step IV argues for the optimality of the equilibrium
probabilities with which the targetability-maximizing debt-reform bundle T and the
efficiency-maximizing bundle E are played.
Step I: Optimality of Fˆ ∗T . Consider candidate A when he decides to play the debt-
reform bundle T and assume he deviates from the equilibrium distribution under this
bundle, Fˆ ∗T , to another distribution FT . When this candidate A meets a candidate B
that chooses also the bundle T and that offers money according to Fˆ ∗T , the vote share
of candidate A is:4
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
∫ uT
lT
Fˆ ∗T (x)dFˆT (x) (B.6)
=12
{
MLT +MHT
H
− lT +H
H
FˆT (lT +H)
+uT −H
H
FˆT (uT −H) + 2H − uT
H
}
,
where
MLT =
∫ lT+H
lT
xdFˆT (x), (B.7)
and
MHT =
∫ uT
uT−H
xdFˆT (x). (B.8)
Equations (B.7) and (B.8) capture the money spent on transfers in the low interval
[lT , lT +H] and the high interval (uT−H, uT ], respectively. We choose the high interval
4Without loss of generality, we exclude a mass point at the lower bound lT of the support.
Whenever necessary later on, we deal with this case separately. We follow this approach for the
remainder of this appendix.
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to be open to the right, because the continuous equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T puts zero
mass on the single offer uT −H. In order to win a positive mass of voters in the upper
interval, the respective offers must therefore be strictly higher than uT −H.
Candidate A chooses FˆT under the constraint that
MLT +MHT +MMT = MT , (B.9)
where
MMT =
∫ uT−H
lT+H
xdFˆT (x) (B.10)
is the money spent on transfer offers in the middle interval (lT + H, uT − H]. MT
denotes the resources beyond existing endowments under bundle T .
In the following, we will argue that, when checking for profitable deviations from
the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T that is played in case of bundle T , we can concentrate
on distributions FˆT that have no offers in the middle interval. We will do so by showing
that if FˆT has a positive mass of offers in the middle interval which are not concentrated
at the upper bound uT − H of this interval, then the vote share can be increased by
shifting that mass up towards uT − H. As a last step, it can then be shown that, if
a distribution only has offers in the middle interval concentrated as a mass point at
uT −H, then such a distribution can always be approximated by another distribution
Fˆ ′T that has no offers in the middle interval and achieves the same vote share against
the equilibrium strategy. This will establish that, when looking for deviations from
the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T , it is enough to focus on distributions FˆT that have no
offers in the middle interval.
Therefore, assume that FˆT is a best response to the equilibrium strategy and spends
a positive amount on offers in the middle interval (lT + H, uT − H]. First, it is easy
to see that candidate A will not make offers in the interval (lT +H, lE].5 With such
offers, candidate A cannot win additional votes against Fˆ ∗T , because Fˆ ∗T contains no
offers in the middle interval. Furthermore, lE is the lowest offer that the equilibrium
distribution Fˆ ∗E in case of the efficiency-maximizing debt-reform bundle E contains.
Therefore in order to win additional votes, candidate A must provide definitely more
than lE.
5Note that given the definition of H and the relationship l = 2M − u, we have lE − (lT + H) =
2(ME −MT ) > 0.
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We will now argue that, if FˆT contains offers in the interval (lE, uT −H) = (lE, uE),
then FˆT is actually not a best response to the equilibrium strategy. This is less straight-
forward to argue, because offers in this interval are made to some voters under the
equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗E associated to bundle E. Suppose hence that FˆT is a best
response to the equilibrium strategy and spends a positive amount on offers in the in-
terval (lE, uT −H). Then we can arrive at a contradiction by constructing a profitable
deviation F˜T .
In particular, note that if FˆT has only offers in the middle interval (lE, uT − H],6
then it will tie against the equilibrium distribution in case of maximizing targetability,
Fˆ ∗T , and it will lose against the equilibrium distribution in case of maximizing efficiency,
Fˆ ∗E.
The latter is a more general claim which states that for any bundle T with MT <
ME, a distribution FˆT with a support contained in [lE, uT − H], the support of Fˆ ∗E,
will lose against Fˆ ∗E:
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) =
∫ uT−H
lE
x− lE
uE − lE dFˆT (x)
= MT
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE
<
ME − lE
uE − lE
=1/2(uE + lE)− lE
uE − lE =
1
2 .
The inequality follows from MT < ME.
Therefore, any FˆT that is supposed to be a best response to the equilibrium strat-
egy cannot only have offers in the middle interval (lE, uT −H] and must have a positive
amount of offers in the low or high part of T ’s equilibrium support,max{|MLT |, |MHT |} >
0. We can then construct a deviation from FˆT to F˜T such that F˜T (lE) = FˆT (lE) and
F˜T (uT − H) = FˆT (uT − H), but M˜MT > MMT . That is, we shift the offers in the
middle interval (lE, uT − H] up towards uT − H without changing the mass of offers
in this or any other interval. This can be achieved, because there are offers in the
upper or lower part of T ’s equilibrium support that can be shifted downwards within
the respective interval. Strictly speaking, we therefore need to exclude the case where
6Since we have argued that there will be no offer in (lT +H, lE ], we will henceforth refer to
(lE , uT −H] as the middle interval.
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there are offers in the low interval [lT , lT + H] only at the lower bound. We consider
this case at the end.
We now show that the expected vote share increases when using the described
deviation F˜T . When candidate B, who plays the equilibrium strategy, chooses to play
bundle T and the associated distribution Fˆ ∗T , then for candidate A a deviation from FˆT
to F˜T is detrimental. As we can see from (B.6) combined with the budget constraint
(B.9), increasing MMT to M˜MT , decreases candidate A’s vote share by 12
M˜MT−MMT
H
.
When candidate B chooses to play bundle E with distribution Fˆ ∗E, then candidate
A’s vote share is:
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) =1− FˆT (uT −H) +
∫ uT−H
lE
x− lE
uE − lE dFˆT (x)
= MMT
uE − lE +
(−lE)
uE − lE [FˆT (uT −H)− FˆT (lE)]
+ 1− FˆT (uT −H).
By the first term, a deviation of candidate A from FˆT to F˜T increases his vote share
by M˜MT−MMT
uE−lE .
In total, it is beneficial to increase MMT to M˜MT if and only if
(1− βE)12
1
H
< βE
1
uE − lE .
Recall that the equilibrium probability of bundle E was βE = 1− 2HuT−lT . With this
the above equation is equivalent to
2H
uT − lT
1
2H <
uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT
1
uE − lE
⇔uE − lE = uT −H − lE < uT − lT − 2H
⇔lE − (lT +H) = 2(ME −MT ) > 0,
where the last inequality holds by assumption.
For the case where not all offers outside the middle interval (lE, uT −H] are con-
centrated at the lower bound lT of the low part of T ’s equilibrium support, we have
therefore shown that a best response FˆT to the equilibrium strategy cannot have offers
in the middle interval (lE, uT −H] expect at the upper bound uT −H.
In the following, we show that, even if all offers outside the middle interval (lE, uT−
H) are concentrated as a mass point of mass FˆT (lT ) at lT , the vote share can still be
increased. In this case, the vote share formulas become:
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S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
1
2 −
1
2 FˆT (lT ),
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) =
MT − lT FˆT (lT )
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE
[
1− FˆT (lT )
]
=12 −
ME −MT
uE − lE +
lE − lT
uE − lE FˆT (lT ).
Plugging in the equilibrium values for βT and βE, the total expected vote share
becomes:
βTS(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) + βES(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT )
=12 +
[
− H
uT − lT +
uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT
lE − lT
uE − lE
]
FˆT (lT )− uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT
ME −MT
uE − lE
=12 +
1
uT − lT
[
uE − (lT +H)
uE − lE (lE − lT )−H
]
FˆT (lT )− uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT
ME −MT
uE − lE .
Now we have already shown that lT +H < lE, which implies uE−(lT +H) > uE−lE
and lE − lT > lT +H− lT = H. Therefore, the term in square brackets is positive, and
the vote share can be increased by increasing FˆT (lT ). This can be done until FˆT (lT )
reaches its highest value for which the budget constraint still holds, which is the case
when all other offers in the middle interval are at its upper bound uE. Hence, we have
shown that even when all offers on the equilibrium support of T are concentrated as
a mass point at lT , the vote share can still be increased until all offers in the middle
interval are concentrated at the upper bound uE.
This concludes the proof that a best response FˆT to the equilibrium strategy cannot
have offers in the middle interval (lE, uT −H] expect at the upper bound uT −H.
It can now be shown that a distribution FˆT with a mass point at uT−H = uE and no
other offers in the middle interval (lE, uT −H] = (lE, uE] can always be approximated
by another distribution Fˆ ′T that has no offers at all in the middle interval (lE, uE]
and achieves the same vote share against the equilibrium strategy. Hence consider a
distribution FˆT with a mass point of mass ∆ at uT −H = uE and no other offers in the
middle interval (lE, uE]. For such a distribution we have MMT = ∆uE, FˆT (uT −H) =
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FˆT (uE) = FˆT (lE) + ∆, and MLT + MHT = MT − ∆uE. The vote share against Fˆ ∗E
becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) =
∆uE
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE∆ + 1− [FˆT (lE) + ∆]
= 1− FˆT (lE).
Therefore, the vote share against Fˆ ∗E stays the same if we shift the mass from uE to
above uE by decreasing some offers inside the upper part of T ’s equilibrium support
(uE, uT ]. If there are no offers in (uE, uT ], then we must decrease some offers from uE
down to lT + H in order to shift the remaining offers at uE above uE. In this case
FˆT (lE) and therefore S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) changes. However, as we will argue shortly, the total
expected vote share will not change through such a shift in mass.
With a mass point at uE, the vote share against Fˆ ∗T becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
1
2
{
MT −∆uE
H
− lT +H
H
FˆT (lT +H)
+uE
H
[FˆT (lT +H) + ∆] +
2H − uT
H
}
=12
{
MT
H
+ uT + lT − 2H
H
FˆT (lT +H) +
2H − uT
H
}
.
Similar to the vote share against Fˆ ∗E, this vote share stays the same when the mass
from uE can be completely shifted into the upper part of T ’s equilibrium support
(uE, uT ] and FˆT (lT +H) = FˆT (lE)7 does not have to be changed. On the other hand, if
FˆT (lT +H) = FˆT (lE) needs to be decreased in order to get rid of the mass point at uE,
then there is still no change in the total expected vote share, because the equilibrium
probabilities are constructed in a way that the total expected vote share is independent
of the terms involving FˆT (lT + H) = FˆT (lE). With probabilities βE = 1 − 2HuT−lT and
βT = 1− βE = 2HuT−lT , we get for the total expected vote share:
7Recall that we started from a distribution that had no offers in the middle interval expect at its
upper bound uE .
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uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT (1− FˆT (lT +H))
+ 2H
uT − lT
1
2
[
MT
H
+ uT − lT − 2H
H
FˆT (lT +H) +
2H − uT
H
]
=MT − lT
uT − lT
= MT − lT2(MT − lT ) =
1
2 .
In total, we have shown that any distribution FˆT that is supposed to be a best
response to the equilibrium strategy cannot have offers in the middle interval (lE, uE]
expect at uE and that for any distribution that only has offers in the middle interval
at uE, there is a distribution without any offers in the middle interval that achieves
the same vote share.
Therefore, when checking for profitable deviations from the equilibrium distribution
under bundle T , we can concentrate on distributions FˆT that have no offers in the
middle interval (lE, uE] and hence satisfy FˆT (uT −H)− FˆT (lE) = 0.
For deviations that fulfill this requirement, equation (B.6) for candidate A’s vote
share against the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T under bundle T becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
∫ uT
lT
Fˆ ∗T (x)d
ˆˆ
FN(x)
=12
[
MLT +MHT
H
+ uT − lT − 2H
H
FˆT (uT −H) + 2H − uT
H
]
.
Candidate A chooses FˆT to maximize this expression under the constraint MLT +
MHT ≤ MT . It is clear that this constraint will not be slack, so MLT + MHT = MT
and the vote share becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
1
2
[
MT
H
+ uT − lT − 2H
H
FˆT (uT −H) + 2H − uT
H
]
.
Candidate A’s vote share from playing FˆT against the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗E
under bundle E becomes:
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) = 1− FˆT (uT −H).
Candidate B plays Fˆ ∗E with probability βE = 1 − 2HuT−lT and Fˆ ∗T with probability
1− βE = 2HuT−lT . Therefore, candidate A’s expected vote share when playing FˆT is:
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uT − lT − 2H
uT − lT (1− FˆT (uT −H))
+ 2H
uT − lT
1
2
[
MT
H
+ uT − lT − 2H
H
FˆT (uT −H) + 2H − uT
H
]
=MT − lT
uT − lT
= MT − lT2(MT − lT ) =
1
2 .
If candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy, candidate A’s vote share is therefore
1
2 for any distribution FˆT that has no offers in the middle interval and is budget-
balanced. In particular, it is 12 when playing the equilibrium distribution Fˆ
∗
T . This
shows that candidate A cannot profitably deviate from the equilibrium strategy by
deviating from the equilibrium distribution under bundle T , Fˆ ∗T .
Step II: Optimality of Fˆ ∗E. We will now show that it is also not profitable to
deviate from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from Fˆ ∗E to another distribution FˆE
under bundle E.
Define
MME =
∫ uT−H
lE
xdFˆE(x) and MHE =
∫ uT
uT−H
xdFˆE(x),
where, as before, the upper interval (uT −H, uH ] is open to the left.
Recall that uT − H = uE, so MME captures the money spent on the support of
the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗E under bundle E. Then the problem of candidate A,
if she opts for reform, is to choose FˆE under the constraints MME + MHE = ME and
FˆE(lE) = 0.8.
When meeting the equilibrium distribution under bundle E, Fˆ ∗E, the vote share of
candidate A using FˆE is:
8It can be argued that any distribution FˆE with a mass point at lE either looses for sure against
the equilibrium strategy or can be approximated with a distribution without a mass point that wins
the same expected vote share.
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S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆE) =1− FˆE(uT −H) +
∫ uT−H
lE
x− lE
uE − lE dFˆE(x) (B.11)
=1− FˆE(uT −H) + ME −MHE
uE − lE +
−lE
uE − lE FˆE(uT −H)
=1 + ME −MHE
uE − lE −
uT −H
uE − lE FˆE(uT −H).
When meeting the equilibrium distribution under bundle T , Fˆ ∗T , A’s vote share
using FˆE is:
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆE) =
∫ uT−H
lE
1
2dFˆE(x) +
∫ uT
uT−H
1
2
(
1 + x− uT +H
H
)
dFˆE(x) (B.12)
1
2 +
1
2
∫ uT
uT−H
x− uT +H
H
dFˆE(x)
=12
[
1 +
∫ uT
uT−H
−uT +H
H
dFˆE(x) +
MHE
H
]
=12
[
1 +
(−uT +H
H
)
(1− FˆE(uT −H)) + MHE
H
]
.
In the following we argue that, if FˆE is supposed to be a best response to the
equilibrium strategy, it cannot have offers in the high interval (uT − H, uT ]. To do
so, we show that any distribution FˆE that has offers in the high interval performs
worse against the equilibrium strategy than a distribution F˜E that deviates from FˆE
by shifting all the offers from the high to the middle interval [lE, uE] = [lE, uT − H].
This will allow us to concentrate on distributions that have no offers in the high interval
when checking for profitable deviations from the equilibrium distribution under bundle
E, Fˆ ∗E.
Therefore, take any FˆE that has MHE > 0 and FˆE(uT − H) < 1. We can then
consider a deviation to a distribution F˜E that shifts all the offers from the high interval
to the middle interval. In terms of the above vote share formulas (B.11) and (B.12),
this corresponds to decreasingMHE to zero and increasing FˆE(uT−H) by the necessary
amount ∆ such that it takes a value of 1.
Recall that the total expected vote share of candidate A playing against the equi-
librium strategy is:
βES(Fˆ ∗E, FˆE) + (1− βE)S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆE),
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where βE = 1− 2HuT−lT is the equilibrium probability to play bundle E.
The above described shift in MHE changes this total expected vote share by
MHE
[
βE
1
uE − lE − (1− βE)
1
2
1
H
]
. (B.13)
On the other hand, the above described shift in FˆE(uT − H) changes this total
expected vote share by
−∆(uT −H)
[
βE
1
uE − lE − (1− βE)
1
2
1
H
]
. (B.14)
We have already argued above that for βE = 1− 2HuT−lT , the term in square brackets
is positive. Recall that ∆ is the mass of offers in the high interval and MHE is the
total amount of money spent on all offers in the high interval. Hence, we have MHE >
∆(uT −H), because uT −H = uE is the upper bound of the middle interval and offers
in the high interval must hence lie above this value. In total, we can then conclude
that effect (B.13) dominates effect (B.14). Therefore, the shift towards the middle
interval increases the total expected vote share and any distribution with offers in the
high interval cannot be a best response to the equilibrium strategy.
Therefore, when checking for profitable deviations from the equilibrium distribu-
tion under bundle E, we can concentrate on distributions FˆE that have no offers in
the high interval and hence satisfy MHE = 0 and FˆE(uT − H) = 1. As can be seen
from (B.11) and (B.12), the vote share of any such reform distribution when meeting
the equilibrium reform or no-reform distribution is 12 in either case. In particular, also
the equilibrium reform distribution Fˆ ∗E achieves the same outcome, and hence there is
no profitable deviation from Fˆ ∗E.
Step III: Optimality of βI = βQ = 0. Before arguing for the optimality of the
exact values of the probabilities for bundles E and T , we must still argue that bundles
I and Q are played with zero probability in equilibrium.
To do so, we show that for I and Q any possible associated distribution is beaten
by the equilibrium strategy. Together with the results established in steps I and II,
this will imply that any strategy that plays I or Q with positive probability will be
beaten for sure by the equilibrium strategy.
B.3. PROOFS 173
Both bundles I andQ are dominated in efficiency by bundles E and T : ME > MT >
MQ > MI . Furthermore, both I and Q are dominated by T in terms of targetability:
uT > uI > uQ.
In step (a) of the following argument, we will use the facts MQ < ME and lQ <
lT + H to prove that any distribution FˆQ associated to bundle Q that is supposed
to be a best response to the equilibrium strategy cannot have offers in the middle
interval [lE, uE], the support of Fˆ ∗E. This will establish that FˆQ as a best response to
the equilibrium strategy should only have offers on the support of Fˆ ∗T . But then, in
step (b), we can use the fact MQ < MT to show that any FˆQ will lose against the
equilibrium strategy.
To see lT +H − lQ > 0 note that:
lT +H − lQ
=lT + lE − lT − 2(ME −MT )− lQ
=lE − lQ − 2(ME −MT )
>lE − lQ − 2(ME −MQ)
= uQ − uE > 0.
The first inequality used the fact that MT > MQ and the last inequality holds by the
assumption on the targetability ranking of the different bundles. In the alternative
specification for the targetability rankings, the assumption lQ ≤ lT is included and so
lT +H − lQ > 0 holds by assumption.
Step (a): To show that any FˆQ that is supposed to be a best response to the equilib-
rium strategy should only have offers on the support of Fˆ ∗T , we argue that the reasoning
in step (I), which proved the same for any distribution FˆT associated to bundle T , still
goes through. When considering the performance against the equilibrium strategy, the
difference between a distribution FˆT associated to bundle T , as done in step (I), and
a distribution FˆQ associated to bundle Q lies in the budget parameter MQ < MT and
the lower bound lQ, which is potentially different from lT . Since lQ < lT + H, when
competing against the equilibrium strategy, FˆQ will not offer in the interval (lT +H, lE],
as was the case for FˆT .
When lQ ≥ lT , then nothing changes in the vote share formulas from step (I) except
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for MT being replaced by MQ.9 In the arguments of step (I) to establish that a best
response FˆT to the equilibrium strategy cannot have offers on the support of Fˆ ∗E, the
only time whenMT played a role was when establishing that a distribution that played
offers only on the support of Fˆ ∗E would lose for sure. To show this, the fact MT < ME
was used. Since MQ < ME, we can make the same argument for bundle Q.
In the case of lQ < lT , there is a change in the formula for S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆQ) and in the
budget constraint, because the possibility for offers below lT , the lowest possible offer
under Fˆ ∗T , arises. Since Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗E only offer above lT , any offer below lT will lose
for sure and only makes sense in order to finance an increase in the offers above lT .
Therefore, all offers below lT should be chosen as a mass point at the lowest possible
offer under bundle Q, lQ, in order to finance the the highest possible offers above lT .
The budget constraint under which FˆQ is chosen becomes:
MLQ +MHQ +MMQ + lQFˆQ(lQ) = MQ, (B.15)
where the M terms are defined analogously to step (I). The vote share formula against
Fˆ ∗T becomes:10
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆQ) =
∫ uT
lQ
Fˆ ∗T (x)dFˆQ(x) (B.16)
=12
{
MLQ +MHQ
H
+ lT
H
FˆQ(lT )− lT +H
H
FˆQ(lT +H)
+uT −H
H
FˆQ(uT −H) + 2H − uT
H
}
.
Recall that the goal is to construct a profitable deviation analogous to step (I)
whenever FˆQ has offers in the middle interval (lE, uE] below the upper bound uE. We
can again show by using MQ < ME that FˆQ must have some offers outside the interval
(lE, uE]. That is there must be a positive mass of offers either somewhere on T ′s
equilibrium support, [lT , lT +H] or (uE, uT ], or as a mass point at lQ.
Now the first possibility is that there are enough offers on [lT , lT + H] or (uE, uT ]
that can be decreased inside these intervals such that all offers in the middle interval
9For lQ > lT , there is a change in the formulas for the special case dealing with a mass point at
lT , which is now at lQ > lT . However, all the arguments for this special case still go through.
10In step (I), the analogous term to lTH FˆQ(lT ), did not appear in the vote share formula, because
the only mass smaller or equal to lT would be concentrated as a mass point at lT . It can be shown
that, as long as there are offers somewhere on the support of T beside lT , the vote share stays the
same by shifting this mass from lT to slightly above lT , while decreasing some other offers on the
support of T . When necessary, the case where the only offers on the support of T are at lT , have
been dealt with in the previous proofs. Now however, all mass smaller or equal to lT is concentrated
as a mass point at lQ < lT , and shifting this mass up to above lT is no longer necessarily neutral on
the vote share.
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(lE, uE] can be shifted up to uE. In this case,MLQ+MHQ decreases just by the amount
by which MMQ increases but the masses in the different intervals are not changed. In
that case the new terms in the formulas compared to step (I) are not affected and the
argument from step (I) can be applied.
The second possibility is that, even when shifting all the offers in [lT , lT +H] down
to lT and all the offers in (uE, uT ] down to uE,11 there are still some offers in the middle
interval whose shift up to uE could not yet be financed. We have to show that even
in this situation there is still a possible profitable deviation. However, this deviation
is easy to see, because the offers at lT can be decreased down to lQ in order to gain
additional money that can be spent on shifting offers in the middle interval up. Since
the offers at lT , the lower bound of T ’s equilibrium support, were also not winning
before the shift down to lQ, such a deviation definitely increases the vote share.
The last possibility is that we have no offers in the upper part of T ′s equilibrium
support, (uE, uT ], and all the offers from the low part [lT , lT + H] have been shifted
down to lQ and there are still some offers in the middle interval (lE, uE] below the
upper bound uE. In this case, we have to redo the arguments that were done in step
(I) for the special case where there were no offers in (uE, uT ] and all offers in [lT , lT +H]
were concentrated at lT . These arguments still go through.
In total, we have therefore shown that for all possible constellations, the arguments
from step (I) still apply and there is always a profitable deviation once there are offers
in the middle interval that are not concentrated at its upper bound uE.
For any lQ < lT + H, it can also still be shown in the same manner as before
that any distribution FˆQ that has some offers concentrated at uE can be approximated
by a distribution Fˆ ′Q that has no offers in the middle interval (lE, uE] and achieves
the same vote share against the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, there is always a
distribution FˆQ that has no offers in the middle interval and that performs at least as
good as any strategy that has some offers in the middle interval. This establishes that
when considering possible best responses FˆQ to the equilibrium strategy, we can focus
on distributions that only play offers on the support of Fˆ ∗T (and potentially at lQ if
lQ < lT ).
11Note that this later change implies a change in FˆQ(uE) besides the shift in theM terms. However,
using an argument similar to the one in step (II) above, we can show that a shift from offers above
uE to uE in order to finance higher offers in the middle interval still increases the total vote share.
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Step (b): In step (I), after having established that a best response FˆT would only
play offers on the support of Fˆ ∗T , the expected vote share using FˆT was calculated to
be:
MT − lT
uT − lT ,
which was shown to be equal to 1/2 using the definition of uT . If lQ ≥ lT , we can
proceed analogously. In particular, having established in step (a) above that a best
response FˆQ under bundle Q would only play offers on the support of Fˆ ∗T , the expected
vote share of playing any best-response distribution FˆQ against the equilibrium strategy
will now be:
MQ − lT
uT − lT
<
MT − lT
uT − lT =
1
2 .
The last step used the fact MQ < MT .
Similarly, if lQ < lT then the expected vote share of playing any best-response
distribution FˆQ against the equilibrium strategy is:
MQ − lT
uT − lT +
(lT − lQ)
uT − lT FˆQ(lQ)
≤MQ − lT
uT − lT +
(lT − lQ)/2
uT − lT
=(uQ − lT )/2
uT − lT
<
uT − lT
uT − lT =
1
2 ,
where the first weak inequality follows from FˆQ(lQ) ≤ 1/2. If FˆQ were to put more than
1/2 of offers at lQ < lT , then it would lose for sure against the equilibrium strategy.
The last step holds due to the targetability ranking uT > uQ.
This shows that any FˆQ that is a best response to the equilibrium strategy will lose
against the equilibrium strategy and therefore bundle Q should be played with zero
probability.
Analogous steps can be used for proving that bundle I will not be played in equilib-
rium, since the same facts that were used to prove the case of Q also apply to bundle I.
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Step IV: Optimality of βE = 1− 2HuT−lT and βT = 1−βE. Having established that
only bundles E and T will be played with positive probability in equilibrium we can
now argue for the optimality of the respective equilibrium probabilities βE = 1− 2HuT−lT
and βT = 1 − βE. When candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy, candidate A is
indifferent between playing bundle E and bundle T : In steps (I) and (II), we have
shown that for all distributions FˆE and FˆT played under these two bundles that are
potential best responses to the equilibrium strategy, the total expected vote share is
1
2 when playing against the equilibrium strategy. Therefore, candidate A is happy to
play bundle E with a probability of βE = 1 − 2HuT−lT and bundle T with probability
βT = 1− βE.
B.3.6 Proof of Proposition B.2.2:
The proof of existence has five steps: Step I shows that there is no profitable deviation
from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from Fˆ ∗T , step II shows that it is not prof-
itable either to deviate on Fˆ ∗I , step III shows that it is not profitable to deviate on Fˆ ∗E,
and step IV shows that bundle Q will be played with probability zero. Finally, step
V argues for the optimality of the equilibrium probabilities with which bundles T , I,
and E are played.
Step I: Optimality of Fˆ ∗T . Consider candidate A when he decides to play the debt-
reform bundle T and assume he deviates from the equilibrium distribution under this
bundle, Fˆ ∗T , to another distribution FˆT . When this candidate A meets a candidate B
that chooses also the bundle T and that offers money according to Fˆ ∗T , the vote share
of candidate A is:
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) =
∫ uT
lT
Fˆ ∗T (x)dFˆT (x) (B.17)
=12
{
MLTT +MHTT
H ′′
− lT +H
′′
H ′′
FˆT (lT +H ′′)
+uT −H
′′
H ′′
FˆT (uT −H ′′) + 2H
′′ − uT
H ′′
}
,
where
MLTT =
∫ lT+H′′
lT
xdFˆT (x), (B.18)
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and
MHTT =
∫ uT
uT−H′′
xdFˆT (x). (B.19)
Equations (B.18) and (B.19) capture the money spent under distribution FˆT on trans-
fers in the low interval [lT , lT +H ′′] and high interval (uT −H ′′, uT ], respectively. These
two intervals make up the support of the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T under bundle T .12
In the following, we will refer to this support as the equilibrium support of T . Simi-
larly, we will refer to [lI , lI +H ′] and (uI−H ′, uI ], the support of Fˆ ∗I , as the equilibrium
support of I. Finally, we refer to [lE, uE], the support of Fˆ ∗E, as the equilibrium support
of E.13
Candidate A chooses FˆT under the constraint:
MLTT +MHTT +MMT = MT , (B.20)
where
MMT =
∫ uT−H′′
lT+H′′
xdFˆT (x) (B.21)
is the money spent on transfer offers in the middle interval (lT + H ′′, uT −H ′′]. This
middle interval is made up by the equilibrium supports of I and E, except for the
intervals (lT + H ′′, lI) and (lI + H ′, lE). A best response to the equilibrium strategy
will never offer in these latter intervals though. This is because, for instance, offers in
the interval (lI + H ′, lE) are more costly than offering lI + H ′, but do not win more
votes than offers at lI + H ′.14 As before, MT denotes the resources beyond existing
endowments under bundle T .
In the following, we will argue that, when checking for profitable deviations from
the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T that is played in case of bundle T , we can concentrate
on distributions FˆT that have no offers in the middle interval (lT + H ′′, uT − H ′′].
12This is why the subscripts L and H in the above formulas, which stand for the low and high part
of a given support, are themselves indexed by the letter T .
13We choose the intervals of the upper parts of the equilibrium supports of T and I to be open to
the left, because the lower bounds of these intervals are at the same time the upper bounds of the
intervals below, which belong to a different support. To have the intervals open is without loss of
generality because the continuous equilibrium distributions Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗I put zero mass on the single
offers at these lower bounds of the respective parts in their supports. In order to win a positive mass
of voters in the respective parts of their supports, the respective offers must therefore be strictly
higher than these lower bounds.
14Since we are considering a distribution FˆT , whose lowest bound lT lies below the middle interval
(lT +H ′′, uT −H ′′], we can also exclude offers at lE and lI , the lower bounds of E’s and I’s equilibrium
supports.
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Said differently, FˆT should not contain offers on the equilibrium supports of I and E.
Therefore, assume that FˆT has a positive mass of offers on the equilibrium supports of
I and E.
Step (A): If FˆT only has offers on the equilibrium supports of I and E, then it will
be beaten by the equilibrium strategy.
Once FˆT is restricted to only operate on the equilibrium supports of I and E, the
facts MT < MI and MT < ME can be used to show that FˆT will lose against the
equilibrium strategy.
Step (A1): FˆT will lose against the equilibrium strategy when it only offers on the
equilibrium support of E.
Since 50 percent of the offers of Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗I lie above (respectively below) the equi-
librium support of E, a distribution FˆT that only offers on the equilibrium support
of E will tie against Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗I . Applying the fact MT < ME, it will lose against
Fˆ ∗E (see step (I) in the proof of Proposition B.2.1). Since bundle E is played with
positive probability by the equilibrium strategy, this means that FˆT will lose against
the equilibrium strategy.
Step (A2): When FˆT is restricted to operate on the equilibrium supports of E and
I, then a best response to the equilibrium strategy should only offer on the equilibrium
support of I.
Using step (A1) and following analogous arguments as in step (I) of the proof of
Proposition B.2.1, we can show this in the following way. When FˆT offers a positive
amount on the equilibrium support of E, then there is a profitable deviation from FˆT
given that the following condition holds:
βI
1
2H ′ < βE
1
uE − lE
⇔ βI
βE
1
2H ′ <
1
uE − lE
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Plugging in the equilibrium values of βI and βE, the above becomes:
2H ′
uI − lI − 2H ′
1
2H ′ <
1
uE − lE
⇔lI +H ′ < lE
⇔2MI − uI + (uI − uE) < 2ME − uE
⇔ME > MI .
The last inequality holds by the assumptions on the efficiency ranking. Hence it fol-
lows that when restricted to only offering on the equilibrium supports of E and I, FˆT
should only offer on the equilibrium support of I.
Step (A3): When FˆT offers only on the equilibrium support of I, then it loses to
the equilibrium strategy.
When FˆT offers only on the equilibrium support of I, then the vote shares against
the different equilibrium distributions are:
S(Fˆ ∗I , FˆT ) =
1
2
[
MT
H ′
+ uI − lI − 2H
′
H ′
FˆT (uI −H ′) + 2H
′ − uI
H ′
]
,
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆT ) = 1− FˆT (uI −H ′),
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) = 1/2.
Hence, the total expected vote share from playing such a distribution FˆT is:
βI
1
2
[
MT
H ′
+ uI − lI − 2H
′
H ′
FˆT (uI −H ′) + 2H
′ − uI
H ′
]
+ βE
[
1− FˆT (uI −H ′)
]
+ βT
1
2
=βI
1
2
[
MT
H ′
+ 2H
′ − uI
H ′
]
+ βE + βT
1
2
<βI
1
2
[
MI
H ′
+ 2H
′ − uI
H ′
]
+ βE + βT
1
2
=uT − lT − 2H
′′
uT − lT
MI − lI
uI − lI +
2H ′′
uT − lT
1
2
=uT − lT − 2H
′′
uT − lT
1
2 +
2H ′′
uT − lT
1
2
=12 .
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The inequality just used the fact that MT < MI . Hence, when FˆT offers only on the
equilibrium support of I, then it loses to the equilibrium strategy.
Combining steps (A1)-(A3), we have therefore shown the claim raised at the be-
ginning of step (A) that if FˆT only has offers on the equilibrium supports of I and E,
then it will be beaten by the equilibrium strategy.
Step (B): If FˆT spends a positive amount of offers, but not all of its offers (see step
A), on the equilibrium supports of I and E below the upper bound uI of I’s equilibrium
support, then we can construct a profitable deviation along the lines of step (I) in the
proof of Proposition B.2.1.
Step (B1): If FˆT spends a positive amount of offers on the equilibrium support of
I below uI , then we can construct a profitable deviation.
Under the conditions of step (B1), we can construct a deviation that leaves the
mass of offers in all intervals the same, but increases the amount of money spent on
the equilibrium support of I,15 while decreasing the amount of money spent on the
equilibrium support of T .16 Using arguments analogous to step (I) in the proof of
Proposition B.2.1, such a deviation is profitable if
βT
1
2H ′′ < βI
1
2H ′
⇔βT
βI
<
H ′′
H ′
.
15That is, the offers inside this support are shifted upwards. For the case where all offers in I are
concentrated at lI +H, the upper bound of the lower part of I’s equilibrium support, offers must be
shifted to the high part of I’s equilibrium support and so masses change. However, the equilibrium
probabilities are constructed in a manner that this mass shift does not change the total expected vote
share and so the only effect on the vote share is still the change in the amount of money spent on the
equilibrium support of I.
16That is, the offers inside this support are shifted downwards. The case where all offers on the
equilibrium support of T are concentrated at lT and cannot be decreased can be handled in the same
manner as in in the proof of Proposition B.2.1.
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Plugging in the equilibrium values of βT and βI , the above becomes:
H ′′
H ′
uI − lI
uI − (lT +H ′′) <
H ′′
H ′
⇔lT +H ′′ < lI
⇔2MT − uT + (uT − uI) < 2MI − uI
⇔MI > MT .
The last inequality holds again by the assumptions on the efficiency ranking.
Step (B2): If FˆT spends a positive amount of offers on the equilibrium support of
E, then we can construct a profitable deviation.
The first possibility is that there are some offers on the equilibrium support of
E below uE. Then we can construct a deviation that leaves the mass of offers in
all intervals the same, but increases the amount of money spent on the equilibrium
support of E, while decreasing the amount of money spent on the equilibrium support
of T .17 Such a deviation is profitable if
βT
1
2H ′′ < βE
1
uE − lE .
But since we have already established βT 12H′′ < βI
1
2H′ in step (B1) and βI
1
2H′ <
βE
1
uE−lE in step (A2), this follows immediately.
The other possibility is that all offers on the equilibrium support of E are concen-
trated at the upper bound uE. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition
B.2.1, where it was argued that any distribution with a mass point at uE achieves the
same vote share as a distribution that shifts this mass into the equilibrium support of
T , it can then be shown that in the case here, a distribution with a mass point at uE
achieves the same vote share as one that shifts all the mass from uE to the equilibrium
support of I. But this case was already handled in step (B1).
Together, steps (B1) and (B2) can be used to argue that when there are offers
on the equilibrium supports of I and E below the upper bound uI of I’s equilibrium
support, then we can always construct profitable deviations until all these offers are
concentrated at uI . At that point, applying one last time the argument that such a
17The case where all offers on the equilibrium support of T are concentrated at lT and cannot be
decreased can again be handled in the same manner as in the proof of Proposition B.2.1.
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distribution achieves the same vote share as one that shifts this mass into the equilib-
rium support of T , completes the proof of step (B).
In total, combining steps (A) and (B), we have therefore shown that any distribu-
tion FˆT played under bundle T that is supposed to be a best response to the equilibrium
strategy should have no offers on the equilibrium supports of E and I. Said differ-
ently, we can concentrate on distributions FˆT that have only offers on the equilibrium
support of T .
For such distributions FˆT , the total expected vote share against the equilibrium
strategy is:
βTS(Fˆ ∗T , FˆT ) + (1− βT )(1− FˆT (uT −H ′′))
=βT
MT + 2H ′′ − uT
2H ′′ + (1− βT ).
Plugging in the equilibrium value for βT , this becomes:
MT − lT
uT − lT
=(uT − lT )/2
uT − lT =
1
2 .
In particular, note that Fˆ ∗T by definition also fulfills the above requirement that it
only offers on the equilibrium support of T . Hence, there is no profitable deviation
from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗T , which
is played under bundle T .
Step II: Optimality of Fˆ ∗I . Similar to step (I), we will argue that when checking for
profitable deviations from the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗I , which is played in case of
bundle I, we can concentrate on distributions FˆI that have no offers on the equilibrium
supports of T and E. Assume therefore that FˆI spends a positive mass of offers on the
equilibrium supports of T and E.
Step (A): FˆI will lose against the equilibrium strategy when it only offers on the
equilibrium support of E.
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Since 50 percent of the offers of Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗I lie above (respectively below) the equi-
librium support of E, a distribution FˆI that only offers on the equilibrium support
of E will tie against Fˆ ∗T and Fˆ ∗I . Applying the fact MI < ME, it will lose against
Fˆ ∗E (see step (I) in the proof of Proposition B.2.1). Since bundle E is played with
positive probability by the equilibrium strategy, this means that FˆI will lose against
the equilibrium strategy.
From step (A) we can conclude that any FˆI that is supposed to be a best response
to the equilibrium strategy must have some offers on the equilibrium supports of I or
T . In the following step, we will show that a best response FˆI should have no offers on
the equilibrium support of T . Before we turn to this next step, note the following. In
step (B1) of the proof of the optimality of Fˆ ∗T , we have already shown that lT +H ′′ < lI .
Since lI is the lowest offer that FˆI can make, FˆI can have no offers on the lower part of
the equilibrium support of T , [lT , lT + H ′′]. Hence, we only have to exclude offers on
the high part of T ’s equilibrium support, (uT −H ′′, uT ], in order to exclude offers on
the total equilibrium support of T . Since uT −H ′′ = uI and MI = uI+lI2 with lI < uI ,
FˆI cannot only have offers on the high part of T ’s equilibrium support, (uT −H ′′, uT ],
without violating the budget constraint. Hence, in order to exclude offers on the equi-
librium support of T , it is sufficient to show the following:
Step (B): When FˆI has some offers on the high part of T ’s equilibrium support,
(uT − H ′′, uT ], and has the remaining offers on the equilibrium supports of E or I,
then the vote share can be increased by shifting the offers from (uT − H ′′, uT ] down
towards the lower intervals.
Step (B1): The claim in step (B) is true when some of the remaining offers besides
the offers on (uT −H ′′, uT ] are on the equilibrium support of I.
Note that this includes the case where all the remaining offers are on the equilibrium
support of I. What remains to be shown in step (B2) is then the case where all the
remaining offers are on the equilibrium support of E.
To show step (B1) consider a distribution FˆI that has some offers on (uT −H ′′, uT ]
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and some of the remaining offers are on the equilibrium support of I. The vote share
formulas in this case become:
S(Fˆ ∗I , FˆI) =1− FˆI(uI) +
1
2
[
MLII +MHII
H ′
+ 2H
′ − uI
H ′
FˆI(uI)
− lI +H
′
H ′
FˆI(lI +H ′) +
uI −H ′
H ′
FˆI(uE)
]
,
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆI) = 1− FˆI(uE) +
MMI
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE
[
FˆI(uE)− FˆI(lE)
]
,
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆI) =
1
2
[
1− uT −H
′′
H ′′
(
1− FˆI(uI)
)
+ MHT I
H ′′
]
.
where
MMI =
∫ uE
lE
xdFˆE(x)
is the money that FˆI spends in the middle interval, the equilibrium support of E,
[lE, uE]. Similarly, MLII is the money spent on the lower part of the equilibrium
support of I, [lI , lI + H ′], while MHII is the money spent on the higher part of the
equilibrium support of I, (uI −H ′′, uI ] = (uE, uI ]. Finally, MHT I is the money spent
on the higher part of the equilibrium support of T , (uT −H ′′, uT ] = (uI , uT ].
In the following, we show that any distribution FˆI that has some offers on the higher
part of the equilibrium support of T , (uI , uT ], performs worse against the equilibrium
strategy than a deviation F˜I that shifts all these offers down to the high part of the
equilibrium support of I, (uE, uI ]. Hence, consider a distribution FˆI that hasMHT I > 0
and FˆI(uI) < 1. If we decrease all the offers that are greater than uI down to uI , then
FˆI(uI) increases by ∆ = 1 − FˆI(uI). Furthermore, the money MHII spent in the
high part of I’s equilibrium support increases by ∆ · uI . Since all these offers were
previously greater then uI , there is a positive amount of moneyMA = MHT I−∆·uI > 0
additionally available for spending. Without this additional money the total expected
vote share stays constant:
Through increasing MHII by ∆ · uI while decreasing MHT I by the same amount,
the total expected vote share changes by:
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∆ · uI
[
βI
1
2H ′ − βT
1
2H ′′
]
.
Through shifting FˆI(uI) up by ∆ to reach the value one, the total expected vote
share changes by:
∆
[
βI
(
−1 + 2H
′ − uI
2H ′
)
+ βT
uI
2H ′′
]
=−∆ · uI
[
βI
1
2H ′ − βT
1
2H ′′
]
.
In total, the two changes cancel out. Hence, the change in the vote share depends
on what happens with the additional amount of money MA > 0.
Case (i): There are enough offers in the low or the high part of I’s equilibrium
support, that can be shifted upwards to use up the additional money without changing
the mass or money spent in any other interval.
In this case the only additional change in the vote share formulas is that MLII +
MHII increases by MA while MHT I decreases by MA. The change in the expected vote
share from this is:
MA
[
βI
1
2H ′ − βT
1
2H ′′
]
.
In step (B1) of the Fˆ ∗T -optimality proof, it was shown that the term in square
brackets is positive. Therefore, the total expected vote share increases.
Case (ii): There are enough offers in the equilibrium support of E, that can be
shifted upwards to use up the additional money without changing the mass or money
spent in any other interval.
In this case the only additional change in the vote share formulas is that MMI
increases by MA while MHT I decreases by MA. The change in the expected vote share
from this is:
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MA
[
βE
1
uE − lE − βT
1
2H ′′
]
In step (B2) of the Fˆ ∗T -optimality proof it was shown that the term in square
brackets is positive. Therefore the total expected vote share increases.
Note that the arguments in case (i) and (ii) also imply that the vote share increases
when the amounts of money spent on the equilibrium supports of E and I are increased
simultaneously but the masses in all intervals stay the same.
Case (iii): All the offers in the low and high part of I’s equilibrium support and in
the equilibrium support of E are concentrated at their upper bounds.
In this case, the additional money MA can only be spent by shifting mass between
different intervals. Note that the offers at lI + H ′, the upper bound of the low part
of I’s equilibrium support, must counterbalance all the other offers for budget balance
to hold.18 This means that there are always enough offers at lI + H ′ so that we can
shift enough mass from lI +H ′ to the upper part of I’s equilibrium support, (uE, uI ],
in order to spent all the additional money MA on the equilibrium support of I. Such a
shift of mass is captured in the vote share formulas by a decrease in FˆI(uE), FˆI(lI+H ′),
and FˆI(lE) by the same amount µ.
Hence, consider decreasing FˆI(uE), FˆI(lI+H ′), and FˆI(lE) by the necessary amount
µ such thatMLII +MHII can be increased byMA. At the same timeMHT I is decreased
by MA. The resulting change in the total expected vote share from the change in
FˆI(uE), FˆI(lI +H ′), and FˆI(lE) is:
βEµ+ βI
[
−uI − lI − 2H
′
2H ′
]
µ
=µuT − lT − 2H
′′
uT − lT
[
uI − lI − 2H ′
uI − lI −
2H ′
uI − lI
uI − lI − 2H ′
2H ′
]
=0.
18For instance, if all offers were concentrated at the upper bound uE of E’s equilibrium support,
the total money spent is 1 · uE . However, the available money by the resource constraint is only
MI = uI+lI2 =
uE+(lI+H′)
2 < uE since lI +H ′ < lE < uE .
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That is the equilibrium probabilities are constructed in a way that the above de-
scribed shift in mass does not alter the vote share. The change in the total expected
vote share is therefore completely determined by the increase of MLII + MHII by MA
and the corresponding decrease of MHT I . The resulting change in the total expected
vote share is
MA
[
βI
1
2H ′ − βT
1
2H ′′
]
,
which is positive. We have therefore shown that also in case (iii) the total expected
vote share increases by shifting all the offers down from the high part of T ’s equilibrium
support.
In total, the arguments for cases (i) to (iii) imply that we can always spent the
additional moneyMA by first shifting up the offers in the low and high part of I’s equi-
librium support and in E’s equilibrium support up to their respective upper bounds.19
Any money that then remains can be used for a mass shift as described in case (iii).
In total all such uses of MA increase the total expected vote share.
We have therefore shown the claim of step (B1): When FˆI has some offers on the
high part of T ’s equilibrium support, (uT − H ′′, uT ], then the vote share can be in-
creased by shifting the offers from (uT − H ′′, uT ] downwards for the case where the
remaining offers before the shift are at least partly on the equilibrium support of I.
It remains to show that the same holds when the remaining offers before the shift
are exclusively concentrated on the equilibrium support of E.
Step (B2): When FˆI has some offers on the high part of T ’s equilibrium support,
(uT −H ′′, uT ], and has the remaining offers only on the equilibrium support of E, then
the vote share can be increased by shifting the offers from (uT −H ′′, uT ] down towards
the lower intervals.
We can still work with the same vote share formulas as in step (B1). Since there
are no offers on the equilibrium support of I, this just means that for instance MLII
19Note that this also includes the case where there are no offers on the equilibrium support of E
to begin with and hence no offers can be shifted upwards there. Hence, the arguments here also cover
the case where there are only offers on the equilibrium support of I before we do the proposed shift
of offers down from (uT −H ′′, uT ].
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and MHII take the value zero. Similar to step (B1), we can shift all the mass from the
high part of T ’s equilibrium support down to uI and have a positive amount MA left.
As argued above, the change in the vote share is determined completely by the use of
this additional money MA.
Now since for step (B2) all the offers that are not on the high part of T ’s equi-
librium support are concentrated on the equilibrium support of E, we can always
spent MA by shifting offers inside E’s equilibrium support upward without chang-
ing the mass of offers there.20 This means that the expected vote share changes by
MA
[
βE
1
uE−lE − βT 12H′′
]
> 0, as shown in case (ii) of step (B1).
In total, step (B) has therefore shown that a distribution FˆI that is supposed to be
a best response to the equilibrium strategy should have no offers on the equilibrium
support of T . Since by step (A) a best response FˆI cannot have only offers on the
equilibrium support of E either, two options remain: First, FˆI only has offers on the
equilibrium support of I, second, FˆI has offers on both the equilibrium supports of I
and E. In order to exclude the second option we proceed to show the final step.
Step (C): When FˆI is restricted to operate on the equilibrium supports of E and
I, then a best response to the equilibrium strategy should only offer on the equilibrium
support of I.
This is analogous to step (A2) in the optimality proof of Fˆ ∗T .
In total, we can therefore conclude that when checking for profitable deviations
from the equilibrium distribution under bundle I, we can concentrate on distributions
FˆI that only have offers on the equilibrium support of I. Applying the arguments from
step (A3) in the optimality proof of Fˆ ∗T , it can be shown that any such distribution
FˆI achieves a total expected vote share of 1/2 against the equilibrium strategy. In
particular, Fˆ ∗I is also such a distribution and therefore there is no profitable deviation
from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from the distribution Fˆ ∗I played in case of
bundle I.
20Such a shift would only be prevented if all offers were concentrated at the upper bound uE of
that support, but then budget balance would be violated.
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Step III: Optimality of Fˆ ∗E. Similar to the previous steps, we will argue that, when
checking for profitable deviations from the equilibrium distribution Fˆ ∗E, which is played
in case of bundle E, we can concentrate on distributions FˆE that have no offers on
the equilibrium supports of T and I. In the proof of the optimality of Fˆ ∗T , we have
shown in step (B1) that lT + H ′′ < lI and in step (A2) that lI + H ′ < lE. Since lE
is the lowest offer that FˆE can make, FˆE can neither have offers on the lower part of
the equilibrium support of T , [lT , lT + H ′′], nor on the lower part of I’s equilibrium
support, [lI , lI + H ′]. Hence, we only have to exclude offers on the high part of I’s
and T ’s equilibrium supports, (uI −H ′, uI ] = (uE, uI ] and (uT −H ′′, uT ] = (uI , uT ], in
order to exclude offers on the total equilibrium supports of I and T . SinceME = uE+lE2
with lE < uE, FˆE cannot only have offers on the high part of I’s or T ’s equilibrium
supports, which both lie above uE, without violating the budget constraint.
In order to exclude offers on the equilibrium support of T , it is therefore sufficient
to show the following:
Step (A): When FˆE has some offers on the high part of T ’s equilibrium support,
(uT −H ′′, uT ], and has the remaining offers on the equilibrium supports of E or I, then
the vote share can be increased by shifting the offers from (uT −H ′′, uT ] down towards
the lower intervals.
This corresponds exactly to step (B) in the optimality proof for Fˆ ∗I . In contrast to
the proof there, the vote share formulas need to be adjusted by canceling the terms
related to the lower part of I’ equilibrium support, which now lies below the lowest
possible offer lE. The formulas become:
S(Fˆ ∗I , FˆE) = 1− FˆI(uI) +
1
2
[
MHIE
H ′
+ 2H
′ − uI
H ′
FˆE(uI) +
uI −H ′
H ′
FˆE(uE)
]
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆE) = 1− FˆE(uE) +
MME
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE FˆE(uE)
B.3. PROOFS 191
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆE) =
1
2
[
1− uT −H
′′
H ′′
(
1− FˆE(uI)
)
+ MHTE
H ′′
]
where all the M terms are defined analogously to before. The arguments from step
(B) in the optimality proof for Fˆ ∗I can now be repeated analogously to prove the above
claim. It is now even easier to do the proof because case (iii) from before is now no
longer possible without violating the budget constraint.
Therefore, with step (A), we have shown that any distribution FˆE that is supposed
to be a best response to the equilibrium strategy should have no offers on the equi-
librium support of T . Said differently, FˆE is restricted to operate on the equilibrium
support of E and the high part of I’s equilibrium support. In the last step it remains
to exclude offers on the equilibrium support of I.
Step (B): When FˆE is restricted to operate on the equilibrium supports of E and
I, then a best response to the equilibrium strategy should only offer on the equilibrium
support of E.
This is analogous to the corresponding claim in step II in the optimality proof of Fˆ ∗E
in Proposition B.2.1. The same arguments can be applied here replacing, for instance,
uT by uI and uT −H by uI −H ′.
In total, we can therefore conclude that when checking for profitable deviations
from the equilibrium distribution under bundle E, we can concentrate on distributions
FˆE that only have offers on the equilibrium support of E. For such FˆE, the vote share
formulas become:
S(Fˆ ∗I , FˆE) =
1
2
S(Fˆ ∗T , FˆE) =
1
2
S(Fˆ ∗E, FˆE) =
MME
uE − lE −
lE
uE − lE
= (uE + lE)/2− lE
uE − lE =
1
2
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Therefore any such distribution FˆE, which only has offers on the equilibrium sup-
port of E, achieves a total expected vote share of 1/2 against the equilibrium strategy.
In particular, Fˆ ∗E is also such a distribution and therefore there is no profitable devi-
ation from the equilibrium strategy by deviating from the distribution Fˆ ∗E played in
case of bundle E.
Step IV: Optimality of βQ = 0. Before arguing for the optimality of the exact
values of the probabilities for bundles T , I, and E, we must still argue that bundle Q
is played with zero probability in equilibrium.
To do so, we show that for bundle Q any possible associated distribution is beaten
by the equilibrium strategy. Together with the results established in steps I to III, this
will imply that any strategy that plays Q with positive probability will be beaten for
sure by the equilibrium strategy.
To start, we note some preliminaries. First, we can apply an analogous argument
to step (III) in the proof of Proposition B.2.1 to show that lI +H ′ > lQ. In particular,
we have:
lI +H ′ − lQ
=lI + lE − lI − 2(ME −MI)− lQ
=lE − lQ − 2(ME −MI)
>lE − lQ − 2(ME −MQ)
= uQ − uE > 0.
The first inequality used the fact that MI > MQ and the last inequality holds by the
assumption on the targetability ranking of the different bundles.
In the following, let us first consider the case lQ ≥ lI .
Step (a): Since lQ ∈ [lI , lI + H ′], the only thing that changes in the vote share
formulas from step (II), which proved the optimality of Fˆ ∗I , is that MI is replaced by
MQ. In can be verified that that all the substeps of step (II) showing that a best
response FˆI to the equilibrium strategy should only have offers on the equilibrium
support of I still apply for bundle Q. Therefore, any best response to the equilibrium
strategy played in case of bundle Q, FˆQ, should only have offers on equilibrium support
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of I. For instance, in the arguments of substep (A) to establish that a best response FˆI
to the equilibrium strategy cannot have offers on the support of Fˆ ∗E, the factMI < ME
was used. Since MQ < ME, we can make the same argument for bundle Q.
Step (b): Having established that a best response FˆQ would only play offers on the
support of Fˆ ∗I , we can apply the arguments from substep (A3) of the optimality of
Fˆ ∗T proof. This step showed that a distribution FˆT that offers only on the equilibrium
support of I will lose against the equilibrium strategy due to MT < MI . Since, we
haveMQ < MI , the same arguments go through for bundle Q. Hence any possible best
response FˆQ would lose for sure against the equilibrium strategy and hence should be
played with probability zero in equilibrium.
The same can be established for lQ < lI ,21 using additionally the corresponding
arguments from step (III) in the proof of Proposition B.2.1.
Step V: Optimality of βE = uI−lI−2H
′
uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT , βT =
2H′′
uT−lT , and βI = 1 − βT −
βE = 2H
′
uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT . Having established that only bundles E, T , and I will be
played with positive probability in equilibrium, we can now argue for the optimality
of the respective equilibrium probabilities βE = uI−lI−2H
′
uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT , βT =
2H′′
uT−lT , and
βI = 1−βT −βE = 2H′uI−lI
uT−lT−2H′′
uT−lT . When candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy,
candidate A is indifferent between playing bundles E, T , and I: In steps (I), (II), and
(III) above we have shown that for all distributions FˆE, FˆT , and FˆI played under these
three bundles that are potential best responses to the equilibrium strategy the total
expected vote share is 12 when playing against the equilibrium strategy. In particular,
for all equilibrium distributions Fˆ ∗E, Fˆ ∗T , and Fˆ ∗I , the total expected vote share is 1/2.
Therefore, given that candidate B plays the equilibrium strategy, candidate A is happy
to mix over playing these equilibrium distributions with the above probabilities.
21Note that we always have lQ > lT +H ′′.
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B.4 Comparative statics for probabilities of differ-
ent policies under alternative parameter values
The following two figures depict the probabilities of the different policy bundles against
a change in the debt limit ρ¯ for alternative values of reform benefits e given a fixed
level of reform costs c. The relative size of the distortion compared to the size of
the maximal value e−c1+e that it can take is kept constant at 0.6. However, the results
are virtually unaffected when we keep the absolute value of the distortion constant
across all figures. Note that due to ρ¯ ≤ e, the upper bound of the depicted range of
debt limits is different across the figures. Similarly, the lower bound of the debt limit,
−1 + 2c−e2(1−γ)−1 , also depends on the parameter value e. Therefore, the lower bound of
the depicted range of debt limits also changes across the figures.
Figure B.1: Equilibrium probabilities for e = 0.5, c = 0.3, γ = 0.6 e−c1+e
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Figure B.2: Equilibrium probabilities for e = 0.55, c = 0.3, γ = 0.6 e−c1+e
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Comparative Statics for Default Model
Corollary C.1.1 Suppose an economy in the model with sovereign default starts in
the first period with α1 = αL. Moreover, suppose that the constraint τ2 ≥ τ1 does not
bind.1Then:
1. In the social planner’s solution as well as in the political equilibrium, if αL ≥
2(1− θ)
I. No debt is raised. That is case a) holds.
II. No transfers are paid.
III. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
IV. Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
V. Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
VI. Neither γ nor θ have an influence on the investment decisions.
VII. Free future revenues are increasing in φ and ψ.
2. In the following, consider the political equilibrium for αL < 2(1− θ). That is, we
have λ1 = 2(1− θ) and E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)[(1− γ)2(1− θ) + γ2θ].
(a) If λ1 < E(λ2)
1It turns out that this is not a very restrictive assumption. It would only be violated if the high
income realization ω(·) lied unrealistically high above the low income realization ω(·). A sufficient
condition for this assumption is that ω(·) ≤ 2ω(·).
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I. No debt is raised (case a) holds).
II. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
III. Higher φ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
IV. Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
V. A lower value of γ unambiguously raises investments, whereas an in-
crease in θ raises investments if γ is above 1/2.
VI. Free future revenues are increasing in θ if γ > 1/2, and are increasing
in φ, ψ and γ.
(b) If λ1 = E(λ2)
I. The debt level is indeterminate in the range [0, b]. That is case b) holds.
(c) If E(λ2) < λ1 < E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
I. b1 = b is the optimal debt level. That is case c) holds.
II. Higher φ as well as lower γ lead to an increase of both b1 and free future
revenues.
III. Higher ψ leads to an increase of both b1 and free future revenues if
E(λ2) > 1.
IV. Residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
V. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
VI. Higher φ as well as lower γ increase investments in fiscal and legal
capacity.
VII. Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity if E(λ2) > 1.
(d) If λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b˜
, with b < b˜ < b
I. b1 = b˜ is the optimal debt level. That is case d) holds.
II. Higher ψ leads to an increase of b1 if E(λ2) > 1.
III. Higher φ as well as lower γ lead to an increase of free future revenues.
IV. Residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
V. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
VI. Higher φ as well as lower γ increase investments in fiscal and legal
capacity.
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VII. Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity if E(λ2) > 1.
(e) If λ1 > E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣
b=b
I. Debt is raised maximally, b1 = b (case e) holds).
II. Neither φ nor γ have an influence on the debt level, but it is increasing
in ψ.
III. Free future revenues are 0 and therefore they are constant with respect
to φ, γ, ψ and θ.
IV. Residual revenues are used to finance transfers.
V. There are positive investments in fiscal and legal capacity.
VI. Neither φ nor γ have an influence on the investment decision.
VII. Higher ψ increases investment in fiscal and legal capacity.
C.2 Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Proof of proposition 4.4.1:
Part 1: a) follows from (4.18) and part b) follows from (4.8). Part c) follows from the
FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21) and (4.22)).
Part d): We first want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone
nondecreasing in E(λ2). Since φ enters the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is
increasing in φ, this suffices. Let us rewrite equation (4.16):
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (C.1)
As stated in Part a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (C.1). Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡
f(0, τ2, pi2). Following Corollary 3 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), it remains to show
that g(τ2, pi2) is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2) and satisfies the single crossing property
in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2)). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (C.2)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (C.3)
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∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δω(pi2) > 0 (C.4)
By Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), g(τ2, pi2) has increasing differences in
(τ2, pi2, E(λ2)) and is supermodular in (τ2, pi2). It follows that g(τ2, pi2) satisfies the
single crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2)) and is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2). So,
fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in E(λ2).
It remains to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in
E(λ2). Since we have shown that both are monotone nondecreasing, there are three
other potential possibilities: fiscal capacity is strictly increasing while legal capacity
remains constant, legal capacity is strictly increasing while fiscal capacity remains
constant, both are constant. However, all of them lead to a contradiction regarding
the FOC (4.21) and (4.22), so they can be ruled out.
Part 2: a) follows from (4.18) and b) follows from (4.8). Part c): The positive
investments follow from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21) and (4.22)).
The comparison to the model without debt is due to the fact that when no debt can be
raised, max{λ1, E(λ2)} has to be replaced by E(λ2) which is smaller (the comparison
can be shown rigorously using monotone comparative statics similar to the proof of
part 1 d) of proposition 4.4.1).
Proof of proposition 4.4.2:
If the cohesiveness condition holds, λ1 = α1 and E(λ2) = φαH + (1− φ)αL. These are
the same terms as for a social planner. Therefore, the results of proposition 4.4.1 hold.
Proof of proposition 4.4.3:
Part 1: a) follows from (4.18) and part b) follows from (4.8). Part c) follows from the
FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21) and (4.22)).
For parts d) and e), we apply again monotone comparative statics as in part 1 d) of
proposition 4.4.1. As stated in part a), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (C.1).
Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function given
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in (C.1). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (C.5)
since the stability condition holds.
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (C.6)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δω(pi2) > 0 (C.7)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂θ
= δω′(pi2)τ2(1− φ)2(2γ − 1) + 2∂L(·)
∂pi2
> 0 for γ > 1/2 (C.8)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂θ
= δω(pi2)(1− φ)2(2γ − 1) + 2∂F (·)
∂τ2
> 0 for γ > 1/2 (C.9)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of part 1 d) of proposition 4.4.1, we are
done.
Part 2: a) follows from (4.18). Part b): The positive investments follow from the
FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21) and (4.22)). The comparison to the model
without debt is due to the fact that when no debt can be raised, max{λ1, E(λ2)} has
to be replaced by E(λ2) which is smaller (the comparison can be shown rigorously
using monotone comparative statics similar to the proof of part 1 d) of proposition
4.4.1). Parts c) and e) follow from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21)
and (4.22)) and the definitions of λ1 and E(λ2). Part d) follows from (4.8).
Proof of proposition 4.4.4:
Part 1: The positive investments follow from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity (i.e.
(4.21) and (4.22)). The comparison to the model without debt is due to the fact that
when no debt can be raised, max{λ1, E(λ2)} has to be replaced by E(λ2) which is
smaller (the comparison can be shown rigorously using monotone comparative statics
similar to the proof of part 1 d) of proposition 4.4.1). Part 2 follows from the FOC for
fiscal and legal capacity (i.e. (4.21) and (4.22)) and the definitions of λ1 and E(λ2).
Part 3 follows from (4.18) and part 4 follows from (4.8).
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Proof of Proposition 4.5.1 and Corollary C.1.1
The following proves Corollary C.1.1. This also proves Proposition 4.5.1, which presents
the results of Corollary C.1.1 in a more compact way, except for the results on default
and the comparison of investment incentives in a world with and without default. The
argument for these latter results can be found in the main text.
Part 1:
Part I) follows from λ1 < E(λ2) and part II) follows from αL ≥ 2(1 − θ). Part III)
follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity.
Parts IV) and V): We first want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both
monotone nondecreasing in ψ and E(λ2). Since φ enters the model only through E(λ2)
and E(λ2) is increasing in φ, this suffices.
Let us rewrite equation (4.30):
f(b1, τ2, pi2) = EV I1(τ2, pi2, b1)− λ1(F (τ2 − τ1) + L(pi2 − pi1)− b1) (C.10)
As stated in part I), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (C.10). Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡
f(0, τ2, pi2). Following Corollary 3 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), it remains to show
that g(τ2, pi2) is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2) and satisfies the single crossing property
in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ). We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (C.11)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= δω′(pi2)τ2 > 0 (C.12)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (C.13)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δ(ψω¯(pi2) + (1− ψ)ω(pi2)) > 0 (C.14)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2))(E(λ2)−1) > 0 since we have E(λ2) > λ1 > 1 (C.15)
By Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), g(τ2, pi2) has increasing differences in
(τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ) and is supermodular in (τ2, pi2). It follows that g(τ2, pi2) satisfies the
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single crossing property in (τ2, pi2, E(λ2), ψ) and is quasisupermodular in (τ2, pi2). So,
fiscal and legal capacity are both monotone nondecreasing in E(λ2) and ψ.
It remains to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in
E(λ2) and ψ. Since we have shown that both are monotone nondecreasing, there are
three other possibilities which we have to check: fiscal capacity is strictly increasing
while legal capacity remains constant, legal capacity is strictly increasing while fiscal
capacity remains constant, both are constant. All of these can be shown to lead to a
contradiction as demonstrated for the following case. Consider an increase in E(λ2).
Assume fiscal capacity is strictly increasing while legal capacity remains constant.
From (C.11) and (C.12) it follows that the LHS of the FOC for pi is increasing, so
the RHS has to increase as well. Since L(·) is convex, pi has to increase. This is a
contradiction. In an analogous way, all other cases can be handled. The same can be
done for an increase in ψ. In total, we conclude that fiscal and legal capacity must be
strictly increasing in E(λ2) as well as ψ.
Part VI) follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal capacity and the definitions of
λ1 and E(λ2). Part VII) follows from the definition of free future revenues and the
comparative statics for τ2 and pi2.
Part 2.(a):
Part I) follows from λ1 < E(λ2) and part II) follows from the FOC for fiscal and legal
capacity.
Parts III)-V): We want to show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly
increasing in ψ, θ (for γ > 1/2) and E(λ2). Since φ and γ enter the model only
through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in φ and decreasing in γ, this suffices. For ψ
and E(λ2), the proof is exactly as in Part 1. It remains to show that fiscal and legal
capacity are both increasing in θ (for γ > 1/2).
As stated in part I), b1 = 0 is the debt level that maximizes (C.10). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(0, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function in (C.10).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 (C.16)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂θ
= δω′(pi2)τ22(1− φ)(2γ − 1) + 2∂L(pi2 − pi1)
∂pi2
> 0 if γ > 12 (C.17)
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∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂θ
= δ(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))2(1−φ)(2γ−1)+2∂F (τ2 − τ1)
∂τ2
> 0 if γ > 12
(C.18)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of part 1, we are done.
Part VI) follows from the definition of free future revenues and the comparative
statics for τ2 and pi2.
Part 2.(b):
The result follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of Section 4.5.2
Part 2.(c):
Part I) follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of Section 4.5.2.
For parts II) and III), the comparative statics for b1 follow from the definition of
b1 = b and the comparative statics for τ2 and pi2 in the following parts VI) and VII).
As for the comparative statics for free future revenues, note that the formula for free
future revenues becomes δτ2ψ(v − v), since ω¯(·) and ω(·) can be written as ω¯(·) =
w(·) + v and ω(·) = w(·) + v as argued in Section 4.5. This term is increasing in
τ2. Therefore, the comparative statics for free future revenues w.r.t φ and γ follow
immediately from the comparative statics for τ2 stated in in the following parts VI) and
VII). The comparative statics for free future revenues w.r.t ψ follow from ∂δτ2ψ(v−v)
∂ψ
=
δτ2(v−v) + δψ(v−v) ∂τ∂ψ and the comparative statics for τ2 stated in the following part
VII).
Part IV) is due to αL < 2(1− θ). Part V) follows from the FOCs for τ2 and pi2.
For parts VI) and VII) we apply again monotone comparative statics. We want to
show that fiscal and legal capacity are both strictly increasing in ψ and E(λ2) (since φ
and γ enter the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing in φ and decreasing
in γ, this suffices).
As stated in part I), b1 = b is the debt level that maximizes (C.10). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function of (C.10).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δ(ω′(pi2)(λ1 − 1)) > 0 (C.19)
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∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂E(λ2)
= 0 (C.20)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂E(λ2)
= δψ(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2)) > 0 (C.21)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (C.22)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)− ω(pi2))(E(λ2)− 1) > 0 if E(λ2) > 1 (C.23)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of part 1, we are done.
Part 2.(d):
Part I) follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of Section 4.5.2.
Part II): If ψ increases, the FOC for debt says that ∆ has to increase. Since τ2 and pi2
increase as stated in 2.(d) VII), b1 has to increase.
Part III): Since φ and γ enter the model only through E(λ2) and E(λ2) is increasing
in φ and decreasing in γ, we have to show that free future revenues (FR) are increasing
in E(λ2).
We have ∂FR
∂E(λ2) =
∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) − ∂b1∂E(λ2) and
∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) = δ(ψω¯(pi2)+
(1 − ψ)ω(pi2)) ∂τ2∂E(λ2) + δτ2ω′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2) . We cannot solve for b1 explicitly, still we can
say something about ∂b1
∂E(λ2) . Taking the total differential w.r.t. E(λ2) of the FOC for
b1 we obtain 0 = 1 + (1−ψ)ψ
∂2P (∆)
∂∆2
∂∆
∂E(λ2) .
Since P (∆) is convex, ∂∆
∂E(λ2) < 0. Since we are in case d), ∆ = (1 + R(b))b −
(τ2ω(pi2)) = 1ψ ((1 + ρ)b1 − τ2ω(pi2)) so ∂∆∂E(λ2) = 1ψ ((1 + ρ) ∂b1∂E(λ2) − ω(pi2) ∂τ2∂E(λ2) −
τ2ω
′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2)). This leads to
∂b1
∂E(λ2) < δ(ω(pi2)
∂τ2
∂E(λ2) + τ2ω
′(pi2) ∂pi2∂E(λ2)).
Therefore, ∂δτ2(ψω¯(pi2)+(1−ψ)ω(pi2))
∂E(λ2) >
∂b1
∂E(λ2) . So, free future revenues are increasing in
E(λ2).
Parts IV) and V) follow analogously as parts IV) and V) in 2.(c)
Parts VI) and VII): In case d), the debt level b∗ ∈ (b, b) that maximizes (C.10)
is implicitly defined by the FOC of b1, λ1 = E(λ2) + (1−ψ)ψ
∂P (∆)
∂∆ . Define g(τ2, pi2) ≡
f(b∗, τ2, pi2). By the Envelope Theorem and plugging in the first order condition for
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debt, we obtain the same derivatives and cross-derivatives as in 2.(c). Following the
same reasoning as for parts VI) and VII) in 2.(c), we are done.
Part 2.(e):
Part I) follows from the FOC for debt, as argued at the beginning of Section 4.5.2.
Part II) follows from the definition of b and part III) from the definitions of b and free
future revenues. Part IV) is due to αL < 2(1 − θ). Part V) and VI) follow from the
FOC for τ2 and pi2 in case e). For VII) we apply again monotone comparative statics.
As stated in part I), b1 = b is the debt level that maximizes (C.10). Define
g(τ2, pi2) ≡ f(b, τ2, pi2), with f(b1, τ2, pi2) denoting the objective function in (C.10).
We have:
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂τ2
= δω′(pi2)(λ1 − 1) > 0 (C.24)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂pi2∂ψ
= 0 (C.25)
∂2g(τ2, pi2)
∂τ2∂ψ
= δ(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2))(λ1− 1) +ψ ∂P (∆)
∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
b=b
(ω¯(pi2)−ω(pi2)) > 0 (C.26)
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of part 1, we are done.
Q.E.D.
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C.3 Cross-country Correlations
C.3.1 Scatter plots including highly cohesive countries
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C.3.2 Variable descriptions
Share of taxes in GDP is the variable "taxrevenuegdp99" of Besley and Persson
(2011): "The ratio of total tax revenue to GDP in 1999. This is directly taken from
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005)."2
Shadow economy is the variabel "minform" of Besley and Persson (2011): "This
is the original variable (Informal Economy in % of GNP 1999/2000) from Schneider
(2002)."3
Property Rights Protection Index is the variable "mgadp97" of Besley and
Persson (2011): "This variable tries to measure the extent of government antidiver-
sion policies. It is calculated as an average of indexes of "law and order", "bureau-
cratic quality", "corruption", "risk of expropriation" and "government repudiation of
contracts" from ICRG dataset in 1997 (International Country Risk Guide, The PRS
Group, 1980-present) ."4
Cohesiveness is the variable "mxconst00" of Besley and Persson (2011): "Average
2Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
3Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
4Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
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executive constraints up to 2000. This measures the average value of the variable xconst
(from Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010)) from 1800 (or independence date
if later) up to 2000. The average is taken over non missing values of xconst (values
outside [1, 7] are treated as missing). This variable is normalized so that each country’s
scores lie between 0 and 1 (subtract 1 and divide by 6 as the possible range for the
average score is from 1 to 7). This variable captures the parameter θ in the model."5
Political Stability is the variable "mgamma00" of Besley and Persson (2011):
"Average non-open executive recruitment up to 2000. This measures average values of
the sum of xropen and xrcomp variables in Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers,
2010) from 1800 (or independence if later) to 2000. Note that the average is taken when
both xropen and xrcomp are not missing (we treat xropen and xrcomp as missing if
they are less than one). The sum of xropen and xrcomp takes values between 2 and 7
in any given year so in order to normalize the average we subtract 2 and divide by 5.
To get a measure of political stability this average is inverted (multiplied by minus one
and add with one). This variable corresponds to the parameter 1− γ in the model."6
Debt to GDP is the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2000, taken from Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009). It measures the central government debt-to-GDP ratio. For 8 countries, this
measure is not available and we use the general government debt-to-GDP ratio instead.7
5Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
6Variable description is taken from the codebook of Besley and Persson (2011). The codebook
and the data are available at http://www-2.iies.su.se/pop/Data_1.html.
7The data is available at http://www.reinhartandrogoff.com/data/browse-by-topic/
topics/9/.
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